A Step At A Time

With Ukraine's Supreme Court having rejected all of Yanukovych's complaints about the run-off election, it seems that the Russian government will now be prepared to accept Yushchenko's presidency. Yet there are still some major hurdles to be overcome in the field of Ukrainian-Russian relations. There is, for example, the problem of the comments of the Deputy Speaker of the Russian State Duma, Vladimir Zhirinovsky,who at a rally in front of the Ukrainian Embassy in Moscow on December 29, said:

"The campaign in Ukraine has dragged on for six months. Everything is decorated with orange - even the trees beside the polling stations have been coloured orange. Some kind of tablecloths. Fashionable ones. We also had a fashion a certain number of years ago... for jeans. People were willing to pay anything in order to buy them. They stupefied the minds of the people. And all for what? So that political scum could come to power."

Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has lodged a strong protest with Moscow about these remarks. Reflecting on them, I found myself thinking that it's all very well for some - not many, but some - Western commentators to say that there was really very little to choose between the two candidates, as they both represented the Ukrainian political establishment. In the Russian Deputy Speaker's comments, it's possible to see why there was in fact a great deal to choose between the two men, who represent the old, Soviet past (Yanukovych) and a new direction that began with Ukraine's 1991 independence,and is still evolving (Yushchenko). It's incumbent on us in the West to lend our support to that new direction - and to be aware of what the alternative derives from, represents, and aims for.

Two years ago Estonia introduced an optional smart ID card that is making documents and money obsolete in a growing range of public and private transactions. An Estonian can use it instead of a passport to travel within the EU, to get on the bus and subway and to file taxes with a card reader attached to his computer (refunds in five days for the electronic filers, several months for the paper filers).

"I rarely sign pieces of paper anymore," says Sten Hansson, the information adviser to the Estonian state chancellery. Hansson is 31 now and has already served in government for ten years. Siim Raie, the 27-year-old director of Estonia's chamber of commerce, just took out a personal home loan without picking up a pen. But this is not just a demographic revolution. Hansson's 84-year-old grandfather just got his smart card.

An interesting article about wired democracy in Estonia, from Forbes Magazine. Read the whole thing.

Hat tip: Leopoldo

The author and essayist Susan Sontag has died, aged 71. Steve Wasserman has written a sensitive, vigorous and decent obituary in the Los Angeles Times.

Marc Cooper also has some worthwhile commentary.

While re-reading Manya Harari's translation of An Essay In Autobiography, I noticed that she - or her publisher - had left out the text of the Rilke poems from Das Buch der Bilder (1902) which Pasternak quotes in his own 1957 translations (in Harari's book they are merely alluded to in a footnote to Chapter Three). This is a pity, as it might have been interesting for the reader to at least see the original German. Pasternak's translations are in some sense "free" - though they rhyme and have a Russian metre of their own which reproduces the feminine endings of Rilke's lines. But the thing that marks these versions above all is that they somehow follow the metaphysical syntax of the original poems with uncanny accuracy:


Der Lesende

Ich las schon lang. Seit dieser Nachmittag,
mit Regen rauschend, an den Fenstern lag.
Vom Winde draußen hörte ich nichts mehr:
mein Buch war schwer.
Ich sah ihm in die Blätter wie in Mienen,
die dunkel werden von Nachdenklichkeit,
und um mein Lesen staute sich die Zeit. -
Auf einmal sind die Seiten überschienen,
und statt der bangen Wortverworrenheit
steht: Abend, Abend... überall auf ihnen.
Ich schau noch nicht hinaus, und doch zerreißen
die langen Zeilen, und die Worte rollen
von ihren Fäden fort, wohin sie wollen...
Da weiß ich es: über den übervollen
glänzenden Gärten sind die Himmel weit;
die Sonne hat noch einmal kommen sollen. -
Und jetzt wird Sommernacht, soweit man sieht:
zu wenig Gruppen stellt sich das Verstreute,
dunkel, auf langen Wegen, gehn die Leute,
und seltsam weit, als ob es mehr bedeute,
hört man das Wenige, das noch geschieht.

Und wenn ich jetzt vom Buch die Augen hebe,
wird nichts befremdlich sein und alles groß.
Dort draußen ist, was ich hier drinnen lebe,
und hier und dort ist alles grenzenlos;
nur dass ich mich noch mehr damit verwebe,
wenn meine Blicke an die Dinge passen
und an die ernste Einfachheit der Massen, -
da wächst die Erde über sich hinaus.
Den ganzen Himmel scheint sie zu umfassen:
der erste Stern ist wie das letzte Haus.


За книгой

Я зачитался. Я читал давно.
С тех пор, как дождь пошел хлестать в окно.
Весь с головою в чтение уйдя,
Не слышал я дождя.

Я вглядывался в строки, как в морщины
Задумчивости, и часы подряд
Стояло время или шло назад.
Как вдруг я вижу, краскою карминной
В них набрано: закат, закат, закат.

Как нитки ожерелья, строки рвутся
И буквы катятся куда хотят.
Я знаю, солнце, покидая сад,
Должно еще раз было оглянуться
Из-за охваченных зарей оград.

А вот как будто ночь по всем приметам.
Деревья жмутся по краям дорог,
И люди собираются в кружок
И тихо рассуждают, каждый слог
Дороже золота ценя при этом.

И если я от книги подыму
Глаза и за окно уставлюсь взглядом,
Как будет близко все, как станет рядом,
Сродни и впору сердцу моему!

Но надо глубже вжиться в полутьму
И глаз приноровить к ночным громадам,
И я увижу, как земле мала
Околица, она переросла
Себя и стала больше небосвода,
А крайняя звезда в конце села,
Как свет в последнем домике прихода.



Der Schauende


Ich sehe den Bäumen die Stürme an,
die aus laugewordenen Tagen
an meine ängstlichen Fenster schlagen,
und höre die Fernen Dinge sagen,
die ich nicht ohne Freund ertragen,
nicht ohne Schwester lieben kann.

Da geht der Sturm, ein Umgestalter,
geht durch den Wald und durch die Zeit,
und alles ist wie ohne Alter:
die Landschaft, wie ein Vers im Psalter,
ist Ernst und Wucht und Ewigkeit.

Wie ist das klein, womit wir ringen,
was mit uns ringt, wie ist das groß;
ließen wir, ähnlicher den Dingen,
uns so vom großen Sturm bezwingen, -
wir würden weit und namenlos.

Was wir besiegen, ist das Kleine,
und der Erfolg selbst macht uns klein.
Das Ewige und Ungemeine
will nicht von uns gebogen sein.
Das ist der Engel, der den Ringern
des Alten Testaments erschien:
wenn seiner Widersacher Sehnen
im Kampfe sich metallen dehnen,
fühlt er sie unter seinen Fingern
wie Saiten tiefer Melodien.

Wen dieser Engel überwand,
welcher so oft auf Kampf verzichtet,
der geht gerecht und aufgerichtet
und groß aus jener harten Hand,
die sich, wie formend, an ihn schmiegte.
Die Siege laden ihn nicht ein.
Sein Wachstum ist: der Tiefbesiegte
von immer Größerem zu sein.


Созерцатель

Деревья складками коры
Мне говорят об ураганах,
И я их сообщений странных
Не в силах слышать средь нежданных
Невзгод, в скитаньях постоянных,
Один, без друга и сестры.

Сквозь рощу рвется непогода,
Свозь изгороди и дома,
И вновь без возраста природа.
И дни, и вещи обихода,
И даль пространств - как стих псалма.

Как мелки с жизнью наши споры,
Как крупно то, что против нас.
Когда б мы поддались напору
Стихии, ищущей простора,
Мы выросли бы во сто раз.

Все, что мы побеждаем, - малость.
Нас унижает наш успех.
Необычайность, небывалость
Зовет борцов совсем не тех.

Так Ангел Ветхого Завета
Нашел соперника под стать.
Как арфу, он сжимал атлета,
Которого любая жила
Струною Ангелу служила,
Чтоб схваткой гимн на нем сыграть.

Кого тот Ангел победил,
Тот правым, не гордясь собою,
Выходит из такого боя
В сознаньи и расцвете сил.
Не станет он искать побед.
Он ждет, чтоб высшее начало
Его все чаще побеждало,
Чтобы расти ему в ответ.

Looking back 100 years in Russian history, it's striking how that period, too, was characterized by changes and apparent transformations. Yet the life of Russia at the transition from 19th to 20th century was very much more vibrant and full of challenge than it is now. In the second chapter of his An Essay in Autobiography (1959), the poet and novelist Boris Pasternak described that era like this:

The second decade of my life was very different from the first. Moscow in the 'nineties,in all the splendour of her "sixteen hundred belfries", still had the look of a remote, provincial town as picturesque as a fairytale, but with something of the legendary grandeur of the ancient capital and of the Third Rome. Ancient customs were still observed. In the autumn, horses were blessed in Yushkov Lane which ran between the College and the Church of St Florus and St Laurus, who were regarded as patrons of horse-breeders; the horses and the grooms and coachmen who brought them crowded the church precincts and the Lane as if it were a horse fair.

It seemed to me as a child that the advent of the new century changed everything as at the stroke of a magic wand. The city was gripped by the same financial frenzy as were the leading capitals of the world. Tall blocks of offices and flats sprang up overnight in an epidemic of speculative deals. All at once, brick giants reached into the sky from every street. And with them, Moscow, outstripping Petersburg, produced a new Russian art, the art of a big city, young, fresh and contemporary.

With the advent of twenty-first century Russia, where is that sense of freshness and innovation? Where are the Baksts, the Scriabins, the Bloks, Tsvetayevas, Mandelstams,Pasternaks and Akhmatovas of the present age? Where is the aura of internationalism and Europeanism that marked Russia's entrance to the twentieth century? The questions go on reverberating, for they don't have an answer.

Lucas 2:7 Y dio a luz a su hijo primogénito, y lo envolvió en pañales, y lo acostó en un pesebre, porque no había lugar para ellos en el mesón.

Just a note to say that I'll be heading back to London shortly.

Thanks are due to the staff at ABR - I had a really relaxing two weeks! And thanks also to CyberAkumal, for being so helpful in the matter of Internet access.

Nicholas D. Kristof, writing in the IHT from Riga, Latvia:

In these long winter nights, a headless horseman is roaming Russia's "near abroad," threatening independent countries and raising fears of a renewed cold war.

This specter is Vladimir Putin. Let's hope he finds his head soon.

In traveling around Eastern Europe lately, people keep telling me what a menace Putin is becoming, and they're right. There are plenty of examples of Putin's bullying neighboring countries, from Georgia and Estonia to this lovely little Baltic nation of Latvia, but the most egregious example was Putin's recent plotting to install a new pro-Russian stooge in Ukraine.

And, Kristof goes on:

There's no evidence that Russia was involved in the poisoning, or even that he was poisoned at that dinner. But Russia managed to insert itself into every other aspect of the campaign, so it's a possibility that Ukrainians are murmuring about.

It's clear that Russia doesn't blanch at murder. Two Russian secret agents assassinated a former president of Chechnya (whom Moscow called a terrorist) in the Gulf nation of Qatar in February by blowing up his car as he drove away from a mosque. "The Russian leadership issued an order to assassinate the former Chechen leader," the Qatari judge said after examining all the evidence and convicting the two men.

The bottom line is that the West has been suckered by Putin. He is not a sober version of Boris Yeltsin. Rather, he's a Russified Pinochet or Franco. And he is not guiding Russia toward free-market democracy, but into fascism.

In effect, Putin has steered Russia from a dictatorship of the left to a dictatorship of the right (Chinese leaders have done much the same thing). Mussolini, Franco, Pinochet, Park Chung Hee and Putin all emerged in societies suffering from economic and political chaos. All consolidated power in part because they established order and made the trains - or planes - run on time.

The whole article, headed "America, Too, Needs to Stand Up to Putin", makes some telling points. The only paragraph where I had some major doubts reads:

Still, a fascist Russia is a much better thing than a Communist Russia. Communism was a failed economic system, while Franco's Spain, Pinochet's Chile and the others generated solid economic growth, a middle class and international contacts - ultimately laying the groundwork for democracy. Eventually we'll see pro-democracy demonstrations in Moscow like those in Kiev.

Some would argue that the distinction between Communism and Fascism the article's author makes is in many ways a spurious one - certainly in the context of Russia's present development, which is more a reversion to familiar patterns from the past than a boldly new and untried direction. After all, a fascist Russia has been with us for a long time - certainly for most of the 20th century. And those Moscow "pro-democracy demonstrations" don't look like materializing any time soon.

From the London Times, December 13:

Yurko Pavlenko, an opposition MP, said the findings by an Austrian clinic confirmed their suspicion that a mysterious illness that left their candidate’s face deeply pockmarked and discoloured had been caused by dioxin — possibly at the instigation of the Kremlin.

“This was done by people who wanted to kill him or effectively knock him out of the presidential race,” Pavlenko said.“Russia has campaigned against Yushchenko and interfered in a shameless way in the Ukrainian election, and its intelligence sources cannot be excluded from the top suspects. “This confirmation will boost Yushchenko’s vote and will especially bring undecided voters to his side.”

For "The Kremlin", read "Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin". One hopes that Messrs Schroeder, Chirac, Blair, Bush, Zapatero et al. are following the development of this latest ignominious adventure of their pal and buddy.

It has to be said, though, that the novel is a major creation. It possesses many flaws, not the least of which are structural ones. Yet it's still an imposing structure, built with passion. But it's not really about Mexico, or Mexican history, it's about Lawrence's own inner world, where the Aztec imagery and Quetzalcoatl myth serve as symbols of some kind of lost psychic strength and power.

In the same sequence as my earlier post Post-modernism and Fascism, here's another item, this time drawn from one of the central figures of twentieth-century literary modernism:

And sometimes she wondered whether America really was the great death-continent, the great 'No' to the European and Asiatic, and even African 'Yes!' Was it really the great melting-pot, where men from the creative continents were smelted back again, not to a new creation, but down to the homogeneity of death? Was it the great continent of the undoing, and all its peoples the agents of the mystic destruction? Plucking, plucking at the created soul in a man, till at last it plucked out the growing germ, and left him a creature of mechanism and automatic reaction, with only one inspiration, the desire to pluck the quick out of every living spontaneous creature.

Was that the clue to America? she sometimes wondered. Was it the great death-continent, the continent that destroyed again what the other continents had built up? The continent whose spirit of place fought purely to pick the eyes out of the face of God? Was that America?

And all the people who went there, Europeans, Negroes, Japanese, Chinese, all the colours and the races,were they the spent people,in whom the God impulse had collapsed, so they crossed to the great continent of the negation, where the the human will declares itself 'free', to pull down the soul of the world? Was it so? And did this account for the great drift to the New World, the drift of spent souls passing over to the side of Godless democracy, energetic negation? The negation which is the life-breath of materialism. And would the great negative pull of the Americans at last break the heart of the world?

D.H.Lawrence - The Plumed Serpent

"More than 15 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the free world continues to underestimate the universal appeal of its own ideas. Rather than place its faith in the power of freedom to rapidly transform authoritarian states, it is eager to achieve 'peaceful coexistence' and 'detente' with dictatorial regimes."

- Natan Sharansky

BBC Monitoring has a roundup of Ukrainian and Russian press commentary on the present situation in Ukraine. While some of it sounds an optimistic note, the comments from Russia have a distinctly old-fashioned ring, and there is no mistaking the traditional inflections of Soviet-style bluster in the approach taken by Pravda:

Now these same [Western] forces are striving to yoke Ukraine and Belarus, in order then to gain complete control of Moscow. Complete control! They are no longer pretending to hide it...

Specialists in strategic analysis reckon that the personal qualities of the Ukrainian opposition figures are of no great importance. They have done their job: they have roused the people, brought the economy to the brink of collapse, and the state to the verge of dividing in two. Now more serious people can take over. According to sources, Nato troops in Hungary and Poland are preparing to move, and Romanian and Slovakian military units have been put on alert. Ukrainian towns are in their sights.

Some excerpts from an interview with Sergei Yastrzhembsky, Putin's aide for relations with the EU, broadcast on RTR Russia TV (via BBC Monitoring):

- Going back to the subject of The Hague, this was the first meeting after the EU expansion. Did you get the impression, as a high-level professional, that after the EU expansion, Western Europe's attitude towards Russia is changing, and not for the better, precisely because Eastern European countries have joined the EU and they have a huge grudge against, formerly, the Soviet Union and now Russia. Some of these countries are now taking an active part in the situation in Ukraine, let's say, and it's obvious that Polish diplomacy is very active there.

- Unfortunately, I have to agree with this conclusion. This is not just my impression. I had the impression that I felt it with my skin, literally. I made a speech a month or a month-and-a-half ago in the European parliament. I was invited by the European parliament, and it is a rarity for a Russian to speak in the European parliament, especially addressing a 250-strong audience. I made a 15-minute
speech and then was subjected to the toughest grilling, a question-and-answer session. The tone was set not by representatives of the old Europe, 15 countries, but by representatives of the 10 countries which entered the EU recently. The tone of their speeches reminded me of the hottest debates during the first congress of people's deputies of the Soviet Union, the sharpest speeches by deputies.

Interestingly, some of those deputies have moved from Moscow to Brussels, I mean Mr Landsbergis and several others. They are the same, they remain the same, they have got a chance to jump from the Communist past into the hyper-democratic today. But they have received no education in political maturity, political correctness,
or tolerance. So, these people have integrated into Europe with all their inferiority complexes, Russophobic complexes first of all. Whether our tested partners in Europe want to see it or not - it will soon be impossible not to notice it - a certain bloc, an informal bloc so far, has been established inside the European Union, mainly made of 10 new countries, but also some northern countries. For instance, the recent behaviour of Finland on many issues is a surprise for us. Well, they have not been particularly friendly to Russia recently. In a word, there is a bloc of countries which, I think, are trying to snatch the initiative from European Union giants -...

- Speaking about giants loyal to Russia you mean France, Germany,Italy -

- yes, first of all - and to start forming completely different agendas, making them much tougher. This is the first sign. The second sign is the EU's heightened attention, hyper-attention towards the so- called frozen conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. They call them new neighbours, they are new neighbours for the EU: the Caucasus, Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine. And they wish to be very active players on this patch, while ignoring realities which have existed there for a long time, and interests which have existed there for a long time, even ignoring international structures which have been busy trying to settle those frozen conflicts for a long time. So, I think that in the past six months certain elements have appeared in the EU's policy towards Russia which are disturbing for
us of course.

via Marius

Another clip from today's RFE/RL Newsline:

DUMA ASSAILS EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT OVER UKRAINE... The Russian State Duma passed a resolution on 3 December accusing members of the European Parliament, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of destabilizing Ukraine, ITAR-TASS reported. The resolution, which passed by a vote of 415-0 with eight abstentions, accused the Europeans of "destructive foreign interference in the development of the situation in Ukraine." The action of the Europeans "practically pushes the radically minded part of the Ukrainian population toward dangerous actions," which threatens to result in "mass disturbances, chaos, and a split of the country." The resolution harshly criticized the Ukrainian opposition supporting presidential hopeful Yushchenko for using the tactics of "street democracy." The resolution added that the Duma is sincerely interested in seeing that the situation in Ukraine is resolved in "a democratic and constitutional way," and stressed the lawmakers' "firm commitment to continuing efforts toward the strengthening of traditional friendship and fraternal relations between the peoples of Russia and Ukraine." BW

From today's RFE/RL Newsline:

Commenting on Kuchma's visit to Moscow, Duma Deputy Speaker Sergei Baburin (Motherland) said on 2 December that he believes the Ukrainian president made the trip to persuade Putin to retreat from his open support for Yanukovych, TV-Tsentr on 2 December. Baburin said that while, as a Russian, he supports Yanukovych, as a politician he admires Yushchenko as "a revolutionary." The same evening in Kyiv, Yushchenko addressed his supporters with an unusual 20-minute speech in Russian, in which he called Russia Ukraine's most important neighbor and encouraged Ukrainians to acquire a good understanding of the Russian language. Meanwhile, gazeta.ru speculated on 2 December that during their meeting Putin probably advised Kuchma how to handle international pressure and the popular support that Yushchenko enjoys. The newspaper went on to say that Putin and Kuchma's discussion likely centered on finding a common position on a proposal by an international group of mediators that Ukraine prepare a new presidential election law jointly with a constitutional reform that would shift the balance of power from the president to the parliament and the prime minister (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 2 December 2004).

Heartening to see that Ukrainian Internet service providers are offering free dialup access "until total victory".

Ukraine's Supreme Court has annulled the election result, and called a third round, probably to be held on Boxing Day - or at any rate, by then.

Update: the only fly in the ointment so far seems to be that Kuchma has vetoed the law that would have made voting with absentee ballots illegal. As the translator at Maidan has pointed out, according to reports of international observers, "most of the frauds took place with the help of absentee ballots."

Another Update: Le Sabot Moderne has a post that shows there are further obstacles to be overcome, as well.

And SCSUScholars has some instructive analysis that needs to be thought about.

TulipGirl has posted a link to an online language translator. I experimented with the Russian-English autotranslator on the NG article I posted this morning, and found the results surprisingly close to the original. There are oddities - for example, the program gives "audio-film" for "audiotape", and there are various other places where one wouldn't want to trust it, but in general the sense is there, and in surprisingly good English, too. No Ukrainian version of the program yet, though.

In an apparent complete contradiction of the Novaya Gazeta article I quoted this morning, Taras Kuzio at EDM gives a different, and even more convoluted, account of the shadowy events surrounding "Yanukovychgate":

Significantly, the Yanukovych audiotapes were accepted as evidence by the Supreme Court, which is sitting to discuss mass violations in the runoff. Ukrainian courts never accepted the Melnychenko tapes as evidence. The SBU tapes will add to the documents intercepted by Yushchenko supporters that the authorities had attempted to smuggle out of the presidential administration building.

The tapes contain hundreds of intercepted telephone conversations from Yanukovych's "shadow election headquarters" between October 30 and November 23, taking in both rounds of the elections. Yanukovych always had two campaign headquarters. The official face, led by the dapper chairman of the National Bank, Serhiy Tyhipko, played on the positive attributes of Yanukovych's election program, such as his social policies. The "shadow campaign" headquarters had a fundamentally different role and was led by Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Klyuev, a close Donetsk ally of Yanukovych. The shadow office was established to channel funds above the legislated candidate spending limits and to undertake activities that undermined the Yushchenko campaign. The shadow team also coordinated state-administrative resources and the media in favor of Yanukovych and against Yushchenko.

Tyhipko and Yanukovych always presented themselves as conducting a "free and fair" campaign through three strategies. First, they denied that a shadow campaign existed. Second, they insisted that dirty tricks came from other candidates (i.e. the phony candidates promoted by the authorities). Third, they insisted that both Yushchenko and Yanukovych had allegedly hired Russian political advisors. The Yanukovych camp hired two long-time associates of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Marat Gelman and Gleb Pavlovsky, who run the "Russian Club" in Kyiv.

In reality the Yanukovych campaign had four inter-related units: 1) Tyhipko's official campaign; 2) Kluyev's shadow campaign; 3) "technical" or "fake" candidates; and 4) Russian advisors. Of these four, only Tyhipko's had a "clean" image. The other three components were behind Ukraine's dirtiest election to date. To suggest -- as Tyhipko and Yanukovych are now doing -- that they knew nothing of the other three elements is unbelievable.

The audiotapes provide information as to how voting was conducted and massaged, "who directed this process and how, and why the voting dynamics changed so intricately during the presidential elections in Ukraine" (Zerkalo nedeli, November 27). The tapes also provide insight into how the Yanukovych campaign added upwards of 2 million votes -- and raised turnout by 19% -- in Donetsk oblast between rounds one and two. In comparison, turnout increased by only 3% in Lviv, Yushchenko's base.

Unlike some of the Melnychenko tapes, the voices on these new recordings are clearly identifiable. These figures include Kluyev, Viktor Medvedchuk (head of the presidential administration), Sergei Kivalov (chairman of the Central Election Commission [CEC]), Sergei Kluyev, "political technologist" Yuriy Levenetz, and long-time Yanukovych adviser Eduard Prutnik.

One of the most interesting sections on the tapes is a conversation about how the official results in round two were to be "massaged." One conversation, early in the evening on election day and three days before the official results were released by the CEC, describes how, "We agreed about 3-3.5% difference to our advantage" (maidan.uar.net/audio/). It is unlikely that it is a mere coincidence that the CEC declared Yanukovych victor with a 2.72% lead.

The audiotapes provide concrete evidence of the existence of a "transit server" whose purpose was to manipulate the results as they were sent from local Territorial Election Commissions (TECs) to the CEC. The "transit server" was based in the presidential administration.

Details of the "transit server" were leaked to the Yushchenko camp and the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv during the first round of the elections, but the authorities always denied its existence. Nevertheless, the long time it took the CEC to receive protocols sent by electronic mail from TECs always seemed suspicious.

The tapes also include conversations by Kluyev, ordering provocations to be undertaken to discredit Yushchenko. In one instance, Kluyev orders an unknown person to "organize some fights or something like this."

The audiotapes, together with other mounting evidence collected by the Yushchenko camp and submitted to the Supreme Court, proves beyond any shadow of a doubt that the authorities never intended to hold a clean election. While possessing knowledge of pre-planned election fraud, Kuchma and Yanukovych nevertheless repeatedly "guaranteed" to the United States and EU that Ukraine would hold free and fair elections. This is, therefore, a major case of deception conducted by Ukraine's leaders that has now backfired and may lead to their own undoing.

At the Poetry International website, shortly before the elections, Ukrainian poet Yuri Andrukhovich meditated on Ukrainian poetry and the situation faced by his country today:

The country in which we appeared on this earth has plenty of reasons to be considered poetry-centric. Its history has been such that poetry was one of only a few means for national or, at the very least, linguistic survival, especially during the nineteenth century, which was disastrous for Ukraine. It became the century of poets, and specifically of one poet (the Father of our Nation), after whom came an entire army of successors and followers. I use the word ‘army’ not by chance. Starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, poets and poetry gained a special meaning in Ukrainian public tradition. Poetry was connected with the fight for freedom, words were weapons, and individualism and intimacy were pushed far to the background, as is required by any disciplined army. The poet was no longer seen as just a spokesperson, but as a national messiah, and poetry was a citizen’s strongest message. I note in brackets, that in this sense we are not alone, especially in the part of the world that later came to be known as Central-Eastern Europe.

According to external logic, this notion should have existed until at least August 1991, when Ukraine gained its independence. In reality it disappeared significantly earlier. Perhaps this disappearance started in 1933, when hundreds of Ukrainian poets, who were residents of the capital city of Kharkiv, failed to notice village people swollen from hunger and dying on the streets or in the unattended parks. Or perhaps it began in 1985, when Vasyl Stus, who was nominated for a Nobel Prize in Literature, died in a Soviet labor camp in the Urals.

Yet what if it still exists today? With seven days left until the decisive Ukrainian Presidential elections (on October 31), my email inbox is practically screaming with messages about students being pursued by the police, about the leadership’s lies, about the arrival in Kyiv of countless military units who were trained by Russian specialists in “suppression of massive unrest”. Slowly, you start to think about your own participation and your joint responsibility. You want to remain so uninvolved that you can’t stay out of politics any longer.

By an important measure, this is the final autumn. Perhaps it has to be categorically so. Maybe the epoch of Ukrainian uncertainty will end along with it, and Ukrainian poetry will have a path by which to survive.

The website also has biographical portraits of several other contemporary Ukrainian poets, with samples of their work, both in the original and in English translation. The poets include Andriy Bondar (1974– ), Oksana Zabuzhko (1960– ), Ivan Malkovych (1961– , Oleh Lysheha (1949– ), Natalka Bilotserkivets (1954– ), and Serhiy Zhadan (1974– .

The Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta has a story by Yanina Vaskovskaya about the role of Ukraine's intelligence service in the case of the election commission audiotapes. I've translated the article:

The Supreme Court of Ukraine is currently examining Viktor Yushchenko’s complaint about the results of the second round of voting. But the court has not accepted the main evidence of falsification – the audio tapes of the telephone conversations of the leadership of Yanukovych’s staff on the eve of the elections and during them. From these conversations it becomes obvious: on the day of the vote Yanukovych’s staff knew all the passwords and logins to the electronic counting system, and was in control of it.

The recordings are of good quality. And although not all the media decided to make them public with the names of those who figure in them, those with ears to hear will have little difficulty in identifying the parties to the conversation. They include, among others: the head of Kuchma’s administration Viktor Medvedchuk, Ukraine’s vice premier, the head of Yanukovych’s staff Andrei Klyuev, the head of the Central Electoral Commission Kivalov, and one of the group’s principal financiers, Eduard Prutnik.

The opposition says that it has tapes of several hundred conversations involving hundreds of people who worked in Yanukovych’s staff. The tapes were apparently made available by a citizen of Ukraine who is currently in hiding, but is prepared to give evidence if the court is prepared to hear him. The first supposition that emerges in this connection: the special services.

In the present rather difficult situation the leadership of Ukraine’s security service is demonstrating its neutrality. On the eve of the second round of voting the head of the CEC, Sergei Kivalov, made a formal request to the SBU (Ukrainian Security Service) to ensure the security of the electronic system.

Indeed, it was already clear after the first round of voting that not the CEC’s computers were not as “clean” as they ought to be. The opposition claimed that all the data arriving at Kiev underwent preliminary processing at a secret centre under the control of the president’s administration. The data arrived late, and in chunks that were too large.

A month before the elections a new head of the CEC’s computer division was appointed – Sergei Katkov. Under the pretext of testing and checking the system, he obtained all the keys and codes from the computer personnel. At precisely this period, in the opinion of one of the experts, an additional communication channel was connected to the system.

A few days after the counting of the votes in the first round, the electronic system was disconnected, and Katkov was removed from his post. However, the opposition maintains that Yanukovych’s staff made new attempts to connect the secret server. It is quite possible that the SBU, who were investigating the situation, also bugged these attempts.

As a matter of fact, even completely private individuals could have done this. A scanner that allows the recording of mobile phone conversations costs half a million dollars, and it can be bought on the open market. Yanukovych’s staff are convinced that the opposition did the bugging. If that is so, then their legitimacy is sharply reduced. Wiretapping is a criminal act, for which the Ukrainian criminal code prescribes four years of imprisonment.

It is most likely that no one is prepared to vouch for the tapes’ authenticity, and the recordings will meet the fate of the Melnichenko* tapes: the law enforcement agencies will not recognize their validity, while the opposition press will consider them to be a historic fact and will quote them widely.

*There's some background on the Melnichenko case here.

Dr. Brzezinski: Comment


http://maidan.org.ua/static/mai/1101999236.html

Clearly we are at a historic moment. What we are witnessing is profoundly moving, in terms of Ukraine [the birth of a nation]. It is the wedding of Ukrainian nationalism with Ukrainian democracy on a popular level. And that is a dramatic moment in the history of a nation of almost 50 million people. So we have to be profoundly conscious of it.

I think it is also appropriate for us as private citizens to express our support and commitment of support to President-elect Yushcenko. Because I think it is very important to be clear about that. I think the scale of the fraud and the statistical results officially announced clearly indicates that he is the victor.

Ambassador Fried spoke about the importance of clarity. And you are quite right, clarity is essential. And I think we have in both the United States and Europe clarified our position, our view of what is happening. But I think clarity will increasingly call for more than that, namely, clarity also about consequences. And these consequences have to be both positive and negative, vis-à-vis Ukraine but also vis-à-vis Russia. Because we cannot separate the issue from Russia, because ultimately the issue of Ukraine involves the future of Russia. The Ukrainian struggle for democracy is a struggle about the future of Russia. If Ukrainian democracy prevails, Russia has no choice but to go to the West and to be a democracy. If Ukrainian democracy fails, Russian imperial ambitions are reawakened, there is a temptation of an alternative future, which is imperial and authoritarian. So we are involved because of the scale of this problem.

The consequences have to be both positive and negative. Positive in terms of inducements. Inducements to Ukraine in the sense of awards for Ukraine going forth with democracy. Inducements for Kuchma, and his family, assurances about their personal safety, about their "fortune", arrangements which provide encouragement for a decent resolution. And Kuchma has to be made aware of the fact that the Lukashenko choice is not going to be profitable for him. And that has to be made clear to Moscow, too, because Moscow sponsored Lukashenko. Kuchma has to be made aware of the fact that the best out for him is the Saakashvili [Georgia] result, and there looms in the background danger of a Cuicesciu [Romania] consequence if he doesn’t accommodate. And in terms of consequences, if things go badly in Ukraine, if we end up with a Lukashenko arrangement at least for a while, we shouldn’t just ostracize Ukraine. If we just punish Ukraine, we will push it more into the hands of those in the Kremlin who’d like to recreate a larger Russian sphere.

And therefore, it has to have an effect on American-Russian relations. And that has to be stated flatly, boldly, privately at this stage, not by you and the government, but it’s something the Russians have to be made aware of, that simply succeeding with a Lukashenko model in Ukraine is not going to be a free ride for Russia. Because, otherwise, the Russians have no incentive also to tell Kuchma, "Lay off, we don’t want a crisis to the south, we don’t want an explosion in Ukraine, and we don’t want ostracism, tension, worsend relations with the West."

So, we [Americans] and the Europeans have to be very clear of this, because the stakes are truly of historic proportions.

Anne Applebaum's column The Freedom Haters in yesterday's Washington Post (free registration required) contains some pithy and much-needed insights into the not-so-very-new phenomenon of leftist intellectuals who hate freedom. The piece begins with some nicely-judged sarcasm, directed against all those who have tried to question the moral integrity of the brave hundreds of thousands who have frozen for freedom on Independence Square in the past week:

Just in case anyone actually thought that all of those people waving flags on the streets of Kiev represent authentic Ukrainian sentiments, the London Guardian informed its readers otherwise last week. In an article titled "US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev," the newspaper described the events of the past 10 days as "an American creation, a sophisticated and brilliantly conceived exercise in western branding and mass marketing." In a separate article, the same paper described the whole episode as a "postmodern coup d'etat" and a "CIA-sponsored third world uprising of cold war days, adapted to post-Soviet conditions."

Neither author was a fringe journalist, and the Guardian is not a fringe newspaper. Nor have their views been ignored: In the international echo chamber that the Internet has become, these ideas have resonance. Both articles were liberally quoted, for example, in a Web log written by the editor of the Nation, who, while writing that she admired "citizens fighting corrupt regimes," just as in the United States, she also noted darkly that the wife of the Ukrainian opposition leader, a U.S. citizen of Ukrainian descent, "worked in the Reagan White House."

Versions of this argument -- that pro-democracy movements are in fact insidious neocon plots designed to spread American military influence -- have been around for some time. Sometimes they cite George Soros -- in this context, a right-wing capitalist -- as the source of the funding and "slick marketing." Sometimes they cite the evil triumvirate of the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute and Freedom House, all organizations that have indeed been diligently training judges, helping election monitors and funding human rights groups around the world for decades, much of the time without getting much attention for it.

The whole essay is well worth reading and reflecting on.

Kuchma to Putin: Without Russia we are lost

The following exchange between Putin and Kuchma has been published on the Maidan news site (it was originally on the site of Ukrainska Pravda):

«Dear Leonid Danylovych, I am glad that you have found it possible, in this complicated internal situation in the country, to meet me at least for a couple of minutes, to exchange opinions on the situation in Ukraine, on the perspectives of its development and on possible ways out of this very acute political crisis.

Despite the severity of the situation, you managed to keep the situation under control avoiding its extreme manifestations. Thankfully, nothing worse happened.

We are very concerned by all phenomena connected with a tendency to split the country, and we support your efforts directed on strengthening the integrity of the country. These phenomena trouble us very much, we are not indifferent to what is happening there.

According to the official census, ethnic Russians constitute 17 per cent of the population of Ukraine. In fact, they are much more numerous. This is an entirely Russian speaking country. We do not divide it into West or East, at least every second family in Ukraine has family and personal ties with Russia.

What is happening now is a serious internal process. We follow the developments in Ukraine with concern and express our support to what you are doing trying to find a way out of the crisis.

I would like to assure you that Russia will always be together with Ukraine, it will support and aid Ukraine in all efforts to stabilize the situation. We consider Ukraine a united and independent state. As you rightly noted, we have lived in one country for so many years, so in our hearts we do not divide Ukraine into North, South or West.

Whatever internal whirls may roar in the country, we hope that all parties will adhere to the legislative norms and to the Constitution in force. Once the Constitution is violated, the country may collapse.

We are ready to participate in the settlement of the situation within the limits you consider possible for us».

Kuchma to Putin:

It would be surprising if Russia remained aside from the events that are going on now in Ukraine.

Without Russia’s efforts to find a way out of the political crisis, its solution will be impossible, otherwise Ukraine risks to disgrace itself.

I don't want to be misunderstood, but Ukraine as it was before the elections now does not exist.

It has been divided. One side does not consider the point of view of the other, this policy being accomplished by a coercive, revolutionary methods without taking into account the economic consequences.

The general solution giving the possibility to settle the conflict within political and juridical limits seems to have been found yesterday. There was shaking of hands, but it is necessary to raise blockade from the governmental institutions. The government is not to blame for the actual processes. It is not the government that does not work, the problem is that the government is not given the possibility to work.

It seems that a compromise, also a legal one, has been found, still I cannot give an unambiguous answer as to the further development of events.

The most important thing is that the Supreme Court, as the highest organ, must say if the violation occurred or not. The parliament has adopted a political decision. It is quite right, we must find a political solution.

The next developments seem very simple: Supreme Court's verdict and the constitutional reform that will allow the parliament to form a government in a few days. In this case the parliament will be responsible for the situation in the country. Then a commission will consider the issue of reelections».

According to his words, there will be no revoting, since «it will be a plebiscite. I do not know a legal norm called revoting in any legislation of any country».

Maidan-Inform to the opposition leaders: do you have any other questions?

We strongly recommend to read the appeals of the Maidan site (in Ukrainian):

http://maidanua.org/static/mai/1101942620.html

http://maidanua.org/static/mai/1101599992.html

"I am glad that you found it possible to meet for several minutes at this difficult political moment of your country and discuss the state of affairs in Ukraine, prospects and ways out of this acute political crisis.

"Despite the crisis' acuteness, you have managed to prevent extreme events. Thank God, nothing worse has happened.

"All of us are greatly concerned about the possibility of a national split and support your efforts to strengthen the national integrity. We are worried, and we care about developments [in your country]."

- V.V. Putin, as reported by Interfax.

The BBC adds:

A repeat presidential vote to break the political deadlock in Ukraine would be useless, Russian President Vladimir Putin has said in Moscow.

From the Polish daily Rzeczpospolita :

How Walesa Mediated

Piotr Dzieduszycki, former protocol chief of ex-president Lech Walesa, who accompanied him on his trip to Kyiv last Thursday and participated in all his talks there, describes what happened.

I experienced something similar when I accompanied Walesa on his trip to Fatima. When we arrived at the place we suddenly encountered a crowd of some three hundred thousand pilgrims. Walesa was recognized, and cheering began in his honor. When he turned to greet them he had tears in his eyes. Please believe me, on Independence Square his emotion was even greater...

He had no problems with Victor Yushchenko. We talked in Yushchenko's office. Yushchenko gave us to understand that he opposed any subjection of Ukraine - to Russia or the EU. He was very moved by what was going on in Independence Square. He feared provocation. He talked about pressure from Moscow, and also about his rival - Yanukovich, he didn't talk badly about him, and if he criticized, then it was only his HQ. Walesa proposed that the two men should meet that day. Yushchenko didn't raise any objection.

It went worse with Yanukovich. We went straight to him from Independence Square. Walesa - and all of us - were greatly moved when "Polsha, Polsha..." [Poland, Poland] chanted by tens of thousands of people, was heard.

What surprised me most was his security. Yanukhovich's HQ was full of uniformed functionaries. They stood everywhere, on every floor. All of them were clad in brand-new battledress which had been brought from a warehouse, and all were speaking Russian. I didn't hear even one Ukrainian word. Before we entered, "bodyguards" checked our IDs. "We know you, so no ID is needed," they told Walesa, but the rest were checked.

To begin with, Yanukovich told us that he already had the official results of the election and it was clear from them that he'd got one million votes more. Our president was warning him about responsibility in the case of an explosion. In the end he proposed a direct meeting with Yushchenko.

Yanukovich had almost agreed to this when suddenly a secretary came in with information that Putin was on the phone. After ten minutes our collocutor came back totally changed. There was no more talk about a meeting with Yuschchenko, but he warned us that thousands of miners were coming to Kiev, to make a stand against the opposition. He said one more strange thing: "I'm against using any force, but I don't have control of my HQ," and he gave his rival 24 hrs to fulfill the set conditions - the post of prime minister, but not before his supporters are called off from Independence Square.

We returned to Yushchenko and Independence Square full of gloomy thoughts. When information arrived that a group of "miners" was coming towards the Square, we feared that it would come to an explosion and the slaughter would begin....

[passage omitted]

(Via Marius - his tr., my minor editing)

It's not just in Britain that the Orange Revolution has met with a cool response from parts of the left-liberal establishment (though in Britain even conservative commentators like Jenkins are less than enthusiastic). The view on events in Ukraine from the American Left:

A Russian friend once said to me, "You Americans are an odd people. You love our liberals, but you don't like your own liberals." He added, "You should support your local liberals too."

*****

My friend's words came to mind this past week as I watched the extraordinary street protests in Ukraine. Anyone who cares about citizens fighting corrupt regimes can't help but be moved by scenes of thousands of demonstrators, many of them students, standing for hours in Kiev's Independence Square in sub-zero temperatures--waving banners, chanting and protesting what they believe is a rigged election.

When the Bush Administration rushed to celebrate the protesters' courage and tenacity, I thought--what rank hypocrisy. These same officials have shown no respect for American pro-democracy protesters, and, if they have their way, they'll probably lock their political opponents out of central Washington when Inauguration Day rolls around.

You can read the rest of the article here.
(Via Marius)

Starting on Monday (6 December), I'll be away from this desk for a couple of weeks, so there may not be as many posts as usual. I'll try to update when I can, but normal service won't resume until around 22nd December. I'll be posting as usual until Monday, though.

The response of the British media to the momentous and historic events in Ukraine that have unfolded during the past week has been mixed, to say the least. While the BBC has done a reasonably good job of informing its listeners and viewers about what has taken place, the amount of coverage has varied: the World Service has given priority to reports on the crisis, but the domestic stations and channels have tended to sideline them in favour of stories about reality TV and the home secretary's failed love affair. What has been even more depressing is the preponderance in the "quality" papers of columns like those of Peter Unwin in the Independent, Ian Traynor and Jonathan Steele in the Guardian, and Simon Jenkins in the Times, which make one wonder if the snobbish, appeasing, xenophobic "anything-for-a-quiet-life" atmosphere of 1930s Britain ever really went away - and, of course, there has been the omnipresent John Laughland to reinforce one's consciousness of the political and cultural philistinism that is the dominant characteristic of a small but influential section of the British establishment.

So it's encouraging to read the comments of British journalist, Eastern Europe specialist and political analyst Timothy Garton Ash in today's Guardian. Ash takes the above-mentioned columnists to task, and exposes the devious, convoluted lines of their arguments: for example, he writes, Jenkins uses the perfectly justified assertion that "Putin obliterated his opponents in Russia's last presidential election without a peep from the west" not in order to criticize Putin's election-rigging, but as a reason for the West not to criticize election-rigging in the Ukraine - "a plague on both their houses":

Behind all these contorted reservations, we hear an inner voice which says, in effect, "Why won't all these bloody, semi-barbarian, east Europeans leave us alone, to go on living happily ever after in our right, tight, little west European (or merely British) paradise?" And, quite often, "Why are those bloody Americans stirring them up to disturb us?" For this is not a simple left-right divide. It's a divide between, on the one side, central and east Europeans inside the EU, together with Americans of left and right, and, on the other, west Europeans of both left and right. Not all west Europeans, to be sure. In fact, the EU has spoken out remarkably clearly on the election fraud, through its Dutch presidency and Spanish foreign minister. But many west Europeans.

And Ash has some questions for the "Reluctant West Europeans":

1. Can't you see the wood for the trees?

You point out some bad trees, but here's the shape of the wood: An election was stolen. Most of the orange revolutionaries want their country to enjoy more of the freedoms, rights and opportunities that we in western Europe enjoy, rather than being tied back closer to an increasingly authoritarian Russia. Wouldn't that be a good thing, for them and for us?

2. Do you think Ukrainians don't deserve democracy?

Please examine your attitude and see if it doesn't reflect some deep-seated prejudices of west Europeans towards the continent's other half, typecast for centuries as distant, exotic, mysterious, dark etc. A good test is to substitute, say, "Spaniards" or "French" for "Ukrainians" in any statement, and see how it reads.

3. Are you reluctant to support the orange movement just because the Americans do?

Put thus starkly, most people would say no. But some of the west European unease undoubtedly comes from the fact that American pro-democracy organisations have actively supported the Ukrainian opposition, and Washington does have a geostrategic agenda involving the expansion of Nato, military bases across central Asia etc. Yet the knee-jerk leftist or Euro-Gaullist reaction - "if the Americans are for it there must be something wrong with it" - is silly. Please consider the Ukrainian case on its own merits, not through an American or anti-American prism.

4. Why is Russia entitled to a sphere of influence, including Ukraine, if the United States is not entitled to a sphere of influence, including Nicaragua?

The truth is, neither Moscow nor Washington is entitled to such a sphere. There are hard realities of economic, military and political power with which the smaller, weaker neighbours of great powers have to deal. In the case of Ukraine, this is further complicated by the cultural and ethnic identification of many eastern Ukrainians with Russia. But these are constraints with which Ukraine must deal itself, as a sovereign state. The country of Yalta (a town in the Ukrainian Crimea) should not be subjected to a new Yalta.

5. Would you rather have George Bush or Vladimir Putin?

Preferably neither. Given the choice between Bush and Putin, I choose Marilyn Monroe. But it's incredible that so many west Europeans, including Chancellor Schröder of Germany, seem to prefer as their partner an ex-KGB officer currently reimposing authoritarian rule in Russia over a man who, for all his faults, has just been re-elected in a free and fair election in one of the world's great democracies.

6. If you don't like the Americans taking the lead in Ukraine, why don't we?

To some extent we already are. At the negotiating tables in Kiev yesterday, there was Javier Solana from Brussels, the Polish and Lithuanian presidents, and a senior Russian official, but not, so far as I know, any senior American. And that's right. This is a version of our European model of peaceful revolution, with the aim of rejoining Europe, not America. Now it's up to us to support it, with all the peaceful means at our disposal. These include saying that, in our interest as well as theirs, a democratic Ukraine deserves a place in the European Union. Agreed?

Let's hope that this long overdue column will at least inspire some debate in the Guardian and elsewhere in the British media over the coming days. It's time that figures like Laughland, Steele, Jenkins and others were made accountable for their published views. With the spread of Internet communication, those views can have an influence on what is happening in Ukraine - they are not merely an internal British affair, but have international resonance and significance.

From a recent AP report:

While decrying what he considers widespread fraud in the elections, Powell has said nothing about Russia's position. His view is that quiet diplomacy is the best hope to induce the Russians to shift course and contribute to a democratic outcome in Ukraine, a former republic of the Soviet Union.

Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski is less constrained. "The stakes are of truly historic proportions," Brzezinski said last week in discussing what he sees as a Russian power grab in Ukraine.

"If Ukrainian democracy prevails, Russia has no choice but to go to the West and to be a democracy," Brzezinski told a gathering at the American Enterprise Institute. "If Ukraine democracy fails, Russia and imperial ambitions are awakened."

Much like Brzezinski, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger believes Moscow's propensity for acquiring client states was undiminished by the collapse of the Soviet empire 15 years ago.

In an EDM commentary (December 1) on the current situation in Latvia, Vladimir Socor reports that on December 1 the political parties of Latvia entered into a broad-based coalition. The outgoing government, which resigned in October, had relied on the support of a Russian leftist party,but this had not been sufficient to keep it in office. The new coalition government contains a rmarkably far-ranging spectrum of parties, and includes

the right-wing, free-market New Era party led by former prime minister Einars Repse; the conservative, pro-business People's Party of former prime minister Andris Skele and prime minister-designate Aigars Kalvitis; the politically colorless Latvia's First Party led by business tycoon Ainars Slesers; and the Greens and Farmers Union led by the outgoing Prime Minister Indulis Emsis. These parties hold 24, 20, 14, and 12 parliamentary seats, respectively, for a cumulative 70 seats. In addition, the right-conservative Fatherland and Freedom with seven seats, as well as up to three independent deputies, have announced their support for the new coalition government, raising its parliamentary majority to nearly 80 seats in the 101-seat parliament.

Socor notes that this coalition is unprecedented in post-1991 Latvia, as it has massive public support from the Latvian population, and effectively isolates the Russian parties, which follow a left-wing political agenda. The Latvian economy is picking up fast, and the problems that face it tend to be those of success rather than failure: they are associated with a healthcare system that's in need of reform, a privatization program, and a degree of inflation. The new government, which it's hoped will last until 2006, intends to tackle these issues and, Socor writes: "This agenda suggests that Latvia is well on its way toward the condition desired by all three Baltic states: 'turning into boring Nordic/EU countries.'" There is, however, one problem over which the country has little control, and which essentially emanates from beyond its borders:

On Latvia's (as well as Estonia's) road to that destination, a major stumbling block is Russian-instigated manipulation of the issues of language and citizenship.

As part of those tactics, Russia is now enlisting OSCE help to pressure Latvia and Estonia into ratifying the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Far from all of the EU and CoE member countries have signed or ratified that document; and many signatory countries introduced reservations and exemptions at their sovereign will. Only Latvia and Estonia are now coming under pressure to ratify. In Latvia's specific conditions, with a Soviet-bequeathed Russian/"Russian-speaking" population amounting to more than one-third of Latvia's total population, and forming outright majorities in Riga and the other cities, implementation of the terms of that Convention could achieve Russia's policy goal of turning Latvia into a bi-national country.

The controversy over that Convention is turning into a major internal and external policy issue for Latvia. The coalition's programmatic declaration does not mention that issue.

Russia Threatens to Blockade Abkhazia

Civil Georgia / 2004-12-01 15:43:29

Russia increases pressure on Abkhaz opposition leader Sergey Bagapsh, by threatening with blockade of breakaway region, as the latter intends to be inaugurated as the President of unrecognized republic on December 6.

Assistant to the Prime Minister of Russia Gennady Bukaev said on December 1 that Russia is closing the railway communication with Georgia's breakaway province of Abkhazia starting on December 2, Russian news agencies reported.

He also said the "regime of border protection is being strengthened, including the maritime border."

Bukaev added that Russia is ready to fully close the border with Abkhazia "in case of further unconstitutional actions by Sergey Bagapsh." The leadership of Russia supports the actions of President Vladislav Ardzinba to stabilize the political situation in Abkhazia,said Russian official.

"Vladislav Ardzinba is the legitimate President of Abkhazia and Russia supporters his efforts to stabilize public-political situation in the republic, as well as his decision to hold repeat elections of the Abkhaz President," Itar-Tass news agency reported, quoting aide to the Russian Prime Minister.

This is the highest-profile statement regarding a possible economic blockade of Abkhazia from the Russian authorities. A similar statement was made last week by the governor of the Russian region of Krasnodar, bordering Abkhazia.

This toughening of official Moscow's stance follows the Abkhaz parliament backing of the opposition candidate Sergey Bagapsh's claims for victory in a contested October 3 presidential election. Russia openly backed pro-government candidate - Raul Khajimba, who insists on re-vote of elections.

Similar messages of warning were sent by Russia to the Abkhaz opposition, when Sergey Bagapsh was visiting Moscow early in November. "Someone tried to threaten us by warning that they might close down the Russian-Abkhazian border at the river of Psou if we do not agree on repeat elections. But if they think that it is possible to intimidate us by these threats, they are making a mistake," Bagapsh said after visiting Moscow on November 4.

On December 1 Sergey Bagapsh criticized Russian authorities for meddling in Abkhaz elections, particularly he commented over the visit of Russian top-level Interior Ministry officials and representatives of the Russian Central Election Commission to
Abkhazia in order to examine documentation of the Abkhaz CEC concerning October 3 presidential polls.

"Of course, they can get acquainted with the current situation in Abkhazia. We can acquaint our Russian guests with the materials regarding the elections, however examination of these documents is not the prerogative of Russian law-enforcement agencies and the CEC of another state," Regnum quotes Bagapsh as saying.

Via Chechnya-SL

Saakashvili Furious over Russian Media Coverage of Ukraine

/Civil Georgia, Tbilisi / 2004-11-30 20:09:41

Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili harshly slammed the way developments in Ukraine are covered by, as he put it, "newspapers of one of our neighboring countries" making a clear hint on Russia.

"Just take a look what a bacchanalia takes place in some of the newspapers of one of our neighboring countries. There is a horrible bacchanalia which concerns Ukraine and which mainly concerns us as well," Saakashvili said, while addressing the staff of the Georgian State Security Ministry.

The speech was partially broadcasted by the Georgian televisions.

"They have forgotten that Ukraine is a different state, which has its own problems. And these problems were triggered as a result of external interference… Ukrainian people were subjected to an attempt of imposing political will by the external forces. But Georgia became a major target as well. I have looked through the newspapers and 17 articles out of 20, which report about Ukraine, are also about Georgia and personally about me," Mikheil Saakashvili said.

President Saakashvili also added that the Georgian authorities are ready to cooperate with any state "within the frames of Georgia's interests."

Georgian authorities make no secret that they sympathize to the Ukrainian opposition leader Victor Yushchenko.

Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania expressed confidence that the opposition will succeed in Ukraine. "It is impossible not to win when million Ukrainians are protesting in the freeze," Zhvania told reporters on November 30.

In his article published by The International Herald Tribune on [http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/11/29/news/edsaakash.html] November 30 President Saakashvili says that the message of Georgia's Rose Revolution "is widely spreading in the region."

"…democracy is universal and can be successful in post-Soviet states," Saakashvili says, adding that Georgia is "carefully watching similar events in Ukraine."

Meanwhile, predictably, the Kremlin has been using RIAN to voice its own take on the situation. (Via Marius)