Lavrov Statement at 69th Session of UNGA

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STATEMENT
by H.E. Mr. Sergey V. LAVROV,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
at the 69th session of the UN General Assembly

September 27, 2014

Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

There is a growing evidence of a contradiction between the need for collective
and partner efforts in the interest of elaborating adequate responses to challenges
common to all and the aspiration of a number of states for domination and revival of
archaic bloc thinking based on military drill discipline and erroneous logic of "friend
or foe".

The U.S.-led Western alliance that portrays itself as a champion of democracy,
rule of law and human rights within individual countries, acts from directly opposite
positions in the international arena, rejecting the democratic principle of sovereign
equality of states enshrined the UN Charter and trying to decide for everyone what is
good or evil.

Washington has openly declared its right to unilateral use of force anywhere to
uphold its own interests. Military interference has become a norm - even despite the
dismal outcome of all power operations that the U.S. has carried out over the recent
years.

The sustainability of the international system has been severely shaken by
NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia, intervention in Iraq, attack against Libya and the
failure of operation in Afghanistan. Only due to intensive diplomatic efforts the
aggression against Syria was prevented in 2013. There is an involuntary impression
that the goal of various "color revolutions" and other projects to change unsuitable
regimes is to provoke chaos and instability.

Today Ukraine has fallen victim to such an arrogant policy. The situation there
has revealed the remaining deep-rooted systemic flaws of the existing architecture in
the Euro-Atlantic area. The West has embarked upon the course towards "vertical
structuring of humanity" tailored to its own hardly inoffensive standards. After they
declared victory in the Cold War and the "end of history", the U.S. and EU have opted
for expanding the geopolitical area under their control without taking into account the
balance of legitimate interests of all peoples of Europe. The Western partners did not
heed to our numerous alerts on inadmissibility of violation of the principles of the UN
Charter and Helsinki Final Act, and time and again avoided serious joint work for the
establishment of the common space of equal and indivisible security and cooperation
from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The Russian proposal to draft the European security
treaty was rejected. We were told directly that only the members of the North Atlantic
Alliance can have the legally binding guarantees of security, and the NATO
enlargement to the East continued in spite of the promises to the contrary given
earlier. The instant switch of NATO to hostile rhetoric and to the drawdown of its
cooperation with Russia even to the detriment of the West's own interests, and
additional build up of military infrastructure at the Russian borders - made obvious
the inability of the alliance to change the genetic code it embedded during the Cold
War era.

The U.S. and EU supported the coup d’état in Ukraine and reverted to outright
justification of any acts by the self-proclaimed Kiev authorities that opted for
suppression by force of the part of the Ukrainian people that had rejected the attempts
to impose the anti-constitutional way of life to the entire country and wanted to
defend its rights to the native language, culture and history. It is precisely the
aggressive assault on these rights that compelled the population of Crimea to take the
destiny in its own hands and make a choice in favor of self-determination. This was
an absolutely free choice no matter what was invented by those who are responsible in
the first place for the internal conflict in Ukraine.

The attempts to distort the truth and to hide the facts behind blanket accusations
have been undertaken at all stages of the Ukrainian crisis. Nothing has been done to
track down and prosecute those responsible for February bloody events at Maidan and
massive loss of human lives in Odessa, Mariupol and other regions of Ukraine. The
scale of appalling humanitarian disaster provoked by the acts of the Ukrainian army in
the South-Eastem Ukraine has been deliberately underscored. Recently, new horrible
facts have been brought to light when mass graves were discovered in the suburbs of
Donetsk. Despite UNSC Resolution 2166 a thorough and independent investigation of
the circumstances of the loss of Malaysian airliner over the territory of Ukraine has
been protracted. The culprits of all these crimes must be identified and brought to
justice. Otherwise the national reconciliation in Ukraine can hardly be expected.

Russia is sincerely interested in the restoration of peace in the neighboring
country and this should be well understood by all who are even slightly acquainted
with the history of the deep-rooted and fraternal ties between the two peoples. The
way towards political settlement is well known: last April Kiev has already taken
upon itself an obligation in the Geneva Declaration of Russia, Ukraine, U.S. and EU
to immediately start a wide all-national dialogue with the participation of all regions
and political forces of Ukraine with a view to carrying out a constitutional reform.
The implementation of this obligation would allow all Ukrainians to agree on how to
live in accordance with their traditions and culture and restore the Ukraine's organic
role as a binding link between the various parts of the European space which naturally
implies the preservation and respect by all of its neutral and non-bloc status. We are
convinced that in the presence of good will and denial of support to the "party of war"
in Kiev which is trying to push the Ukrainian people into the abyss of national
catastrophe the way out of crisis is within our reach.

The way to overcoming the crisis has been opened with the achievement of the
cease-fire agreement in the South-Eastem Ukraine on. the basis of initiatives by
Presidents P.A.Poroshenko and V.V.Putin. With the participation of the
representatives of Kiev, Donetsk, Lugansk, OSCE and Russia, practical measures are
being agreed upon successive implementation of this understanding, including the
separation of the parties to the conflict, pull back of heavy weapons of the Ukrainian
army and militia forces, setting up monitoring trough the OSCE and preparation for
elections in the South-East. Russia is ready to continue to actively promote the
political settlement. However, it should be crystal clear that we are doing this for the
sake of peace, tranquility and wellbeing of the Ukrainian people rather than for
catering to someone's ambitions. The attempts to put on pressure on Russia and to
compel it to abandon its values, truth and justice have no prospects whatsoever.

Let me recall a history of not so far ago. As a condition for establishing
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933 the U.S. government demanded of
Moscow the guarantees of non-interference into domestic affairs of the U.S. and
obligations not to take any actions with a view to changing political or social order in
America. At that . time Washington feared a revolutionary virus and the above
guarantees were put on record on the basis of reciprocity. Perhaps, it makes sense to
return to this topic and reproduce that demand of the U.S. government on a universal
scale. Shouldn't the General Assembly adopt a declaration on the inadmissibility of
interference into domestic affairs of sovereign states and non-recognition of coup
d'état as a method of the change of power? The time has come to totally exclude from
the international interaction the attempts of illegitimate pressure of some states on
others. The meaningless and counterproductive nature of unilateral sanctions is
obvious if we took an example of the U.S. blockade of Cuba.

The policy of ultimatums and philosophy of supremacy and domination do not
meet the requirements of the 21“ century and run counter the objective process of
development of a polycentric and democratic world order. Russia is promoting a
positive and unifying agenda. We always were and will be open to discussion of the
most complex issues no matter how unsolvable they would seem in the beginning. We
will be prepared to search for compromises and the balance of interests and go as far
as exchange concessions provided only that the discussion is respectful and equal.

The Minsk understandings of 5 and 19 September on the ways out of the
Ukrainian crisis and the compromise on the timeline of the entry into force of the
Association Agreement between Kiev and EU are good examples to follow, the same
as the finally declared readiness of Brussels to begin negotiations on establishing the
FTA between the European Union and the Customs Union of Russia, Belorussia and
Kazakhstan as it had been proposed by V.V.Putin back in January this year.

Russia has been consistently calling for harmonization of integration projects in
Europe and Eurasia. The agreement on political benchmarks and timelines of such a
convergence of integrations" would become a real contribution to the work of the
OSCE on the topic of "He1sinki+40". Another crucial area of this work would be to
launch pragmatic discussion free of ideology on politico-military architecture in the
Euro-Atlantic, so that not only NATO and CSTO members but all the countries of the
region including Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia enjoy equal and indivisible security
and not have to make a false choice of: "either with us or against us".

The new dividing lines in Europe should not be allowed, even more so that
under globalization these lines can turn into a watershed between the West and the rest
of the world. It should be stated honestly that no one has the monopoly on truth
and no one can anymore tailor the global and regional processes to one's own needs.
There is no alternative today to the development of consensus regarding the rules of
sustainable global governance in the new historical circumstances - with full respect
to cultural and civilizational diversity of the world and the multiplicity of the models
of development. It will be a difficult and perhaps tiresome task to achieve such a
consensus on every issue. Nevertheless the recognition of the fact that democracy in
every state is the "worst form of government, except for all the others" also took time
to break a way through, until W.Churchill passed his verdict. The time has come to
realize the inevitability of this axiom also in the international affairs where today
there is a huge deficit of democracy. Of course someone will have to break up the
centuries-old stereotypes and to abandon the claims to eternal uniqueness. But there is
no other way to follow. The consolidated efforts can be built only on the principles of
mutual respect and taking into account of the interests of each other as is the case for
example in the framework of BRICS and SCO, G20 and the UN Security Council.
The theory of the advantages of collective work has been supported by practice: this
includes the progress in the settlement of situation around Iranian nuclear program
and successful conclusion of chemical demilitarization of Syria. Besides, on the issue
of chemical weapons we would like to obtain authentic information on the condition
of chemical arsenals in Libya. We understand that our NATO colleagues after they
bombed out this country in violation of a UNSG Resolution would not like to "stir up"
the mayhem they created. However, the problem of uncontrolled Libyan chemical
arsenals is too serious to turn a blind eye on it. The UN Secretary General has an
obligation to show his responsibility on this issue as well. I

What is important today is to see the global priorities and avoid making them
hostages of a unilateral agenda. There is an urgent need to refrain from double
standards in the approaches to conflict settlement. Everybody largely agrees that it is a
key issue to resolutely counter the terrorists who attempt to put under their control
ncreasingly larger territories in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Sahara-Sahel area. If
this is the case then this task should not be sacrificed to ideological schemes or the
desire to get square with someone. Terrorists no matter what their slogans are should
remain outside the law.

Moreover, it goes without saying that the fight against terrorism should rely on
a solid basis of international law. The unanimous adoption of a number of UNSG
Resolutions including those on the issue of foreign terrorist operatives became an
important stage in this fight. And vice versa the attempts to act against the Charter of
our Organization do not contribute to the success of joint efforts. The struggle against
terrorists in the territory of Syria should be structured in cooperation with the Syrian
government, which clearly stated its readiness to join it.

From the very beginning of the "Arab spring" Russia urged not to leave it to
extremists and to establish a united front to counter the growing terrorist threat. We
warned against a temptation to make allies with almost anybody who proclaimed
himself an enemy of B.Assad: be it Al Qaeda, Jabhat an Nusra and other "fellow
travelers" seeking the change of regime, including ISIL, which today is in the focus of
our attention. As the saying goes, it is better late than never. It is not for the first time
that Russia makes a real contribution to the fight against both ISIL and other terrorist
factions in the region. We have sent large supplies of weapons and military equipment
to the governments of Iraq, Syria and other MENA countries and will continue to
support their efforts to suppress terrorists.

The terrorist threat requires a comprehensive approach if we want to eradicate
its root causes rather than be condemned to react to the symptoms. ISIL is just a part
of the problem. We propose to launch under the auspices of the UN Security Council
an in-depth study on the extremist and terrorist threats in all their aspects across the
MENA area. The integrated approach implies also that the long standing conflicts
should be examined, primarily between Arabs and Israel. The absence of settlement of
the Palestinian issue over several decades remains as it is widely recognized one of
the main factors of instability in the region that helps the extremists to recruit more
and more new Jihadists.

Another literally pressing area of our common work is the joining of our efforts
to implement the decisions of UNGA and UNSC on the fight against Ebola virus. Our
doctors are already working in Africa. There are plans to send additional humanitarian
assistance, equipment, medical instruments, medicines and teams of experts to assist
the UN programs in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

The United Nations established on the ruins of World War II enters the year of
its seventieth anniversary. It is an obligation for all of us to celebrate in appropriate
manner the jubilee of the Great Victory and pay tribute to the memory of all who died
for freedom and the right of each people to determine its own destiny.

The lessons of that terrible war and all the course of events in_ today's world
demand of us to join our efforts and forget about unilateral interests and national
electoral cycles when it comes to countering the global threats to all humanity. It
should not be allowed that the national egotism prevail over collective responsibility.

http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/gadebate/pdf/RU_en.pdf

Ann Clwyd on Iraq

Almost ignored by the mainstream UK press and TV, which had earlier devoted much air time and column space to Clare Short, the testimony of UK human rights envoy Ann Clwyd to the Chiilcot Inquiry gives a picture of the genesis of contemporary Iraq that is rather different from the one propounded by the critics of Tony Blair's policy who are currently so vociferous in the British media. For one thing, unlike many of the media "opinion-formers", Clwyd obviously knows Iraq and cares about its civilian population, especially the Kurds among whom she has lived and worked at intervals for many years. Instead of focusing on issues from the past, she is concerned for the present and the future of the fledgling democracy that has emerged from years of brutal dictatorship - and like Iraqis themselves she sees an improvement. On police training, for example, she has this to say:

Obviously we have been helping through our police training, through our training of judges --

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: When you say "our police training" -- I was going to come to that -- what sort of support have you been giving to them on police training? Because the evidence we have had shows that our kind of model is not necessarily relevant.

RT HON ANN CLWYD MP: They have never actually said that in my hearing. I haven't heard that from the Iraqis. In fact, they want more of the British. They have always said, I have to say, right from the beginning, you know, "The British understand us. We would like more of the British to come here, and, you know, we don't want you  to go away. We would like more help from you".  That's why they can't understand Inquiries like this. The Iraqis always say to me, you know -- because weapons of mass destruction was Saddam -- "Why are you still operating in this area? What we need is your help and your attention", and obviously the Iraqis can pay for a lot of things  themselves now, but nevertheless they appreciate the guidance that we can give them and we have had police trainers there. We have also had them in round tables. 

Ann Clwyd's testimony can be viewed here (scroll down to Video 2), and the transcript is here (pdf). Via Harry's Place

Playing God

In their eagerness to assume that their excoriation of Tony Blair over the issue of the Iraq war is universally shared, sections of the British left are trying to cast the ex-prime minister as an international  "pariah", who will have to spend the rest of his days in ignominy. In protest, Normblog writes:  

So dogmatically certain are some of the denizens of those 'quarters' of there having been only one truth about the Iraq war, that they blithely assume that everyone must feel the same about Blair as they do. But worst of all is what is least likely to be noticed. I know nothing about his metaphysical outlook, but Norman here offers a secular version of the belief that there is divine justice: Blair may not get what's coming to him, but don't worry, all those of you who also loathe him; I, Matthew Norman, am in a position to assure you that Blair is suffering all the torments.

Gaza and Basra

In the Spectator, a British soldier who served with the army's Intelligence Corps in Iraq and Afghanistan gives his perspective on Israel's Gaza operation. In the problems faced by the IDF during Operation Cast Lead he sees direct parallels with the difficulties that were encountered by British forces in Iraq, including the public relations dimension opened up urban warfare and the methods needed to combat an enemy such as Hamas, which "is willing to dress in civilian clothing, attack from legally protected sites and use civilians as human shields". He also addresses the issue of so-called "disproportionate" firepower:

A fact often unappreciated by those with no military experience is that the selective use of overwhelming force, aimed at key targets, actually shortens conflict and saves lives. In Basra in 2003 the USA and the UK chose to use extreme force against locations that had been fortified by the Ba’ath Party, in order to spare our troops and the people of Basra the horror of a drawn-out street battle. It appears that the IDF made the same choice in Gaza.

Via Z-Word Blog

The throwing of the shoe

The Austin Powers precedent.

Maritime Concerns

Via Stratfor:

The Limitations and Necessity of Naval Power

By George Friedman

It has now been four years since the fall of Baghdad concluded the U.S. invasion of Iraq. We have said much about the Iraq war, and for the moment there is little left to say. The question is whether the United States will withdraw forces from Iraq or whether it will be able to craft some sort of political resolution to the war, both within Iraq and in the region. Military victory, in the sense of the unfettered imposition of U.S. will in Iraq, does not appear to us a possibility. Therefore, over the next few months, against the background of the U.S. offensive in Baghdad, the political equation will play out. The action continues. The analysis must pause and await results.

During this pause, we have been thinking about some of the broader questions involved in Iraq — and about the nature and limits of American military power in particular. We recently considered the purpose of U.S. wars since World War II in our discussion of U.S. warfare as strategic spoiling attack. Now we turn to another dimension of U.S. military power — the U.S. Navy — and consider what role, if any, it plays in national security at this point.

Recent events have directed our attention to the role and limits of naval power. During the detention of the 15 British sailors and marines, an idea floated by many people was that the United States should impose a blockade against Iran. The argument was driven partly by a lack of other options: Neither an invasion nor an extended air campaign seemed a viable alternative. Moreover, the United States’ experience in erecting blockades is rich with decisive examples: the Cuban missile crisis, barring Germany’s ability to trade during World War II or that of the American South during the Civil War. The one unquestionable military asset the United States has is its Navy, which can impose sea-lane control anywhere in the world. Finally, Iran — which is rich in oil (all of which is exported by sea) but lacks sufficient refinery capacity of its own — relies on imported gasoline. Therefore, the argument went, imposing a naval blockade would cripple Iran’s economy and bring the leadership to the negotiating table.

Washington never seriously considered the option. This was partly because of diplomatic discussions that indicated that the British detainees would be released under any circumstances. And it was partly because of the difficulties involved in blockading Iran at this time:

1. Iran could mount strategic counters to a blockade, either by increasing anti-U.S. operations by its Shiite allies in Iraq or by inciting Shiite communities in the Arabian Peninsula to unrest. The United States didn’t have appetite for the risk.

2. Blockades always involve the interdiction of vessels operated by third countries — countries that might not appreciate being interdicted. The potential repercussions of interdicting merchant vessels belonging to powers that did not accept the blockade was a price the United States would not pay at this time.

A blockade was not selected because it was not needed, because Iran could retaliate in other ways and because a blockade might damage countries other than Iran that the United States didn’t want to damage. It was, therefore, not in the cards. Not imposing a blockade made sense.

The Value of Naval Power

This raises a more fundamental question: What is the value of naval power in a world in which naval battles are not fought? To frame the question more clearly, let us begin by noting that the United States has maintained global maritime hegemony since the end of World War II. Except for the failed Soviet attempt to partially challenge the United States, the most important geopolitical fact since World War II was that the world’s oceans were effectively under the control of the U.S. Navy. Prior to World War II, there were multiple contenders for maritime power, such as Britain, Japan and most major powers. No one power, not even Britain, had global maritime hegemony. The United States now does. The question is whether this hegemony has any real value at this time — a question made relevant by the issue of whether to blockade Iran.

The United States controls the blue water. To be a little more precise, the U.S. Navy can assert direct and overwhelming control over any portion of the blue water it wishes, and it can do so in multiple places. It cannot directly control all of the oceans at the same time. However, the total available naval force that can be deployed by non-U.S. powers (friendly and other) is so limited that they lack the ability, even taken together, to assert control anywhere should the United States challenge their presence. This is an unprecedented situation historically.

The current situation is, of course, invaluable to the United States. It means that a seaborne invasion of the United States by any power is completely impractical. Given the geopolitical condition of the United States, the homeland is secure from conventional military attack but vulnerable to terrorist strikes and nuclear attacks. At the same time, the United States is in a position to project forces at will to any part of the globe. Such power projection might not be wise at times, but even failure does not lead to reciprocation. For instance, no matter how badly U.S. forces fare in Iraq, the Iraqis will not invade the United States if the Americans are defeated there.

This is not a trivial fact. Control of the seas means that military or political failure in Eurasia will not result in a direct conventional threat to the United States. Nor does such failure necessarily preclude future U.S. intervention in that region. It also means that no other state can choose to invade the United States. Control of the seas allows the United States to intervene where it wants, survive the consequences of failure and be immune to occupation itself. It was the most important geopolitical consequence of World War II, and one that still defines the world.

The issue for the United States is not whether it should abandon control of the seas — that would be irrational in the extreme. Rather, the question is whether it has to exert itself at all in order to retain that control. Other powers either have abandoned attempts to challenge the United States, have fallen short of challenging the United States or have confined their efforts to building navies for extremely limited uses, or for uses aligned with the United States. No one has a shipbuilding program under way that could challenge the United States for several generations.

One argument, then, is that the United States should cut its naval forces radically — since they have, in effect, done their job. Mothballing a good portion of the fleet would free up resources for other military requirements without threatening U.S. ability to control the sea-lanes. Should other powers attempt to build fleets to challenge the United States, the lead time involved in naval construction is such that the United States would have plenty of opportunities for re-commissioning ships or building new generations of vessels to thwart the potential challenge.

The counterargument normally given is that the U.S. Navy provides a critical service in what is called littoral warfare. In other words, while the Navy might not be needed immediately to control sea-lanes, it carries out critical functions in securing access to those lanes and projecting rapid power into countries where the United States might want to intervene. Thus, U.S. aircraft carriers can bring tactical airpower to bear relatively quickly in any intervention. Moreover, the Navy’s amphibious capabilities — particularly those of deploying and supplying the U.S. Marines — make for a rapid deployment force that, when coupled with Naval airpower, can secure hostile areas of interest for the United States.

That argument is persuasive, but it poses this problem: The Navy provides a powerful option for war initiation by the United States, but it cannot by itself sustain the war. In any sustained conflict, the Army must be brought in to occupy territory — or, as in Iraq, the Marines must be diverted from the amphibious specialty to serve essentially as Army units. Naval air by itself is a powerful opening move, but greater infusions of airpower are needed for a longer conflict. Naval transport might well be critically important in the opening stages, but commercial transport sustains the operation.

If one accepts this argument, the case for a Navy of the current size and shape is not proven. How many carrier battle groups are needed and, given the threat to the carriers, is an entire battle group needed to protect them?

If we consider the Iraq war in isolation, for example, it is apparent that the Navy served a function in the defeat of Iraq’s conventional forces. It is not clear, however, that the Navy has served an important role in the attempt to occupy and pacify Iraq. And, as we have seen in the case of Iran, a blockade is such a complex politico-military matter that the option not to blockade tends to emerge as the obvious choice.

The Risk Not Taken

The argument for slashing the Navy can be tempting. But consider the counterargument. First, and most important, we must consider the crises the United States has not experienced. The presence of the U.S. Navy has shaped the ambitions of primary and secondary powers. The threshold for challenging the Navy has been so high that few have even initiated serious challenges. Those that might be trying to do so, like the Chinese, understand that it requires a substantial diversion of resources. Therefore, the mere existence of U.S. naval power has been effective in averting crises that likely would have occurred otherwise. Reducing the power of the U.S. Navy, or fine-tuning it, would not only open the door to challenges but also eliminate a useful, if not essential, element in U.S. strategy — the ability to bring relatively rapid force to bear.

There are times when the Navy’s use is tactical, and times when it is strategic. At this moment in U.S. history, the role of naval power is highly strategic. The domination of the world’s oceans represents the foundation stone of U.S. grand strategy. It allows the United States to take risks while minimizing consequences. It facilitates risk-taking. Above all, it eliminates the threat of sustained conventional attack against the homeland. U.S. grand strategy has worked so well that this risk appears to be a phantom. The dispersal of U.S. forces around the world attests to what naval power can achieve. It is illusory to believe that this situation cannot be reversed, but it is ultimately a generational threat. Just as U.S. maritime hegemony is measured in generations, the threat to that hegemony will emerge over generations. The apparent lack of utility of naval forces in secondary campaigns, like Iraq, masks the fundamentally indispensable role the Navy plays in U.S. national security.

That does not mean that the Navy as currently structured is sacrosanct — far from it. Peer powers will be able to challenge the U.S. fleet, but not by building their own fleets. Rather, the construction of effective anti-ship missile systems — which can destroy merchant ships as well as overwhelm U.S. naval anti-missile systems — represents a low-cost challenge to U.S. naval power. This is particularly true when these anti-ship missiles are tied to space-based, real-time reconnaissance systems. A major power such as China need not be able to mirror the U.S. Navy in order to challenge it.

Whatever happens in Iraq — or Iran — the centrality of naval power is unchanging. But the threat to naval power evolves. The fact that there is no threat to U.S. control of the sea-lanes at this moment does not mean one will not emerge. Whether with simple threats like mines or the most sophisticated anti-ship system, the ability to keep the U.S. Navy from an area or to close off strategic chokepoints for shipping remains the major threat to the United States — which is, first and foremost, a maritime power.

One of the dangers of wars like those in Iraq and Afghanistan is that they soak up resources and intellectual bandwidth. It is said that generals always fight the last war. Another way of stating that is to say they believe the war they are fighting now will go on forever in some form. That belief leads to neglect of capabilities that appear superfluous for the current conflict. That is the true hollowing-out that extended warfare creates. It is an intellectual hollowing-out.

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