The serial posts I wrote a few years ago about the time I spent in Moscow as a research student during the late 1960s and early 70s are still on the Blogger server. They can be accessed here and here. The last posts in each series come first - links to the earlier posts are listed at the bottom of the relevant pages. I think these accounts still give a fair reflection of what it was like living in the Soviet reality, even for a relatively short period of time.
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
Monday, September 29, 2008
Unchanged
Recent news from the Russian Federation suggests that in spite of evidence of superficial change, life in Russia remains at bottom much the same as ever - not only as it was in Soviet times, but even longer ago. For one thing, there are the same sudden anomalies of behaviour in a government which on the face of it seems mind-crushingly authoritarian, yet occasionally makes room for flamboyant, incongruous forays into the denunciation of past wrongs. Such, for example, is the recent visit of President Dmitry Medvedev to the remote Magadan region on Russia’s Pacific coast, where he laid flowers at a memorial built to commemorate the victims of the Soviet Gulag prison camps, and described the whole era of Stalin’s deportations and purges as “a tragic page in our country’s history”.
Only a couple of days later, the United Kingdom’s outgoing Moscow ambassador Tony Brenton was describing to a British newspaper how he was personally made the target of a nightmarish, Gogolian campaign of intimidation when his car was
tailgated at high speed through the streets of the Russian capital by militant members of Nashi, Vladimir Putin’s zealous youth movement, who went on to harass him in shops and restaurants and intimidate his family.
In the long interview, Ambassador Brenton says that during his period of tenure the British Embassy “has come under a greater barrage of bugging and espionage from the Russian secret service than at any time since the end of the Cold War.” Describing some of the bugging methods used, he alludes to some curious details:
Sir Tony – who will next week be replaced by Anne Pringle, Britain’s first female Ambassador to Russia – denied rumours in Moscow that his two cats were regularly checked for bugging devices. The suggestion may seem fanciful, but the Soviet KGB once successfully implanted a listening device into a US ambassador’s dog.
It’s the promotion - even in theory - of cats and dogs to the rank of intelligence officers that is so quintessentially Russian. I would submit that in no other country of the world could one expect to discover such things.
Sunday, September 28, 2008
Appeal for international military tribunal on Chechnya
On Chechnya-sl, Norbert Strade has translated the text of a recent appeal by Akhmed Zakayev, chairman of the ChRI Cabinet of Ministers:
Appeal by the Government of the ChRI
CHECHENPRESS. Publications and Media Department. 26.09.08CHECHENPRESS received by e-mail the following appeal by the Government of the ChRI to the EU Headquarters, the President of the General Assembly of the UN, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the International Criminal Court and leaders of democratic countries.
Ladies and gentlemen!The Government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, which is obliged to democratic values and considers human rights, the rights of nations and peoples to be fundamental achievements of civilization, addresses itself to you with the following:
- Taking into account the inhuman suffering of the Chechen people during the entire period of its history when it was under the control and influence of the Russian Empire in its different political manifestations (the USSR, the Russian Federation), such as the repeated deportations and the incessant military actions during the last 14 years, which demanded more than 200,000 lives, including 40,000 children, according to authoritative international non-governmental organizations;
- taking into account the zeal and the readiness for self-sacrifice of the Chechen people in the name of achieving freedom and independence, a convincing proof of which is the substantial support by the citizens of the ChRI for the Resistance forces, despite the fact that they thus subject themselves to terror from the side of the Russian military formations and special services;
- taking into account the numerous and unpunished war crimes committed by the occupation forces on the territory of the ChRI;
- taking into account the unquestionable right of the Chechen people to national sovereignty and independence, not only within the framework of the declarations of the United Nations "About the Rights of Nations and Peoples", but also according to the decision of April 18-20, 1990, by the supreme body of power in the USSR, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (whose legal successor is the RF), which defines an unequivocal treatment of the rights of the Autonomous Republics: "In the case of a union state leaving the USSR, an Autonomous Republic which is part of this union state has the right to determine its future independently", a statement which precisely was the justification for the Russian authorities in their decision to recognize the independent statehood of Abkhazia and South Ossetia;
- taking into account the unquestionable fact that Russia acknowledged its military aggression against the ChRI in 1994, Russia's defeat in this war and the signing on May 12, 1997 of the "Peace Agreement" between the RF and the ChRI, in which the sides determined that the peoples of the RF and the ChRI are ending their century-old conflict and that the relations between the subjects of this agreement from now on and forever will be based on international law and that the application of the armed forces will be categorically excluded from the solution of disputes;
- and finally, taking into account the existence of attempts by the RF side to take revenge for the lost war of 1994-1996, the incessant military operations and punitive actions, as a result of which thecitizens are suffering, as well as in view of the irreconcilability of the Chechen people with the conditions of the occupation, which are aggravated even more by a feeling of desperation over the absence of truth and justice with regard to the war criminals who committed war crimes in the Chechen Republic during the last 14 years, and furthermore in view of the alienation between the sides in the military conflict and the impossibility for the Chechen population to live in freedom and without fear in its historical native land, we request the creation of an international military tribunal for the Chechen Republic.
The Government of the ChRI believes that the absence of juridical and political consequences of Russia's terrorist policy in the North Caucasus only discredits the entire world system of democracy and provides totalitarian regimes with a feeling of impunity and omnipotence, visible evidence of which are Russia's latest actions against sovereign Georgia.
Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the ChRI Ahmed Zakayev
PACE session to focus on Georgia-Russia war [civil.ge]
PACE Session to Focus on Georgia-Russia War
Civil Georgia, Tbilisi / 28 Sep.'08 / 18:17
http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19617
The August war in Georgia will be the main focus of the autumn session of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE), which opens in Strasbourg on September 29.
The debates will be held in two parts: on September 30 and on October 2.
A group of 24 members of PACE submitted a request for the reconsideration of the credentials of the Russian delegation to PACE “on the grounds of serious violations of the basic principles” of the Council of Europe.
Vice-Speaker of the Georgian Parliament, Mikheil Machavariani, who is a member of the Georgian delegation to PACE, told journalists before departure to Strasburg that it was not yet possible to predict the outcome of the request and whether the credentials of the Russian delegations would be suspended or not.
As part of the run-up to the debates, an ad hoc committee will paid a fact-finding visit to Georgia and Russia. The group called for an international probe into the events that led to the war.
Meanwhile, on September 24, Foreign Ministers of Council of Europe member states met in New York on the sideline of the UN General Assembly to discuss Georgia-Russia war and its consequences.
This informal meeting was initiated by Carl Bildt, the Swedish Foreign Minister, who is now a chairman of the CoE’s ministerial committee.
The Swedish Foreign Minister said in the report submitted to the ministerial committee that as far as South Ossetia and Abkhazia are “integral parts” of Georgia “the military actions undertaken by Georgian forces during the conflict thus concerned Georgian territory” and should no way be seen “as an aggression towards the Russian Federation.”
“It is furthermore clear, that since it contravenes International law when a state uses military force to protect its citizens in another state, the Russian large-scale military actions in Georgia can not be justified as self-defense,” Carl Bildt said.
Russia acted like a colonial power
In his address to the United Nations General Assembly, Czech foreign minister Karel Schwarzenberg said that when Russia invaded Georgia last month it acted like a colonial power, Reuters reports.
Schwarzenberg also suggested that Moscow had violated a fundamental principle of the U.N. charter and international law -- that disputes should be resolved peacefully and without resorting to military force, except in self-defence.We have recently witnessed systematic provocations and finally military aggression of a powerful country, a permanent member of the Security Council, against its small neighbor with the aim to carve it up," Karel Schwarzenberg told the U.N. General Assembly.
"This action was designed to create two tiny entities totally dependent (on) its administrative, economic and military structures. Colonial powers used to act this way."
Saturday, September 27, 2008
Domain name change
On September 25 the Ingushetian authorities closed down the Ingushetiya.ru web site, which was owned by Magomed Yevloyev,the Ingush journalist, lawyer and businessman who on August 31 this year was murdered, it is believed, on the orders of President Murat Zyazikov. However, the site immediately changed its domain name and switched to a server the United States. It can now be accessed at the new URL Ingushetia.org.
At Window on Eurasia, with particular reference to a recent interview with Russian security and intelligence expert Anatoly Soldatov, Paul Goble demonstrates how Moscow is currently struggling in its attempts to control the Internet,
... senior Russian intelligence officials have repeatedly called on Western governments to reach an agreement with Moscow to close sites that the Russian government has identified as connected with extremism or terrorism. But to date, no Western country has agreed to do that.
Great Britain had been edging toward an accord, the Agentura.ru editor says, but backed away after the Litvinenko murder. And as a result, “it is possible to register in England, to put out a Russian Internet publication and no requests from the Russian side will be considered. Simply because there is no legal basis for this.”
As a result, Soldatov concludes, Moscow will not be able to continue its struggle with independent-minded Internet sites without the use of hackers, a conclusion that the experience of other Russian sites tends to confirm (www.forum.msk.ru/material/news/533859.html and www.compromat.ru/main/internet/filter.htm).
Friday, September 26, 2008
58th Army being transferred to Ingushetia
FinRosForum, citing a report in Nasha Abkhazia, writes that Russia's 58th Army, which played a major part in the recent invasion of Georgia, is being transferred from North Ossetia to Ingushetia, noting that the situation in Ingushetia is becoming more complicated and that there is a fear that after the end of Ramadan the Ingush will start an uprising.
SCB discussions
A couple of recent discussions on soc.culture.baltics connected with the recent controversies surrounding Estonian-Finnish relations can be found here and here. Although I don't post much to the newsgroup these days, I've contributed a few items during the past few weeks. A leading voice in several of the debates is that of Eugene Holman,a lecturer at the University of Helsinki, but there are many other posters with equally interesting points of view.
Thursday, September 25, 2008
Time to Extend a Hand to Ukraine
Writing in the New Atlanticist policy and analysis blog, Alexander Motyl argues that it's in Europe's interests for Ukraine to join the European Union "both if and when it meets all the membership criteria". Excerpt:
If Brussels really believed in European values, soft power, and the like, it should be able to state, unflinchingly and immediately, that “Ukraine is European and, once rich and fully democratic, deserves to be within the EU.”
Of course, if Brussels—or, more specifically, such states as Italy, Germany, and France—don’t really believe in democracy, then indifference to Ukraine’s European aspirations makes more sense. But just a tad. After all, if old Europe’s ruling elites are primarily interested in hard power and geopolitics, then they should be even more interested in getting Ukraine on their side. As Zbigniew Brzezinski has often pointed out, an independent Ukraine is the best guarantee of Russia’s non-emergence as an
empire and, I might add, of the Cold War’s non-revival. That admonition may have seemed like a bit of hypothetical reasoning in the past, but the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 has surely demonstrated that Putin’s Russia is ready to reassert itself in the former Soviet imperial space and, thus, to threaten Europe’s geopolitical interests.The good news is that the global economic crisis and the fall-out from the Georgian invasion have refocused Moscow’s attention on Russia’s domestic problems. That gives Ukraine time to get its house in order and accelerate its efforts to join Euroatlantic structures. That also gives Europe time to come to its senses and extend a hand to Ukraine. The bad news is that Ukraine’s squabbling political elites—and Yushchenko, alas, belongs to them—seem ill-equipped to do anything but squabble. And old Europe seems ill-prepared to do anything but kowtow to an authoritarian Russia. Not coincidentally, perhaps, the Munich Agreement that made appeasement so
notorious a concept took place exactly 70 years ago, in September 1938.
The Russian Gas Deficit - is it Real?
The Russian Gas Deficit - is it Real?
Tunne Kelam’s speaking notes in the EP Baltic-Europe Intergroup on 23rd September 2008 in Brussels
Analysis by Boris Nemtsov (former Russian deputy Prime Minister) and Vladimir Milov (former Russian deputy energy minister). Moscow, 2008-09-22
· The position of Gazprom in Russia is unique. In 2007 Gazprom earned 93 billion USD which is 7% of the Russian GDP (2, 5 times more than the Russian defence budget).
· Gazprom provides more than 12% of the volume of Russian industrial output and 16% of the value of Russian exports.
· Gazprom supplies provide for 40% of the Russian electricity production. In other words, Gazprom is the energy heart of Russian industry.
Gazprom has become the most important personal project of Vladimir Putin. The Russian president has renovated the management of the company, not on the basis of professional abilities but on the basis of their membership of his Petersburg clan. Prime Minister Kasyanov's attempts to reform the gas industry in 2002-2003 and to open it to competition were blocked by the Kremlin.
Putin also approved the decision to raise the price of gas for Russian customers. Gazprom had lobbied for this move during the past 15 years, but unsuccessfully. The Fradkov Government, however, decided in May 2007 to double the domestic price of gas by 2011 (from 64 USD for 1000 cubic meters to 125 USD).
Management which is loyal to Putin has operated Gazprom for 7 years. Its main "achievement" has been not to allow the company to fulfil its key job - to provide for a reliable supply of gas for Russian customers. Gas production has, in fact, stagnated during all these years. In 1999 it was 546 bcm, in 2007 - 548 bcm (in 2006 a record 556 bcm).
Gazprom supplies for domestic customers have increased by 2% (from 2001 till 2007), while internal demand has increased by 18%. In 2007, Gazprom supplied 307 bcm to domestic markets, while the unsatisfied demand is 132 bcm (increase of 72 bcm a year since 2001). One third of Russian internal gas consumption has to be supplied through "non-Gazprom” sources.
As for the domestic markets, Gazprom supplied 301 bcm (in 2001) and 307 bcm (in 2007). At the same time, domestic demand was 373 bcm (in 2001) and has increased to 439 bcm (in 2007). The gap between demand and supplies increased from 72 bcm (2001) to 138 bcm (2007). This gap has been traditionally covered by supplies from Russian independent producers and by gas imports from Central Asia. Now the Government has strictly curbed the potential of independent companies while the prices of Central Asian gas have skyrocketed. As a result of this new situation, during the winter of 2007/2008, Gazprom almost totally exhausted its underground gas reservoirs.
The stagnation of gas supplies for the domestic market can be explained only by the systematic lack of investments into the production of gas. The new super-giant gas field lies in Yamal peninsula - 600 km to the north of functioning fields. Gazprom obtained licences to exploit the Yamal fields, committing itself to start production of gas there by the end of 1990s. Nothing really has happened. Under the Gazprom chief Aleksey Miller, licences were extended by 8-12 years. However, even the new terms are not being met.
Nowadays, the costs of the whole project of starting production and transportation of gas from Yamal peninsula are estimated to be ca 200 billion USD - a sum which exceeds the Russian Stability Fund.
On the background of general economic growth (GDP increase of 70% in 2000 - 2008), Gazprom production has not increased. This leads Russia to the deficit of gas.
Gazprom’s burden of debt has grown from 13, 5 billion USD (2000) to 61,6 billion USD (2007). This amounts to two thirds of the company's earnings. The increasing debt burden does not allow Gazprom to make sufficient investments into gas production. Default in the foreseeable future is not excluded.
For the biggest state owned company, Gazprom's contribution to the Russian state budget is surprisingly modest. Gazprom paid 7 USD taxes for every barrel of produced oil and gas while oil companies pay 40 USD per barrel.
As a result of the policies of economic-political expansion, Gazprom lost control of 60 billion USD of its assets.
Gazprom spent 14 billion USD to buy the oil company Sibneft (this sum equals 3 year investments to the production of gas). The economic result of this deal has turned out to be catastrophic - in 3 years Rosneft production fell by 11, 5%. ???
Lack of efficiency in running the company has exceeded the worst expectations. Since 2003, the operational costs of the company tripled - from 4, 9 USD a barrel to 14, 8 USD.
Alan Riley's analysis from October 2006.
/Riley is Research fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels/
· The core issue - for the EU - is not the threat of a politically motivated gas cut off (as happened in January 2006) but that Russia, as a result of lack of investments, will not be in a position to produce enough gas to cover both Russia's domestic needs and the EU demand.
· Riley ( 2 years ago) - if no action is taken by 2010 the EU may be facing a deficit close to or even beyond its current Russian gas import level. The decline of supply from the Russian gas fields is likely to make it increasingly difficult for Gazprom to meet its supply contracts ... which will lead to a significant supply crisis across Russia, the CIS and the EU.
· True, since 1968, when gas first flowed to Western Europe, Russia has been a reliable supplier to Western Europe. However, the same cannot be said of supplies to Eastern Europe - at least 40 cuts offs have been identified since 1991.
· The gas deficit was identified by the IEA /International Energy Agency/ and Vladimir Milov /former deputy energy minister and president of the Moscow-based institute of energy policy/. This deficit was already identified 2 years ago and is likely to grow above 126 billion cubic meters (bcm) by 2010. Current Russian exports to non-FSU Europe /non-former Soviet Union/ are ca 150 bcm.
· It seems unbelievable that the country with the world's largest proven reserves /47 trillion cubic meters - 26% of the global proven reserves/ can be running short of gas.
· During the first decade of the 21st century the supply deficit has become increasingly acute. It arises from two interlocking problems.
1. The run off from the existing super-giant fields in Nadym Pur Taz (NPT) region
2. The lack of domestic investments in new fields. /Gazprom has not opened up any new giant fields apart from Zapolyarnoye, which is a Soviet legacy project and has temporarily reduced the impact of the decline of the NPT fields/.
There has been no necessary investment to develop new super-giant fields. Why?
Gazprom itself is heavily in debt - just the purchase of Sibneft added 38 billion USD to its existing debt. Also, whenever Gazprom does have extra revenue, it fritters it away in higher operating costs.
The Russian financial system is weak and cannot provide financing on the scale necessary to develop super-giant gas fields. / The costs of developing the next super-giant filed in Yamal area are estimated to be 70 billion USD/ Gazprom's decision to develop the Shtokman field without a foreign partner will add significantly to these heavy capital demands.
Even where Gazprom invests, those investments are directed at foreign acquisitions and building export infrastructures, NOT on building and refurbishing domestic pipelines and opening up new fields.
While huge foreign investments will be needed to develop new gas fields, Russia is handicapped by its own policies which view foreign investors as a threat and do not provide room for open competition or for safeguarding investors' rights. Russia's unwillingness to comply with contractual agreements is likely to act as a powerful deterrent to potential future investors. The huge costs / 70 billion USD / of developing the Yamal super-giant fields are not likely to be covered even partially by foreign companies.
Another problem that has made foreign investors uncertain and hesitant is limiting their rights to 49% of shareholding. /Cases of Shell and BP in Sakhalin in 2006/. But the general hostility towards foreign investments forces Western shareholders in energy firms to accept much smaller percentages than the theoretical 49%.
The deficit was widened by the Gazprom decision to press on with domestic gasification, aiming at 60% regional gasification by 2008 and at building 12.000 km of new domestic pipe-lines.
The aging of much of the Soviet legacy infrastructures. Inefficient Russian compressors used to pump gas along the pipes cause an estimated loss of 42 bcm a year. (IEA estimates). 58% of the pipes are more than 20 years old. In harsh environments there is real concern of gas leakages from the aging infrastructures.
Lack of alternative supplies has forced Gazprom to engage in a desperate rescue strategy - to purchase gas from Central Asia. It must really be a desperate situation when the world's largest holder of gas reserves has to buy gas from abroad. In 2006 Russia planned to increase its gas imports from Central Asia from 6 bcm (in 2004) to at least 60 bcm in 2009 that is at least tenfold. To have such volumes really delivered seemed unrealistic two years ago.
Potential consequences of the possible gas deficit.
Russia itself will be most vulnerable to serious gas shortages. If Russia will cut foreign exports to protect domestic consumption Moscow will have to face dramatic cuts in foreign incomes (Gazprom provides 20% of federal tax revenues). For example, increasing pensions will become highly problematic. If the gas deficit will become even more significant, then cuts will strike at Russian industry which is (together with that of Ukraine and central Asia) the most energy-Inefficient in the world. This could also influence negatively earnings from oil, minerals and metals and start a vicious downward spiral which would undermine the economic gains achieved since 1999.
A longer shortage of Russian gas could throw several Central- and Eastern European countries into considerable difficulties both in respect of industrial production and in terms of the safety and comfort of their peoples.
The most dangerous consequence of significant gas shortages would be the effect on Germany. In the EU’s largest economy, such shortages could cause widespread economic disruption which would have repercussions across the EU. The sharp edge of this forecast is that the gas deficit will hit well before the NEP comes into operation and Shtokman gas comes on stream. As a result any gas shortage /whatever the formal contractual position/ will hit the most westerly EU states receiving Russian gas, first and hardest, and Germany as the biggest recipient hardest of all. For Germany there is an additional risk in the possible fall in value of German investments in Russia as the Russian economy will contract as a result of such gas shortages. This underscores the risk of individual member states seeking bilateral agreements with Russia. In fact, Germany has made a major strategic error. It has made itself heavily dependent on Russian gas without having the corresponding power to force its Russian partner to liberalize its own markets, to permit free flow of foreign capital and to ensure the protection of the rights of investors that would ensure that gas will be available and will be delivered.
End of TK speaking notes.
Wednesday, September 24, 2008
Europeans see Russia as security threat
Writing in the Financial Times, James Blitz notes that
The Russian military’s recent incursion into Georgia means that many more west Europeans now regard Russia as a greater threat to global stability than states such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea, according to a survey for the Financial Times.
Bäckman protest
A group of Finnish and Estonian writers, cultural figures, scientists, journalists and politicians has sent the directors of Helsinki University a letter condemning Johan Bäckman, the author of a recently-published book which vilifies the state of Estonia. Via BNS:
See also in this blog: Finnish Islamists back RussiaThe authors of the letter addressed to the rector, chancellor and dean of the law faculty recall that Backman on Monday presented in Tallinn his book "The Bronze Soldier: The Backdrop and Content of the Estonian Monument Debates," which among other things denies the Soviet occupation of Estonia and calls the corresponding viewpoint a Nazi myth.
They added that Backman predicts a speedy end to Estonian independence, speaks in favor of Estonia's unification with Russia and calls Estonia an apartheid state in both his book and his blog as well as in public appearances. He contrasts different ethnic groups such as Estonians, Russians, Jews and Russian Estonians, and distorts the Estonian history.
The authors note that at the presentation of the book Backman, diminishing the historical experience of Estonians, said it is time for Estonians to understand that there was no Soviet occupation. He supports his claim among other things by the Nazis' anti-Jewish propaganda spread by Nazi Germany in occupied countries during World War II, which he represents as the ideology of Estonians and the Estonian state, thereby labeling people who speak about the Estonian history and experience as disseminators of Nazi propaganda.
The letter notes that Backman lectures on sociology of law and the specific features of the Russian and Estonian legal policies at the University of Helsinki this academic year.
The signatories add that Backman's public statements are not a mere expression of opinion. In their words, questioning the existence of the Estonian state and declaring Estonia to be a part of Russia can be considered hostile propaganda against the state and the nation.
Backman as a lecturer on Estonian and Russian legal policies can be compared to a denier of the Holocaust teaching Jewish history at a university, they added.
"Would that, too, be possible at the University of Helsinki?" they asked.The authors of the letter asked the leaders of the university how is it possible that the University of Helsinki considers it acceptable for subjects linked with Estonian and Russian law and policies to be taught by a person who disseminates hostile propaganda about Estonian history and present-day reality.
They also asked whether the university expects its teachers to be familiar with facts and whether it intends to take a position on the lecturer's statements.
Among the signatories were University of Helsinki researcher and noted columnist Iivi Anna Masso, journalist, writer and film director Imbi Paju, Finnish author Sofi Oksanen, journalist Stefan Brunow, Jewish Estonian historian and writer Elhonen Saks, and Jevgeni Krishtafovitsh, leader of Estonia's Russian-speaking youth association Avatud Vabariik (Open Republic).
Suvi Salmenniemi from the University of Helsinki, researcher Anna Rotkirch, leader of the free-thinkers' association Jussi K. Niemela, members of the European Parliament Lasse Lehtinen and Henrik Lax, writer Mikael Enckell, and Katri Vallaste from the Alexander Institute also signed the letter.
Barbarism
In an article which examines the available evidence of widespread damage and destruction left behind in Georgia by the Russian military, the Wall Street Journal's Melik Kaylan looks at the cultural vandalism which characterized the behaviour of the invasion force:
The full barbarism of Russian actions in Georgia may not emerge for years; much of the evidence lies behind the lines in terrain newly annexed by Russia. But some details are now beyond dispute. Alongside the various human atrocities, such as the bombing and purging of civilian areas, the invaders looted and destroyed numerous historical sites, some of which were profoundly revered by the Georgians as sacred building blocks in their national identity. This is especially true of the region around South Ossetia that served as a kind of cradle of early Georgian culture. The Georgian Ministry of Culture lists some 500 monuments and archaeological sites now mostly under Russian occupation and out of sight.
Ruslan Yamadayev killed
The Second Rose Revolution
PRESIDENT SAAKASHVILI'S SPEECH AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7930&Itemid=65
September 23, 2008
REMARKS
H.E. MR. MIKHEIL SAAKASHVILI, PRESIDENT OF GEORGIA
63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly
New York, 23 September 2008
Mr. President,
Mr. Secretary-General,
Excellencies,
Distinguished delegates,
I thank you for the opportunity today to address this, the 63rd annual gathering of the General Assembly, at such a critical moment in the history of my own country and of the United Nations.
Sometimes, the most extreme tests of this institution’s towering ideals arise in small, even obscure places.
I come to you as the representative of one of those places, the country of Georgia, a land of fewer than 5 million, that last month was invaded by our neighbor.
Despite our small size, the legal, moral, political, and security implications raised by that invasion could not be larger in consequence.
Indeed, those issues cut through to the heart of the UN’s founding charter.
The principles enshrined in that charter included the inviolability of sovereign borders; the sanctity of human rights; the supremacy of international law; and the global rejection of armed aggression.
All of these principles were put to the test by the invasion, and now hang in the balance.
The invasion violated Georgia’s internationally recognized borders.
The subsequent recognition of the so-called “independence” of our two regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia challenged our territorial integrity.
The ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of our people did violence to the very idea of human rights.
This General Assembly, therefore, faces a General Challenge.
We are called upon not just to respond to the particular question of one instance of armed aggression in a single place—but to define our attitude toward armed aggression in all places.
We are called upon to answer this momentous question:
Will this body stand up for its founding principles, or will it allow them to be crushed under the treads of invading tanks, under the boots of ethnic cleansers, under the immobilizing impact of cyber attacks, and under the pernicious tactics of violent separatism?
What would it mean for every member of this Assembly to defend the underlying principles of the United Nations?
First, we must each refuse to stand silent in the face of this armed aggression and assault on human rights.
Second, we must stand united and immediately adopt a non-recognition policy towards Georgia’s two breakaway provinces.
Together, we have both a moral and a legal obligation to protect international law and world order.
Third, we must ensure that all parties comply with the full terms of the existing ceasefire agreement.
And fourth, we must resolve to create a meaningful UN conflict resolution process that will peacefully reunify Georgia.
The bottom line is this: We must be ready to use the full power of international law and of our collective international institutions to uphold the historic balance of justice…
…And thus set in motion a series of actions to right these historic wrongs.
While this crisis poses grave challenges for the entire international community, it creates specific obligations on my own country.
I want to argue that the answer to this new assault on our shared values is not a closing-up—not a circling of the wagons—but rather a greater openness on many fronts.
As a democracy, we have nothing to fear.
As a democracy, we have an obligation to our own people and to the international community to be even more open and transparent.
For me and my government, this commitment translates into a series of specific actions on both the international and domestic levels. Allow me to explain.
First, I know that there are many people in the world who seek a clearer understanding of how this war started and who started it.
Rather than recite our case, let me repeat a simple invitation that I first made on August 17, standing next to German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
There should be an exhaustive, independent investigation of the origins and causes of this war.
Investigators must have unimpeded access to all officials, documents, and intelligence.
Georgia welcomes such an investigation. My government is ready to share every piece of evidence and provide access to every witness sought by investigators.
We call on the other party to this conflict to fully cooperate and not obstruct this investigation.
This is how democracies behave.
The truth must come out not only to clarify how events unfolded last month, but to help us answer the fundamental questions that this invasion has raised.
My government’s second initiative of openness involves developments within our own borders.
Whereas others waged this war with arms, we will wage it with values.
Georgia was attacked because it is a successful democracy in our part of the world.
Our response today is to make our democracy an even more robust.
That is why I am announcing to you four categories of expanded democratic initiatives:
First, we will strengthen the checks and balances of our democratic institutions, including granting greater independence to Parliament and to the judiciary.
Second, we will provide additional resources and protections to foster greater political pluralism, including by increasing funding for opposition parties and ensuring they have greater access to the airwaves.
Third, we will strengthen the rule of law by introducing enhanced due process, trials by jury, and lifetime judicial appointments.
Fourth, we will expand and deepen protections of private property.
And in everything we do, we will be transparent.
This morning, I was honored to learn that in Transparency International’s latest index, Georgia was one of a few countries that have risen significantly in the rankings over the past year.
Despite all the turmoil my country has endured, this proves the resiliency and irreversibility of our democratic commitment.
We will, in short, fight the specter of aggression and authoritarianism with the most potent weapons in our arsenal…
…Namely our commitment to ever-expanding freedoms within our own borders..
This amounts to nothing less than a “Second Rose Revolution.”
If our first revolution was about meeting a threat from within by reinventing a failed state riddled by corruption…
…Our second revolution must be even more focused, as now we face an even greater challenge, one that comes from the outside.
The success of the first Rose Revolution helped save my country.
The health of the international order could well depend on the outcome of the second Rose Revolution.
Countless people throughout the world were deeply moved and profoundly troubled by the invasion of Georgia—which began, with tragic irony, on the eve of that great celebration of peace, the Olympic Games.
On the most basic level, you responded with passionate humanity to the plight of ordinary Georgians under siege—
…To the sight of 80-year-old men and women driven from their village homes…
…To hundreds of thousands of innocent souls taking shelter from bombings…
…To a small country of less than five million being trampled by a neighbor 300 times its size.
You responded immediately by sending generous aid, by coming to Georgia, and by showing your solidarity.
Leaders from around the world, meanwhile, have been working tirelessly to negotiate and enforce a ceasefire.
I am especially grateful to President Sarkozy of France for his dedication to ensuring that the ceasefire is fully implemented, in letter and in spirit.
This means, as all parties have agreed, a full withdrawal of all military forces from my country, to the pre-conflict positions.
Your actions proved that the most potent response to this brutal invasion is to rebuild Georgia’s democracy and economy, making them even stronger than before.
And I want to make a special commitment to all of you who—during these especially difficult economic times—are helping fund Georgia’s reconstruction.
We will spend your resources wisely, well, and with full transparency.
The Georgia we rebuild will contribute to the prosperity and security of all our citizens, and to the entire international community…
…By providing stability in this part of the world, and serving as a model for democratic development.
Reconstruction will also ensure that Europe continues to benefit from true energy security that comes from diversification.
And everything that we do, will be done peacefully.
But today, we must ask a series of questions, the answers to which have grave consequences.
We have all wondered in recent weeks: Was this invasion an aberration—a misguided attempt to resort to the 19th century logic of brute force?
Or is it a sign of an ominous new trend, one that could upend the international order, eroding state sovereignty and the power of our common and hard-fought principles?
I believe that this question and others have not yet been answered.
Other still need to be asked.
Will we encourage violent and hateful separatism around the world, standing aside when state sovereignty is subverted?
Or will we draw a clear line, and defend the principles that uphold the international order, and declare—enough!
In the 21st century, we have better ways to protect the rights of ethnic minorities than with T-72 tanks and Su fighter jets.
We have developed a body of legal and political examples to accommodate minority demands within the context of national sovereignty.
After all, this is one of the great achievements of the United Nations and of the European Union.
Its foundation is the belief that democracy and prosperity provide room for all.
Are we ready to throw this all away?
And what of the use of brute force? Will we look the other way or reward the dispatch of tens of thousands of troops across the internationally recognized borders of another country?
Will we cover our eyes when ethnic cleansing occurs, as it has—over and over again for 16 years—in Abkhazia and South Ossetia?
In a world that struggles to reign in traditional forms of state violence, will we sanction new ones?
During the invasion of Georgia, we were witness to several terrifying new twists in waging war.
We saw proxy forces and militias cynically unleashed to ethnically cleanse the population of my country, operating without any restraint and outside any order.
We experienced the first, full-scale campaign of cyber-warfare—a campaign that aimed to cripple my country’s economy and our ability to communicate with the outside world.
It is profoundly distressing to see the technology that has woven our world together and helped bridge cultures being used to divide ethnic groups and to tear our world apart.
And today, when most of the world understands the existential threat posed by climate change and ecological destruction, we witnessed in Georgia a sickening campaign of “ecocide” as part of the invasion…
…When combat helicopters dropped fire bombs on old-growth forests in Borjomi—forests that formed our national center of tourism, recreation, culture, and water resources.
I believe that together, it is our solemn responsibility to deliver answers to these questions.
Let us resolve that we will carry to the world the right conclusions…
The invasion of our country provided an impressive demonstration of the power of global public opinion that can only arise when societies are open and free.
Ultimately, what stopped the tanks and troops from taking our capital was the international disapproval voiced by so many of you…
…By the free media, by courageous human rights groups, and by leading voices of the world’s conscience, from Natan Sharansky to Vaclav Havel.
Rhetoric, however, is no longer enough. Today we must act.
If words were sufficient, then something might have come from the many calls to peace—and the countless warnings—I myself have issued from this podium over the years.
No one has fought harder than my country and me to heal the ethnic rifts in Georgia and to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflicts.
No one has fought harder.
And we will continue this fight—to peacefully reunify my country, to stitch back together its beautiful, multi-ethnic tapestry.
Four years ago, I stood before you and implored the international community to help stop the mass and forced distribution of illegal foreign passports in the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
We knew then that this subversive tactic—combined with the ethnic cleansing that had driven most Georgians from these territories—would one day be used as a pretext for invasion.
And this is precisely what happened last month. It is also happening in other countries in our neighborhood.
In 2006, I brought to your urgent attention the attempts being made to annex Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and I asked you then: “Would any members in this great hall tolerate such interference by another power on their own soil?”
I warned of the risk that—and I quote—“The Pandora's box of violent separatism and conflict will be unleashed not only in the Caucasus, but across many parts of our globe.”
Today, unfortunately, we stand at this very precipice—where the peace could yield to a pernicious new world order.
One year ago, I came to this hall with even more distressing news, of an illegal new military base being built in South Ossetia by those who hoped that arms and violence could triumph over the will of the people.
I noted that this dangerous escalation was taking place under the very noses of international monitors whose job it was to demilitarize the territory.
And I asked that these reckless acts be countered.
Our warnings continued in the months and weeks before the invasion.
We told anyone who would listen of the campaign that had been unleashed to slander Georgia and my government while blocking any meaningful negotiations with the separatists.
This was part of a calculated effort to weaken international support for Georgia and lay the groundwork for invasion.
We gave the international community details of a sharp military buildup by the purported peacekeepers that began this spring in both conflict zones, leading to armed attacks this summer by separatist militias.
Just before the land invasion began in the early hours of Aug. 7—after days of heavy shelling that killed civilians and Georgian peacekeepers—we urgently sought to refute claims that 2,100 South Ossetian civilians had been killed by Georgians.
This was the excuse used by the invader for what it called a “humanitarian intervention”—a profound perversion of the responsibility to protect.
This lie, subsequently debunked by Human Rights Watch (which estimates 44 dead) and others, was an attempt to conceal the true motives for the invasion.
Over the years, I also have spoken many times to you of the plans Georgia has developed, together with the international community, to peacefully reunify my country.
I talked of the urgent need to replace and transform the failed frameworks of negotiation and peacekeeping in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
I have held out—repeatedly and with genuine intent—my hand to our neighbor.
And just a few days before the invasion of Georgia, we continued to work furiously for peace.
The United Nations Secretary General had sent his special representative to Georgia to determine how to fix the broken process of conflict resolution, and we cooperated closely with him.
The German government had proposed peace talks for mid-August—talks my Government eagerly supported.
The Finnish chair of the OSCE proposed talks in Helsinki as well, in late July, to which we subscribed.
Unfortunately, the counterparties to the conflict turned their backs, repeatedly. They had other plans in mind.
Finally, on the eve of the invasion, my special envoy traveled in desperation, twice, to South Ossetia to plead for peace. His counterpart failed to come to the meetings. He cited a flat tire as the reason.
Within 24 hours, thousands of very full tires were rolling over the border of my country.
So words alone are not nearly enough.
Nor can words accurately convey the horrors of war.
It is difficult, if not impossible, ever to say that anything good could come of war.
The value of human life is incalculable, and we in Georgia grieve not only for our own lost sons and daughters, but also for our fallen neighbors.
Yet, the international community has emerged from the invasion of my country with something truly valuable—clarity.
We understand what has happened. We no longer can deny the motivations and intentions of those actors who instigated this war.
With clarity comes responsibility.
We no longer have reason for inaction.
So now each of us has a responsibility to act.
Despite the destruction created by the invasion - hundreds dead; nearly 200,000 displaced, according to the United Nations; our economy disabled - my government is putting our convictions into practice.
I promise to you that my government will implement, with all due speed, the new democratic initiatives that constitute the second Rose Revolution.
I promise to you that Georgia will soon be stronger and more democratic than ever before, and thus be in a better position to contribute to our collective security and prosperity.
But, for this to have any meaning, we must together defend the principles on which this institution is built.
We need actions, not words. Allow me to once again repeat the four commitments that I believe we must make.
First, we must each refuse to stand silent in the face of this armed aggression, occupation, ethnic cleansing and assault on a UN member state.
Second, we must stand united in rejecting the forced and illegal recognition of Georgia’s two separatist provinces.
Third, we must ensure that all parties comply fully with the existing ceasefire agreement.
And fourth, we must resolve to create a meaningful conflict resolution process that will peacefully reunify Georgia.
If we can accomplish these goals, then this institution will emerge from this crisis stronger than it was before.
If however, we fail to rise to the challenge, I fear that the violence and tactics that subverted state sovereignty in Georgia will spread to other parts of the world.
It is our collective responsibility to respond with conviction and resolve.
Georgia has made its choice and our democracy will emerge stronger as a result.
Together, we will find ways, as we have through the millennia, to ensure peaceful coexistence between all members of our multi-ethnic society, be they Georgians, Abkhaz, Ossetians or any other citizens of my ancient country.
THANK YOU
Ingushetia "close to civil war"
According to Valery Borshchev, a representative of the Moscow Helsinki Group, the republic of Ingushetia is close to a state of civil war.
"One part of the population is keeping quiet, but another part is taking up the fight. Fear creates rebellion, the federal government takes responsibility for that," the BBC quotes him as saying.
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
Marching in step
Window on Eurasia notes that
Sixty-nine years ago today, Soviet and Nazi German soldiers marched together in a military parade in Brest, just one month after Hitler and Stalin had concluded the non-aggression pact that made their countries allies, opened the way for World War II in Europe, and led to Moscow’s occupation of half the continent for 50 years.
That event and even more that alliance – which ended when Hitler invaded the USSR almost two years later -- are not things that most Russians are inclined to recall, especially because of the parallels such recollections invite between the policies of the Soviet government and those of the Nazi one.
Deadly parallels
In Helsingin Sanomat, Merituuli Ahola considers the marked similarity between 22-year old Matti Juhani Saari, the gunman who killed ten people at the Kauhajoki vocational college in western Finland today, and the 18-year old gunman Pekka-Eric Auvinen, who in November last year killed six students at his school in Jokela, 50 km. north of the Finnish capital Helsinki. The points of similarity extend to details like the calibre of the automatic pistols used and the physical appearance of the two, including clothing and hairstyle.
Update (September 24): Finnish news reports say that Saari and Auvinen may have known each other.
From the past to the future
Writing in the Washington Post, Georgia's President Mikheil Saakashvili stresses that the West "cannot allow Russia's annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to stand. Nor can Moscow be permitted to continuously flout the cease-fire to which it has repeatedly agreed." He also underlines the importance of understanding how the recent conflict began:
For years, Russia sought to slander Georgia and my government while also blocking any meaningful negotiations with the separatists. This was part of a campaign to weaken international support for Georgia and lay the groundwork for invasion. As has been reported, Russia began a sharp military buildup this spring in both conflict zones, leading to armed attacks this summer by its proxy militias. Russia then started its land invasion in the early hours of Aug. 7, after days of heavy shelling that killed civilians and Georgian peacekeepers. At the time, Russia announced that 2,100 South Ossetian civilians had been killed by Georgians, thus forcing Moscow's "humanitarian intervention." This lie, subsequently debunked by Human Rights Watch (which estimated 44 dead) and others, was an attempt to conceal Moscow's true motives.
Marking the territory
In his weekly review of events in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, Prague Watchdog's Dzhambulat Are discusses how Chechnya, now forcibly identified with the personality of its ruler, Ramzan Kadyrov, has recently "become a part of Russia" - not only politically, but also culturally.
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