Language as a barrier to dialogue in Ukraine

Via openDemocracy

http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/polina-sinovets/language-as-barrier-to-dialogue-in-ukraine

Polina Sinovets  6 May 2014

The issue of language and politics has long been a problem in Ukraine. Recent developments and unrelenting Russian propaganda have made the problem centre-stage once more.

Recent events have reinvigorated the debate about the official and unofficial use in Ukraine of the Russian language, which has long been a part of Ukrainian society. Local political parties and external actors have used Russian and Ukrainian language cards during electoral campaigns, connecting language use to identity and politics to sway public opinion. After the collapse of Victor Yanukovych’s regime, Ukraine’s new parliament repealed the controversial 2012 Language Law [12] that gave Russian (and some other languages) official status in regions where they are dominant. The repeal was vetoed by Ukraine’s acting president and never came into force, but it nonetheless provoked unrest in the south and east, specifically in Sevastopol, Kharkiv, and Odessa. It also enabled Russia to accuse Ukraine of suppressing the political rights of ethnic Russians and gave Moscow the pretext for military intervention in Crimea.

Russian language and culture

In Ukraine, there are two main groups of language users, which tend to be associated with the country’s political divisions. Geographically, the first group has been based in the larger part of the country, in the south and east, which was part of the Russian Empire for hundreds of years. It associates itself historically and traditionally with Russian language and culture. At present, certain Ukrainian political parties like Rodina (a pro-Russian party based in Odessa) and Russkiy blok (an alliance of parties that includes Za Rus Edinuyu and Russko-Ukrainskiy Soyuz), as well as the transnational Russkiy mir foundation, try to connect Russia’s cultural and linguistic heritage to the influence of contemporary Russia over Ukraine.

[13]Historically the south and the east of Ukraine have associated itself with Russian language and culture. Photo cc via news168

The positions of such parties and movements are quite aggressive and radical. They consider Russian the legitimate ‘civilised’ language of the cities and Ukrainian just a ‘country dialect,’ spoiled by the intrusion of Polish linguistic and cultural heritage. Any expansion of Ukrainian language and culture is regarded negatively as an attempt to erase Slavic identity: to ‘cut Russia off from the southern seas, push it to the north, and launch the process of ultimately dismantling the Russian state’ (as described [14] [in Russian] by a member of Russkiy mir).  In their opinion, this leads to the cultural degradation of the Ukrainian population and ultimately the isolation of Russian minorities into ghettos surrounded by hostile environments.

These groups have made the term ‘Ukrainians’ synonymous with ‘enemies,’ ‘traitors,’ ‘Banderovtsy’ (a reference to the Ukrainian World War II-era nationalist leader Stepan Bandera), and a ‘fifth column’ helping the West to weaken Russia. They insist that Russians are segregated in Ukraine. They regard the 2012 language law as only a very modest step toward the protection of Russian-language rights, because it also provides equal rights for other regional languages, alongside the one with ‘undeniable superiority over all other European languages’ (words, ascribed to the poet Alexander Pushkin, written on advertising billboards all over Odessa). This extreme approach does not support dialogue or compromise, so represents a serious conflict that cannot be won.

At the same time, one of this group’s arguments is difficult to ignore: statistically, the Russian-speaking ‘minority’ in Ukraine makes up 30-40 percent of the population. This is enough for Russian to be considered a state language, similar, for example, to the evolution of English as an official language in British colonies like India, Ireland, and Malta. Surveys conducted in 2013 suggested that Ukrainian self-identification often includes use of the Russian language: 35 percent of respondents called Russian their native language and nearly half of respondents claimed Russian was an easier language for them to speak (another 13 percent said they spoke Russian and Ukrainian equally well). This is one of the reasons why the influence of Russia on the political life of Ukraine is so strong: Russia’s questionable policy of ‘protecting Russian populations’ outside its borders does not apply only to ethnic Russians but also to Russian-speakers. As we have seen in Crimea, this approach may be used as a pretext for military aggression against a sovereign state.

The Russian Orthodox Church also brings its influence to bear in the sphere of language politics. It does this, in particular, through the concept of ‘Russkiy mir,’ according to which Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians constitute the so-called ‘Russian World,’ a single civilisational space united by Russian language and culture. This concept tries to revive the unanimity of the three nations, harking back to the Russian Empire and Soviet times and also setting them collectively apart from Western civilisation. Appearing to justify Russia’s military intervention against Ukraine, a Russian Orthodox Church spokesperson spoke [15] approvingly of a past statement by the Church-backed World Russian People’s Assembly that ‘the Russian people is a split nationality on its historical territory and has the right to be reunified as a single governmental body.’

[16]The Russian Orthodox church actively promotes the idea of 'Russkiy mir', a civilisational space united by Russian language.

Elections are always a prime time for putting forward pro-Russian arguments. That Russian should be made the second state language was one of the main pledges of President Leonid Kuchma in 1994. It was a gambit that Victor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions also used, resulting in the adoption of the 2012 language law. When the Ukrainian parliament initially reversed this law, after deposing Yanukovych, Russia used it as justification for their occupation of Crimea ‘to defend Russians’ on Ukrainian soil.

Ukrainian language and culture

On the other side of Ukraine, however, is a second group—those for whom the unlimited spread of the Russian language means a certain displacement of Ukrainian. This group has been associated with Western Ukraine, where national traditions are very strong, and also with Kyiv, where national ideology is being formed today. The group does not accept Russian as a second official language, as they believe it interferes with the construction of a Ukrainian nation and state. Members of this group consider the Ukrainian language is deprived of proper status and opportunities. In particular, they say that language is the foundation for building the nation, and the ubiquitous use of Russian kills this possibility by marginalising Ukrainian to a narrow area of domestic communication. They consider that the Ukrainian language has to be fostered by the conscious limitation of Russian, the day-to-day language for culture, information, and business in the largest Ukrainian cities. Russian linguistic soft power has played an active part in perpetuating the dominance of the Russian language.

A dangerous mistake

The attempt to repeal the language law unleashed the hardcore positions of both language groups. Just when it was necessary to unify the nation, the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) made a very dangerous mistake. The right-wing nationalist Right Sector movement insisted [17] on the necessity of de-Russifying Ukraine while Russkiy blok rose to defend the rights of Russian-speakers against armed Banderovtsy.

However, this ideological fight is hollow in the face of reality. To begin with, the repeal never came into effect since the acting president of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchinov, rejected it. Moreover, Ukraine ratified the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages in 1996 and gave Russian the status of a regional language in many parts of the south and east of Ukraine. The sole effect of the language law was to tip the existing legal balance toward Russian. Repealing the law would only have levelled the playing field again.

[18]Ukraine's Right Sector has insisted on the need to de-Russify the country. Photo cc: Yuriy Kvach

Today, the possibility of actually displacing the Russian language throughout Ukraine is unimaginable and unrealistic. The current challenge to surmount is the exploitation by political parties and actors of language issues to destroy dialogue and integration.

One popular cliché is that a Russian-speaker must be closely connected politically to Russia. Surveys cast doubt on this claim. According to a June 2013 poll conducted in the city of Donetsk, the number of local respondents between 18 and 45 years old who identify as Ukrainians ranges between 60 to 75 percent, while 99 percent of all respondents preferred to take the survey in Russian. Is not a bilingual Ukraine feasible? A large ‘Russian-speaking Ukrainian Nationalists (RUN)’ group conducts discussions in Russian on the popular social network VKontakte. Its members consider Ukrainian the only official language but say that the transition to Ukrainian should be gradual and that no languages should be suppressed or humiliated on the territory of Ukraine.

Conclusion

As Ukraine finds its feet, it is a mistake for those on either side of the language divide to politicise linguistic matters. There is far more to nation-building than language. Only a small part of the Ukrainian population see themselves as being part of Russia—according to an April 2014 survey [19] [in Russian] by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology conducted in the south and east of Ukraine, only 8.4 percent consider that Ukraine and Russia should be united in one state and only 15.4 percent support the unification of their region with Russia.

The majority of educated and urban-living Russian-speakers in Ukraine demonstrated strong solidarity with their Ukrainian-language compatriots, standing together against Russian aggression and the attempts to divide Ukrainian society and territory. The situation with the population in the small towns is slightly different.  Passive, afraid and confused, today they present an easy prey for any political actors, from pro-Russia agents offering them money or communists to Russian intelligence and propaganda.

This article was originally published as PONARS Eurasia policy memo no. 318 in April 2014

Russian troop locations near Estonia's borders

Kaarel Kaas, editor of Estonia's Diplomaatia monthly, has compiled a detailed survey of the state of Russia's conventional forces near Estonia's borders.

The failed lingua franca

Leonidas Donskis, writing in New Eastern Europe:

The Russian language could have become a lingua franca of Eastern Europe. It failed irreversibly precisely because Putin and his regime stripped the political vocabulary of Russia of its potent moral imagination and alternative potential. What is left is not even the banality of evil practiced by the Kremlin with no impunity and in the moral and political void created by the West and its impotence – the West that attempts to reset relations with a regime hostile to every single political and moral sensitivity of the EU and the US. Instead, it is the evil of banality whose essence lies in exercising power for no meaningful reason and with no love for humanity.

Breedlove: Putin may not need to invade Ukraine

Instead, Russian President Vladimir Putin may be able to annex pieces of Ukraine simply by encouraging unrest among pro-Russian forces inside the country, said Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, who commands U.S. and European NATO forces.

http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/nato-commander-says-russia-doesn-t-need-to-invade-to-take-over-eastern-ukraine-20140502

Hrytsenko: a third world war has already begun

In Ukraine, Civil Position leader and ex-defence minister Anatoly Hrytsenko writes that Putin’s current foreign policy aims include much more than an annexation of Crimea and East Ukraine. Putin wants the whole of Ukraine, and much more besides. Hrytsenko says that the Russian president has decided to demonstrate to the world by his aggression that international law no longer has any validity and that money and power are the only factors that have meaning in the modern world.

Hrytsenko considers that the fears of Western nations that by confronting Putin they will provoke a third world war lag a long way behind the reality of what has actually happened: Putin has already begun such a war, and the West will need to take swift and decisive action to stop it.

Pointing to recent threatening statements from Moscow about the rights of Russian-speakers in the Baltic States, to the movement of heavy artillery and missile launchers to Russia’s borders with Moldova and Transnistria, to the direction of  strategic bombers down the Baltic and North Sea, to the redeployment of fighter and long-range aviation including Su-27s, MiG-29s and Tu-22M3s to the Crimean peninsula, to the distribution of airborne assault teams, sabotage units and  covert agents throughout Ukraine, and probably also into neighbouring countries, Hrytsenko says that Putin has made no secret of his plans: they are already in operation, without any restrictions.

The West’s attempts to slow the aggression by means of negotiations, diplomacy and economic sanctions have not been effective, Hrytsenko warns. To deter further aggression, the West will need to  form an anti-Putin coalition and focus all  available means and capabilities on taking practical military steps. These should in the first instance be the relocation and deployment around the territory of Ukraine (Poland, Slovakia , Hungary, Romania , Bulgaria, Northern Turkey) of a powerful NATO aviation group (80-100 F-16s and F-15s), a carrier strike group in the Mediterranean (70+ carrier-based aircraft) plus 7-8 warships in the Black Sea (destroyers and cruisers with powerful air defence) and several airborne brigades - to establish reliable control over Ukraine’s air and sea space in order to prevent  Russia from building up additional forces and halt the invasion that is now in progress.

Voices of Ukraine

Daniella Peled of the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) has interviewed the English-language editor of Voice of Ukraine, a volunteer-run translation project that is proving to be a vital resource in the Ukraine crisis, providing cross-checked reports and in-depth analysis:

It started in early December 2013 as a social network project when Euromaidan SOS put out a call to translate a text for the OSCE, and the Euro-Maidan As It Is  Facebook page was created by one founder to post such texts to, and very soon after a MaidanNeedsTranslators  Facebook page was started by the other founder in Ukraine as a companion, so translators could take on articles posted there for translation. 

At the beginning, there were two or three people working on the project. Now there is a core group of 15 coordinators and editors, with between eight and 11 doing most of the daily work. Beyond this core are many translators who are not coordinators but who put in a lot of time translating on a regular basis.

Sofi Oksanen's speech at PEN World Voices

Should Ukraine hold a presidential election on May 25?

In an article published in Die Zeit, but apparently translated from English, political analyst Andreas Umland thinks it would be wise for Ukraine to cancel this month's planned presidential election, which he believes could turn into a political disaster that would play into Russia's hands:

Ein Scheitern der Wahl würde Moskau die Möglichkeit geben, die Legitimität der Kiewer Staatsgewalt auf Jahre hinaus infrage zu stellen. Eine niedrige Wahlbeteiligung in der Ostukraine würde Putins Propagandamaschine das Futter liefern, um eine Teilung der Ukraine in zwei Staaten zu propagieren. Das Scheitern der Wahl könnte gar als Vorwand für einen Anschluss ostukrainischer Gebiete an Russland nach dem Muster der Krim-Annexion benutzt werden.

A failure of the election would give Moscow the opportunity to put into question the legitimacy of Kievan state power for years to come. A low voter turnout in eastern Ukraine would be fuel for Putin's propaganda machine to call for a division of Ukraine into two states. The failure of the election could even be used as a pretext for an annexation of Eastern Ukraine by Russia after the pattern of the Crimean annexation.

Umland holds out several alternative ideas, including a switch in the near future from a presidential system to a parliamentary one, and also a reform of Ukraine's constitution.

Armed in Error

In the belief that Russia could be drawn into greater military cooperation by "engagement" (an unclear term that can be interpreted several ways), Western countries, particularly Germany, directly supported and trained the Russian military - and this even continued until recently, when Russia began its attacks on Ukraine. An article by Josh Rogin in the Daily Beast states that in 2011, for example,    

the German defense contractor Rheinmetall signed a $140 million contract to build a combat simulation training center in Mulino, in southwest Russia, that would train 30,000 Russian combat troops per year. While the facility wasn't officially scheduled to be completed until later this year, U.S. officials believe that Germany has been training Russian forces for years.

Rheinmetall defended the project even after the invasion of Crimea, up until the German government finally shut it down late last month. But many tracking the issue within the U.S. government were not happy with Germany's handling of the Russian contract, and worry that some of the training may have gone to the kind of special operations forces now operating in and around Ukraine.

Moreover, it also appears that the German help was going not only to Russia's traditional armed forces but also in a high degree to the sophisticated GRU Spetsnaz units that are now being deployed in the new Russian strategy of intervening "on behalf" of Russian-speakers abroad whenever the latter claim discrimination. While it looks as though now the era of military cooperation with Russia is at an end, some observers are wondering whether the realization of what was really happening may have come too late.

Russia Today and Britain's Far Right

In Searchlight on April 16, Gerry Gable noted that

A film crew from Russia’s RT Documentaries TV channel is coming to London on 19 April. Headed by producer Eldar Kazakov, they plan to interview representatives of as many far-right groups as possible for a long programme.

They approached Searchlight as they hoped we could give them contact details for some of these groups.

The article also mentions groups that RT don't want to take part in the programme - these include the Traditional Britain Group and the Iona London Forum, which apparently have links with Vladimir Putin's propagandist Alexander Dugin. As Gable observed:

Dugin is a close friend of Putin. I suggested Kazakov investigate Iona’s links not only with Dugin but with extreme right groups in Russia, Syria and Ukraine. Such a programme would be far more relevant than the one he was planning.

Putin has cultivated European extreme-right organisations and even invited their representatives to observe last month’s illegal referendum in Crimea.

Kasyanov: Putin will not attack Ukraine

According to Mikhail Kasyanov, quoted in an interview for VoA's Ukrainian service, Putin is not going to attack Ukraine, and is using his troops on the border and acts of sabotage inside Ukraine as a form of blackmail to gain recognition for Russia's control of Crimea, the payment of Ukraine's gas debt, Russian as Ukraine's second state language, and changes to the country's constitution. But Putin is bluffing. His regime is on its last legs - the Russian economy is in a bad way, and the confidence of investors and creditors is falling. The West need only apply some firm and concerted economic pressure in order to secure Russia's total collapse.

Letter from Navalny

Привет, друзья.

Алексей написал очень важное письмо и попросил передать его вам. Мы таже будем признательны, если вы поможете распространить эту информацию.

========================================

Сейчас скажу вам вещь важную, а также незаконную. Вернее, незаконной она считается для меня персонально, поэтому на такой запрет мне плевать. Я хочу, чтоб вы знали.

В четверг меня будут судить, что совсем неоригинальное заявление, потому что меня и вчера судили (и даже приговорили), а также судят постоянно — с начала этого года уже три раза осудили, признав виновным.

Но в четверг будут опять судить по-крупному. Это, так называемое «дело «Ив Роше», по которому подсудимыми будут я и мой младший брат Олег.

Как вы может быть помните, дело это возбудили весьма цинично: прямо не скрывая как «ответку» за то, что я призвал выходить на несанкционированную акцию 15 декабря. Месседж был понятен: если ты думаешь, что будешь народ водить на массовые несанкционированные митинги и думаешь, что мы не ответим по беспределу, то ошибаешься. Тогда, в течение недели, СК заявил о возбуждении аж трёх уголовных дел против меня.

«Дело Ив Роше» было основным и активно использовалось зобмоящиком и всеми мерзкими единороссами, чтобы два года подряд к слову «Навальный» добавлять «похитивший со своим братом 50 миллионов рублей у французской компании Ив Роше».

Таким образом Олег и Алексей Навальные совершили хищение мошенническим путем денежных средств торговой компании в сумме свыше 55 миллионов рублей. Большую часть этой суммы братья Навальные потратили на собственные нужды, а более 19 миллионов рублей из этой суммы, чтобы легализовать полученные преступным путем средства, Навальные по фиктивным основаниям и договорам якобы за аренду нежилого помещения, за сырье и материалы перечислили с расчетного счета так называемой фирмы-прокладки на расчетный счет «Кобяковской фабрики по лозоплетению», учредителями которой являлись в том числе и братья.

sledcom.ru/actual/271295/

Постепенно сумма «похищенного» снизилась до 27 миллионов, но суть от этого не изменилась.

Главным следственным управлением Следственного комитета Российской Федерации Алексею Навальному и его братуОлегу Навальному предъявлено окончательное обвинение в совершении хищений путем обмана денежных средств ООО «Ив Роше Восток» в сумме свыше 26 млн. рублей и ООО «Многопрофильная процессинговая компания» в сумме свыше 4 млн. рублей (ч.4 ст.159 УК РФ), а также в легализации денежных средств в сумме более 21 млн. рублей (п. «а» ч.2 ст.174.1 УК РФ). В ближайшее время СК России планирует завершить расследование данного уголовного дела и предъявить его материалы для ознакомления потерпевшим, обвиняемым и их защитникам.

sledcom.ru/news/362002.html

Бороться с этим не очень легко. Ты понимаешь, что это полный бред. Вот просто бред и полная выдумка. Но и понимаешь, что любой нормальный человек подумает: ну невозможно же совсем на голом месте придумать хищение 27 миллионов. Не будет так Путин подставляться. Какие-то, значит, доказательства есть. Или в суде Навальный докажет, что он прав.

Докажет, да. На всех судах последних лет мне до последнего казалось, что не могут меня осудить, ведь и право, и правда на моей стороне.

Как можно осудить меня по «Кировлесу» без экономической экспертизы?

Как можно осудить меня за сопротивление полиции, если на видео любому видно, что сопротивления нет?

Как можно осудить меня за выкрики, если любому на видео видно, что я спокойно стоял?

Нормально. Везде осудили. Посмотрели видео, убедились, что выкриков не было и написали в судебном решениии: выкрикивал и размахивал руками. Судить по «делу Ив Роше» меня, кстати, будет та же судья Коробченко, что и разглядела на этом видео скандирование и выкрики.

Поэтому в суде я ничего не докажу. Зато вам хочу доказать, поэтому и пишу. И поэтому прошу помочь мне распространить эту информацию.

Итак, с самого начала мы знали, что Ив Роше заставили написать заявление. Они работали с «главподпиской» (компанией, через которую, якобы, совершено хищение) пять лет, были довольны, а теперь вся эта работы объявлена мошенничеством.

К ним пришли ФСБ и СК, сказав: не будет заявления, не сможете работать. Это мы знаем со слов сотрудников самой компании. Бизнес Ив Роше полностью завязан на таможню, контролируемую ФСБ и «небольшие проблемы с оформлением грузов» похоронили бы всё дело в течение месяца.

Написали — ничего не поделаешь. Мы не ФСБ и заставить обратно взять заявление не можем.

Через некоторое время, видимо, Ив Роше осознали, что их хотят использовать не просто для какого-то рутинного запугивания и угроз, а для прямой фабрикации политического уголовного дела. Они сделали сделали очень туманное заявление «после того, как всё будет окончено, ни у кого не возникнет сомнений в нашей репутации». Что это означает, было совершенно непонятно.

Потом пошли разные сообщения на тему того, что Ив Роше ущерб не признаёт и заявление забирает. Об этом, в частности, много раз говорил главред «Новой Газеты» Дмитрий Муратов со ссылкой на личную беседу с директором компании по имени Бруно Лепру.

Однако, никаких формальных последствий это не имело: дело шло, под его соусом шли выемки, обыски и допросы, подписки о невыезде и тд. Компания Ив Роше хранила молчание, хранит его до сих пор и не сделала ни одного заявления, кроме того, что выше по ссылке.

Ну, а потом настал всё-таки долгожданный момент, когда СК объявило об «окончании расследования» и у нас появилась возможность ознакомится с материалами дела. 157 томов. Когда мы начали знакомиться, в одном из самых первых томов мы нашли следующую последовательность документов:

1. Заявление директора компании с просьбой проверить на предмет ущерба и мошенничества (то самое заявление, написанное по настоятельной просьбе сотрудников СК и ФСБ).

2. Бумагу, где Ив Роше сообщает, что оно проведёт проверку на предмет установления возможных убытков.

3. Бумагу, где Ив Роше официально сообщает следствию, что ни прямых убытков, ни упущенной выгоды нет, а «главподписка» оказывала услуги на 4-15% дешевле других контрагентов.

Вам не показалось и вы не ошиблись. Это официальное письмо от компании в СК.

Когда мы прочитали её, то подумали, что чего-то не понимаем в этой жизни. Братьев Навальных обвиняют в хищении денег у компании, а компания говорит: у нас ничего не похищали.

Это было слишком хорошо, чтобы быть правдой. Каким бы жуликом, пьяницей и дебоширом, а также иностранным шпионом ни был Бастрыкин, он же не может быть окончательным дебилом, чтобы шить громкое уголовное дело на таком материале.

Поэтому мы были уверены, что в одном из последних томов (а нам давали их строго по очереди, запрещая смотреть последние), есть документ от Ив Роше, опровергающий этот.

Чем дальше мы знакомились, тем понятнее становилось, что нового документа нет. Это, кстати, объясняло странную штуку: в деле появился ещё один заявитель — некая МПК с какими-то совсем абсурдными и непонятными обвинениями. По датам было видно: Ив Роше написало, что ущерба нет и следствие побежало искать нового «потерпевшего».

Ну так вот, тем дальше мы читали дело, тем больше спрашивали у следствия: а вы ребята совсем что ли плохие? Где у вас документ о том, что Ив Роше причинен ущерб.

И доспрашивались: поняв, что сейчас будет скандал, СК нашёл прекрасное решение: домашний арест с таким экзотическим и абсолютно незаконным условием «запрет на любые комментарии в СМИ о деле». Обратите внимание: мне разрешается (через посредников в лице защиты, конечно) комментировать Путина, Медведева, Крым, Украину, Кадырова, Якунина, Сечина и всё остальное. Только «дело Ив Роше» комментировать в СМИ мне официально запрещено.

Увидев именно это (совершенно уникальное) требование в письме в суд, мы окончательно поняли, что никакой новой бумаги от Ив Роше мы не найдём.Ущерба нет, это официально зафиксированно в материалах дела. А задача следствия сейчас одна: заткнуть нам рот до суда, а там уже судья поможет обойти сложный момент.

Поэтому сейчас я совершенно открыто и официально говорю: что мне плевать на всякие запреты и требования молчать. Плевать на угрозы изменения дом.ареста на обычный. Я молчать не буду и хоть в суде ничего не докажу, но сделаю всё, чтоб доказать вам.

Поэтому я передал это письмо в Фонд борьбы с коррупцией с просьбой опубликовать его и помочь мне написать этот пост. Читайте сами. Тут всё просто:

Ходатайство стр. 1

Ходатайство стр. 2

Докладная записка стр. 1

Докладная записка стр. 2

Вот и всё. Вот вам и «дело Ив Роше», вот вам и «хищения».

Я не знаю, что ещё я могу сделать на суде. Я не знаю более сильного аргумента в пользу невиновности своей и Олега, чем письмо от потерпевшего, что он не потерпевший.

Ничего не буду писать дальше по существу дела, бесполезно уже. Могу добавить только, что мы обращаемся с заявлением о преступлении по факту привлечения заведомо невиновного к уголовной ответственности. Текст здесь.

Что я хочу от вас? Вы мне можете помочь очень просто. Прочитайте это всё и расскажите кому-нибудь ещё. Блог в жж заблокирован, твиттер, ВК и ФБ на очереди. СМИ, которые не побоятся написать об этом, остались единицы.

На это и расчёт: немного людей в интернете знают правду, а в зомбоящике бомбят «похитил 27 миллионов».

Но ведь вы-то не «немного людей из интернета». Вас сотни тысяч. Нас сотни тысяч. Три раза нажали на кнопку и поговорили с парой человек — уже несколько миллионов знают об этом.

Ребята из ФБК даже сделали такой небольшой сайт, чтобы проще было распространять этот расчёт Ив Роше: http://delo.navalny.ru

Хотите помочь: распространите его (а если удобнее, то этот пост) где можете, пришлите каждому, кто вслед за пропагандой пишет про «похитили у Ив Роше». Маме расскажите, бабушке. С таксистом поговорите.

Вот и всё. Я сто раз говорил: нас больше и сила у нас такая, что любую пропаганду мы можем разоблачить моментально. Просто надо работать и не думать, что кто-то это сделает за тебя. Кто-то, у кого больше времени или друзей в Фейсбуке.

Никто ничего не сделает — просто ваш участок фронта будет не закрыт.

Вот в него и проползёт мерзкое рыльце дмитрия кисилева и разнообразная маргарита симонян с подрагивающими ложноножками. Никто не будет виноват, кроме вас.

Другого сопротивления не существует. Это сопротивление может победить и победит.

На этом я своё пафосное мотивирующее выступление заканчиваю.

Заранее спасибо всем, кто поможет. http://delo.navalny.ru

How It Was Done in Odessa

In LRB Keith Gessen takes a tour of post-revolutionary Odessa - and has some commentary on the historical background to recent events:

Concerns over the collapse of the Russophone political space are nothing new. In the 1990s such disparate writers as Solzhenitsyn, Brodsky and Eduard Limonov worried over it. Solzhenitsyn proposed creating a Russian-language superstate, encompassing the Russian Federation as well as the Russian-majority sections of northern Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine. Limonov actually took up arms, or tried to: he was arrested in 2001 for trying to transport a cache of Kalashnikovs and some explosives which he may have been planning to use in an invasion of northern Kazakhstan, with the intention of declaring a Russian republic there. Brodsky’s poem ‘On Ukrainian Independence’, written in the early 1990s, excoriated Ukrainians for wanting independence from Russia. He read the poem once at a public gathering in New York, then forbade its publication, but it’s circulated online for years. It’s a furious poem, but I had never truly realised, until seeing the Russians in Odessa, just how nasty it was. Brodsky warns his Ukrainian readers that on their deathbeds they’ll remember the poetry of Pushkin, not the brekhnya (‘gibberish’) of the Ukrainian national poet, Taras Shevchenko. And maybe he’s right: maybe Pushkin is the better poet, and maybe a Ukrainian inclined to remember poetry on his deathbed would choose Pushkin. But maybe he wouldn’t. And in any case Ukrainian independence isn’t a poetry competition.

Who is Fascist?

In this Al Jazeera article, Halya Coynash discusses the irony in the fact that accusations of "fascism" are being made against Ukraine by a Russian government that's increasingly establishing close links with the parties of the European far right. In addition,

A number of the main actors in the pro-Russian protests in the Donetsk region have strong links with far-right parties. Pavel Gubarev, for example, is a Donetsk business owner and the head of the "People's Militia". On March 1, he was supposedly elected "people's governor" and led a crowd in storming the Donetsk regional administration building, demanding that a referendum be held on the oblast's secession and calling for Russian military intervention. His detention was presented by Russian TV channels as politically motivated persecution. They preferred not to delve into Gubarev's ideological roots as a member of the neo-Nazi Russian National Unity Party.

Unmasked

On his Facebook blog, Ukrainian military expert Dmitry Tymchuk observes a difference in the behaviour of Russian forces in East Ukraine:

It is worth noting that earlier Russian troops tried to hide their affiliation to the Russian Armed Forces. But immediately after yesterday's signing by Moscow of the so-called Geneva agreements, they began to "legitimize themselves", though the Russian government sharply denies their presence in eastern Ukraine.

And in Novaya Gazeta a report from Slovyansk suggests that Russian servicemen are no longer bothering to conceal their identity on the ground.

Map of a Conflict

In the New Atlanticist, Taras Kuzio writes that the unthinkable has happened in Europe - Russia has invaded Ukraine. But there are obstacles in Russia's path:

First, the aim of the “green men” is to mobilize support for separatism in Russian-speaking eastern and southern Ukraine opinion, but polls do not give high levels of support for either federalism, a strong Russian demand, or for union with Russia. In a poll conducted by the Kyiv-based Democratic Initiative foundation, only 6 to 7 percent in eastern and southern Ukraine support their region’s separation and union with Russia. That support reaches its high, 18 percent, in the Donbass region, in the far southeast. Nowhere does secession have majority support.

Second, Ukraine ultimately will fight for its eastern regions, meaning there will be high numbers of casualties on both sides.

Navalny's new blog

The blog of Alexei Navalny, blocked by Roskomnadzor, now has a new home at navalny.com

Eurasianism and Separatism in Ukraine

Voices of Ukraine notes that the "Bravo" section of the Information Resistance Group has published a list and overview of organizations in Ukraine that use the presence of Russian and Russian-speaking minorities to provoke autonomist and separatist sentiment and also to threaten Ukraine's territorial integrity. One of these structures is the officially banned Eurasian Youth Union. From its Wikipedia entry:

The early-20th century Eurasianism ideology of a part of the Russian emigration and modern Neo-Eurasianism developed by Aleksandr Dugin has been declared the main ideology of the organization. Its ideology also features prominently Russian nationalism and imperialism, calls for the creation of a new Eurasian empire centered around Russia. On its website the movement declared the West and in particular the United States as its main opponent and termed it as the "main evil".

Crimea Loses its Freedom

At Voices of Ukraine, Aleksei Fyodorov, a Crimea resident, describes the intimidation and threatening, Soviet-style behaviour of the civil and military authorities now that the Russian occupation is a fact of daily life:

When the “little green men” started to take over the peninsula, some people really were euphoric. I even entertained the perfidious thought that Russia would put its petrodollars into the Crimean economy and life would at last sort itself out. But that’s not how it turned out! Already after a few days some incredibly terrible things happened, it’s difficult to describe them, but to see them live is even worse. It’s like a nightmare or a horror film! A family of Crimean Tartars lived in our building, they had come back home at the beginning of the 1990s. The head of the family dared tell a Russian soldier that his armoured car was blocking the parking spaces near our building (it is on the edge of the city, almost as you come into town). The soldier immediately started swearing, then laughing loudly he commanded his comrade to ram the car. The front of his Lada Priora (bought six months ago on credit) was crushed and the Tartar, hardly believing his eyes, only just got out of the car.

We Never Will Be Brothers

The text of the poem by 23 year-old Kievan Anastasia Dmitruk

http://otvet.bigmir.net/question/927395/

and a reading by the poet, together with a musical setting sung by a group including Lithuania's Jeronimas Milius.

 

http://obozrevatel.com/politics/42396-litovskij-hor-zapisal-pesnyu-o-rf-na-stihi-ukrainki-nikogda-myi-ne-budem-bratyami.htm

The Dangers of Yalta

In Project Syndicate, Yulia Tymoshenko writes:

Putin’s gambit is akin to the infamous Yalta Conference in 1945, where Joseph Stalin made Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt complicit in a division of Europe that enslaved half of the continent for almost a half-century. Today, Putin is seeking to make the West complicit in the dismemberment of Ukraine by negotiating a Kremlin-designed federal constitution that would create a dozen Crimeas – bite-size chunks that Russia could devour more easily later.

Institutska Street Massacre: Photos show SBU killers

The Daily Beast has published a set of exclusive photographs taken in Kyiv on February 20, showing   members of the Russian-trained anti-terrorist Alfa Team preparing to fire on protesters.

Obama's Brussels Speech

The Kyiv Post has the full text of President Obama's speech at the Palais des Beaux Arts in Brussels today:

http://www.kyivpost.com/content/world/full-text-president-obama-gives-speech-addressing-russia-and-ukraine-on-march-26-341010.html

Excerpt:

...the world has an interest in a strong and responsible Russia, not a weak one. And we want the Russian people to live in security, prosperity, and dignity like everyone else – proud of their own history. But that does not mean that Russia can run roughshod over its neighbors. Just because Russia has a deep history with Ukraine does not mean it should be able to dictate Ukraine’s future. No amount of propaganda can make right something that the world knows is wrong.

In the end, every society must chart its own course. America’s path – or Europe’s path – is not the only ways to reach freedom and justice. But on the fundamental principle that is at stake here – the ability of nations and peoples to make their own choices – there can be no going back. It is not America that filled the Maidan with protesters – it was Ukrainians. No foreign forces compelled the citizens of Tunis and Tripoli to rise up – they did so on their own. From the Burmese parliamentarian pursuing reform, to the young leaders fighting corruption and intolerance in Africa – we see something irreducible that all of us share as human beings; a truth that will persevere in the face of violence and repression and, ultimately, overcome it.

The "Russkiy Mir"

In his speech on March 18, Vladimir Putin made it clear that Russia will intervene to "protect" the interests of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers around the globe, wherever they may live.

This policy is known as the "Russkiy Mir", or Russian World, and it is the continuation of a project that was launched in 2007, with the establishment of the global Russkiy Mir Foundation:

a Russian soft power initiative created by decree by Vladimir Putin in 2007, as a government-funded organisation aimed at promoting the Russian language, and "forming the Russian World as a global project", co-operating with the Russian Orthodox Church in promoting values that challenge the Western cultural tradition.

The "National Traitors"

On his Facebook page Sergey Markov has published a list of "traitors of Russia" who supported the "Banderite Maidan". They include

1 Andrei Makarevich
2 Navalny
3 Colllective of the radio station Ekho Moskvy
4 Collective of the television channel Dozhd'
5 Collective of the portal Lenta.ru
6 Arnold Schwarzenegger
7 The singer Ruslana
8 Yuri Shevchuk
9 Dzhigurda
10 Collectives of the group "Okean Elzy"
11 Collective of the group "Lyapis Trubetskoi"
12 Sergei Zverev
13 Valeria Novodvorskaya
14 George Clooney
15 Ksenia Sobchak
16 Viktor Shenderovich
17 Liya Akhedzhakova
18 Boris Nemtsov
19 Boris Grebenshchikov
20 Garik Kharlamov
21 Anna Sedokova
22 Irina Khakamada
23 Marat Gelman
24 Dzhared Leto
25 Mila Jovovich
26 Martin Gore
27 Zemfira
28 Vera Brezhneva
29 Vladimir Zelensky
30 Natasha Koroleva
31 Collective of the group "Serebro"
32 Mikhail Khodorkovsky
33 Bozhena Rynska
34 Collective of the journal "Snob"
36 Boris Akunin
27 The rapper Seryoga
28 Alexander Nevzorov
39 Nikas Safronov
40 Collective of the portal http://slon.ru
41 Garry Kasparov

Tymchuk: Summary for March 21 (in English)

https://www.facebook.com/dmitry.tymchuk/posts/472615769533750?stream_ref=10

Tymchuk: Summary for March 20 (in English)

Dmitry Tymchuk and the Information Resistance Group have published a summary of the situation in Ukraine and Crimea on March 20:

https://www.facebook.com/dmitry.tymchuk/posts/472193336242660?stream_ref=10

From the President's Address

"The most recent public opinion surveys conducted here in Russia show that 95 percent of people think that Russia should protect the interests of Russians and members of other ethnic groups living in Crimea – 95 percent of our citizens."

http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6889

Interview with Dmitry Tymchuk

In Voices of Ukraine, Roman Grivinskiy writes about the well-known Ukrainian blogger and military expert Dmitry Tymchuk, and interviews him:

Currently, thousands of Ukrainians wind down their day with a visit to the Facebook page of Dmitry Tymchuk, Ukrainian officer, coordinator of the Information Resistance group and the Director of the NGO Center for Military and Political Studies. Every evening, the author publishes his summary report that contains operational information about the situation in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the situation in Crimea and on the Ukrainian borders. Day after day, Dmitry uses his unfailing greeting at the beginning [of the summary] (“Brothers and sisters!”) and the hope that the next day will bring Ukraine only good news, expressed at the end. InformationResistance group was created by Dmitry Tymchuk with his colleagues at the initial stage of the [Crimean] conflict; it actually took over the functions of government agencies that were supposed to inform the people and the international community about events in Ukraine. Over the past two weeks this very Facebook page probably became the most valuable source of information for most Ukrainian and international media. During this time, Information Resistance received 23,000 new subscribers! [Since this article was published 5 days ago, they have gained another 10,000+ subscribers –VOU editor].

Putin, Crimea and the legitimacy trap

by J. Paul Goode and Marlene Laruelle - March 13, 2014

http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/j-paul-goode-and-marlene-laruelle/putin-crimea-and-legitimacy-trap-nationalism

If Vladimir Putin appears, in the words of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, to be ‘out of touch with reality,’ it might be that he views events in Ukraine through the lens of Russia’s domestic politics. Nationalism is, indeed, meaningful for Putin, but not for any sense of primordial or mystical attachment to ethnic Russians in Crimea. More that it has been a key element of the political toolkit used by the Kremlin to legitimise the status quo. The presidential administration has invested a great deal of effort and resources into replacing electoral legitimacy with nationalist legitimacy. If one wants to understand the decision to intervene in Crimea, one needs to understand the tactical uses of nationalism in sustaining the Putin regime.

In Russia’s domestic politics, nationalist politics are bound up with the establishment and survival of the regime.  Kremlin-backed nationalism is socially conservative and politically delegative. It justifies the existing hierarchy in Russia and places a premium on citizens’ loyalty rather than action. There is a circular relationship between Putin’s political domination and his claim to legitimacy: by ensuring electoral dominance, Putin claims a popular mandate, which validates his articulation of national values and definition of patriotic obligations on behalf of all Russians. The equation is then easily reversed and it becomes one’s patriotic duty to support Putin, especially against those who would disrupt the image of domestic political tranquility. This strategy has long been successful, both guaranteeing broad popular support for Moscow’s renewed self-assertiveness, and in shaping a consensual national identity. Indeed, like all nationalisms, it represents Russian values in terms of universal values and defines national membership in broadly inclusive terms. The cultural distinctiveness underpinning it is at the same time bound up with the historical arc of Russian statehood.

The former Soviet states play a unique role in this nationalist legitimation. Despite the claim to cultural and historical exception, the shared history of Soviet rule turns Russia’s post-Soviet neighbours into a series of distorting mirrors that serve both as instructive lessons and cautionary tales. Among Russia’s neighbours, no other state is as important as Ukraine in its connection to the way Russians imagine their past, present, and future: Ukraine is still part of Russians’ ‘mental atlas.’ In Putin’s Russia, protests in Kyiv since the Orange Revolution in 2004 have served as a cautionary tale in the state media about the excesses of democracy and Western interference in post-Soviet states. The collapse of the Orange coalition and election of Viktor Yanukovych as Ukraine’s president in 2010 was hailed by the Kremlin as validation of its worldview.

Certainly, the parallels between Russian and Ukrainian politics are difficult to escape despite the vast differences in population, ethnic cleavages, and resources. Both Yanukovych’s Ukraine and Putin’s Russia could be classed as ‘electoral autocracies’ — a kind of semi-authoritarian government possessing all the formal trappings of democracy while constantly subverting them. Putin does not perceive either Ukraine or Russia’s political opposition as an independent, organised, and peaceful movement working towards free elections and the rule of law. Rather, he views it as a vocal, aggrieved minority, lacking a clear platform, and funded by the West through a shadowy network of nongovernmental organisations. Russia’s fractious political opposition traditionally has proven to be its own worst enemy at the ballot box and so the Kremlin reasons that the opposition could only muster a challenge with external sponsorship. Hence, it must be operating on behalf of shadowy forces in the West. As Putin is fond of saying, ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune.’

Some of Russia’s more prominent nationalist organisations began to work together with the weak and divided political opposition, making it stronger and more credible. This uneasy alliance was embodied by opposition leader Aleksey Navalny’s participation in the annual Russian March on November 4 2011. Held on the outskirts of Moscow on the new ‘National Unity Day’ instituted by the regime, the Russian March brings together nationalist, racist, and xenophobic elements to parade (in masks) shouting slogans of ‘Russia for Russians,’ and ‘Stop Feeding the Caucasus.’ Nationalists also joined in the large-scale opposition protests of 2011-2012.

While the protests and the ‘Russian Marches’ were peaceful, Russia has witnessed a series of pogroms targeting both migrant workers and corrupt local governments, from Kondopoga in 2006, to Birуulуovo just last October. During a harrowing three days in December 2010, ultranationalists attacked foreigners, controlled metro stations, and effectively shut down central Moscow. Xenophobia is just the tip of the iceberg of a larger social malaise linked to socioeconomic transformations, a diffuse feeling that living standards are no longer on the rise, and a growing resentment against the state’ s systemic inefficiency, especially its endemic corruption.

A crucial similarity with the (former) opposition protests in Ukraine is the convergence of nationalists and political opposition in Russia on a common complaint: corruption and the lack of democracy. Broadly speaking, nationalists charge the Kremlin with failing to protect the ethnic Russian people at home and the lack of fair elections only sustains (and indicts) a corrupt regime. By contrast, the political opposition accuses Putin of subverting the constitution and denying Russian citizens the democracy they allegedly won by overthrowing the USSR in 1991. Both nationalists and political opposition believe they would have a legitimate stake in the running of the country if elections were free and fair. As long as they remain divided, they pose little threat to the Kremlin. However, a genuine alliance of nationalists and opposition could threaten the Kremlin’s base of support, especially among its youth, working class, and provincial constituencies.

Putin personally experienced just how quickly the ground could shift under his feet when he made an impromptu appearance at a Mixed Martial Arts match in November 2011 and was booed relentlessly by a crowd that ought to have been filled with typical supporters. The moment went viral on social media even as state television edited out the boos when re-broadcasting the event. In the wake of mass protests following the parliamentary elections in December 2011, the Kremlin briefly retreated, firing top Kremlin advisor Vladislav Surkov, restoring gubernatorial elections, and easing party registration requirements.

In the face of such a challenge, Putin’s re-election campaign in 2012 was never really about winning. The field of candidates lacked a single credible challenger. Rather, it was about recapturing legitimacy. Anti-westernism and especially anti-Americanism became staples of Putin’s repertoire, particularly the intimation that the political opposition was on the US State Department’s payroll. The revival of this anti-Western narrative is balanced with the Kremlin’s insistence on Russia’s European mission. The recent ‘morality turn’, which has been notable since the anti-Putin protests of 2011-12 (epitomised by Putin’s speech at Valdai on 20 September, 2013) did not call exclusively for Russia to find itself an identity, but rather to make itself the herald of ‘authentic’ European values, meaning family-oriented values and moral conservatism.

In a series of newspaper articles published in advance of the 2012 presidential election, Putin further elaborated a vision of Russian national identity in which all Russian citizens are Russian regardless of their ethnicity, but the Russian state is identified with ethnic Russian culture and language. This blurry vision of identity aims to be both inclusive and exclusive: exclusive of those who disturb Russian conventional identity (North Caucasians, labour migrants) but inclusive of all the others, whose integration depends on the occasion (those who are not ethnically Russian but who speak the language or heavily identify with Soviet or Russian culture). This identity is promoted by the Kremlin as a ‘Russian world’ (Russkii mir), which puts forward a concentric vision of Russian identity: ethnic and Orthodox Russians reside at the heart of it, but other types of identification with Russianness are welcomed, whether though language, history, religion, or territory. It featured prominently in the opening and closing ceremonies of the Sochi Olympics, where the Russian language took centre stage, followed by celebrations of Orthodoxy, traditional Russian culture, and Soviet-era economic development.

If Putin’s re-election validated his definition of the nation and claim to legitimacy, the post-election crackdown on protest, NGOs, and civil society signaled an end to the Kremlin’s patience with contentious politics. Yet the attempt to send Navalny to prison and remove him from the ballot for the Moscow mayor’s race in summer 2013 produced renewed protests in Moscow. The Kremlin once again backed down, granting a suspended sentence and allowing Navalny to campaign. Navalny fell well short of winning, though he proved more capable than expected. The incumbent, Sergei Sobyanin, narrowly secured a majority vote (which Navalny disputes), in part by appropriating the opposition’s complaints about corruption and migrant labor through a clever series of viral ads packaged under the slogan, Anyone but Sobyanin.

However, the Kremlin’s hope to appear in tune with the xenophobic mood of the population is probably destined for failure. Anti-Putin political forces—whether classic nationalists or ‘national-democrats’ like Aleksey Navalny—have at least as much legitimacy, if not more, from their condemnation of migration. Moreover, the authorities will fail in changing the negative role played by a corrupt administration, which prevents any normalisation of migratory flows.

In Ukraine’s descent into chaos over the last few months, the Kremlin saw the realisation of its own worst case scenario: opposition and nationalists combined forces to overthrow a regime structurally and culturally similar to Russia, albeit significantly more divided from within. Hence, the Kremlin’s depiction of today’s Ukraine as overrun by armed and violent ultranationalists has a certain self-referential quality about it: if such a turn of events is possible in Ukraine, it becomes conceivable (though not necessarily plausible) for Russia. Moreover, Russians do not have to imagine what Moscow would look like if roving bands of ultranationalist bandits were to seize power as long as the memory of the Manezh Square events of December 2010 remains available.

When placed in the context of Russia’s domestic politics, the intervention in Crimea serves an important purpose in confirming Putin’s claims about Ukraine’s new government and deterring defections from the Kremlin—a kind of inoculation against the form of regime change unfolding in Kyiv. Even in democratic states, deploying the military abroad compels social and elite unity and significantly raises the costs of dissent. If the intervention turns Russia into a pariah state, then Russia’s elite have nowhere else to turn precisely when opposing Putin is politically impossible. Moreover, the occupation of Crimea validates Putin’s inclusive and historical definition of the nation, as well as the use of force to defend its blurry borders.

The Russian intervention in Crimea drastically raised the stakes for both Ukraine and Russia. For Putin the issue is not just securing his regime domestically and avoiding Yanukovych’s failure. If the referendum is for Russian annexation of Crimea, he will have to legitimate the intervention and implement legal changes to integrate a new region in the Russian Federation. What does that tell us about the use of nationalism in Russia’s domestic and international policy?

Putin may have decided to intervene in Crimea to be sure Russia would remain the unavoidable stakeholder without whom the future of Ukraine cannot be decided (of course, it would have played a crucial role, regardless, given Ukraine’s geography, history, demographics and economy). His argument that Russia intervened to defend Russian citizens living in Ukraine is not necessarily a nationalist claim, as citizenship is not synonymous with nationality. But Russian citizens were not at risk in Crimea: even if the parliament in Kyiv was short-sighted in depriving Russian language of its official status in the country (a move which was later vetoed by acting President Oleksandr Turchynov), ethnic Russians—some with passports from both Ukraine and Russia—were not physically threatened by the interim government. Russia equally could have argued that it needs the lease of Sevastopol to remain unchallenged, or it could have called for an evacuation of Russian citizens if an actual threat was present.

Instead, by insisting on the relationship with Russian citizens abroad, Moscow created a subtext that implicitly bases itself on national identity and is understood by the Russian (and the Ukrainian) constituencies in both countries as a cultural argument for Crimea being legitimately Russian. This makes real the debate about the future of Ukraine and the role of Russia in it, especially as state television in Russia assails viewers with a narrative justifying Putin’s actions on behalf of Crimean Russians and questioning the historical basis of Ukraine as a state. It also authorises political entrepreneurs in Russia and Crimea to develop and extend Putin’s justifications for intervention. In Crimea, such entrepreneurship potentially involves moves on the ground that are not monitored or planned by the Kremlin, including uncontrollable local political groups, or militias and crowds that can create more problems than Russia would like to see. Such challenges only add to the costs of sustaining the Crimean burden.

If the intervention in Crimea authorises the use of force to patrol the boundaries of citizenship, it also serves as an opportunity for political entrepreneurs within Russia to justify violence or repression of non-Russia migrants and minorities. Some are already pushing for greater restrictions on foreign contacts for Russian NGOs and academics. In such an environment, political entrepreneurs may become ‘ethnopreneurs’ and seek to activate anti-migrant sentiment in ways that threaten Russia’s labour force. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that Putin’s intervention in Crimea will exacerbate the Crimean Tatar issue. Crimea’s Muslim Tatars make up 12% of the population and generally are wary of integration with Russia. This opens the door to renewed secessionism in the North Caucasus. To stave off concerns from both Russian and Crimean Tatars, Tatarstan’s President Rustam Minnikhanov was rushed to Crimea to sign an ambiguous cooperation agreement, television from Tatarstan has been broadcast in Crimea, and a role in Crimea’s government promised to Crimean Tatars.

Having sent in troops on the grounds of defending ethnic Russians abroad, the intervention in Crimea puts Putin’s domestic claims to legitimacy on the line. Given the similarities between Yanukovych’s and Putin’s political systems, Russia’s characterisation of the new government in Kyiv as dominated entirely by Western puppets and radical nationalists (and its denial of civil society’s role) reflects both its own worst fears about threats to its rule at home as well as a challenge to its expansive definition of the nation.

The intervention creates a perverse set of incentives for pro-Kremlin actors in Crimea and in Russia to push for deepening the crisis, so reining in ethnopreneurs risks confirming the nationalist complaint that Putin fails to protect ethnic Russians. Yet allowing local actors to push the boundaries of the crisis means sacrificing Putin’s leading role in defining the nation. Meanwhile, continuing the present course confirms the opposition complaint that Putin denies democracy to Russian citizens, now likely to be tested with the forced choice referendum in Crimea on March 16.

Unfortunately, linking the tactical uses of nationalism in Russia’s domestic politics with intervention in Crimea yields a rather grim outlook: de-escalation of the crisis will only succeed if it can be de-coupled from a discourse of Russian national identity, but for Putin this would mean sacrificing nationalism as a source of legitimacy.

Ukraine: Analysis

Best analysis and prognosis I have seen so far, from Valery Dzutsev's LiveJournal:

 ...на Западе прекрасно понимают, что Крым и Украина это первые (ну или вторые) признаки русского экспансионизма в Европе. Т.е. если Запад побурчит и отдаст Крым или Украину России, то в скором времени ему уже придется сдерживать Россию в Польше, Прибалтике и т.д. Заверения Москвы об особой роли Крым в русском сознании никого на Западе не впечатлят, ну может быть только каких-нибудь особо впечатлительных репореторов НЙ Таймс. Ситуация явно напоминает расширения территории Третьего Рейха времен Адольфа Гитлера, который играл на противоречиях великих держав и на нежелании ввязываться в войну с Германией из-за казалось малозначительных стран и территорий.

Т.е. получается, что воевать с Россией Запад не хочет, но в то же время осознает, что Россия наступает и будет наступать, причем в самом буквально военном смысле этого слова. В таких условиях у Запада остается единственный приемлемый механизм противодействия России - серьезные экономические санкции, причем, даже со вредом для самого Запада, потому что экономический вред все-таки лучше, чем ядерная зима. Именно за-за этого никакого закулисного соглашения по разделу Украины, при котором бы Россия и Запада не потревожили друг друга санкциями, быть не может по определению. 

Это ведет, как многие уже говорили к повторению ситуации холодной войны, но больше это будет похоже на изоляцию Ирана, со своими особенностями. Идеологически Россия не претендует на какой-то новый миропорядок, она только действует согласно своей устоявшейся модели перманентного расширения империи в век утвердившейся модели государства-нации, что неизбежно порождает конфликты. Хотя дворцовый переворот возможен в Москве, более вероятным сценарием представляется все же довольно длительный период противостояния между Россией и Западом. 

Read the whole thing.

Ukraine - Situation on March 13 [D. Tymchuk]

Via Dmitry Tymchuk:

Итоги 13 марта на англ.
(спасибо Voices of Ukraine)

Brothers and sisters, here is the summary for March 13, 2014
(for summary from the previous day, see Summary of March 12).
The bad news:

1. We, the Information Resistance group, have prepared a map showing the disposition of Russian military troops across the perimeter of Ukrainian borders (see below). The picture is depressing. Our borders are only clear in the West. Meanwhile, North, South and East are packed to the rim with Orcs. A trivial analogy, but Ukraine does look like the only island of hope left in the kingdom of darkness. An army of 6,000 people and millions of unarmed patriots, against a horde of evil.

It is unbearably depressing that the Commander-in-Chief of our army isn’t simply unwilling to fight – he does not offer any other options, either. Our guys in Crimea are like Roman legionaries who, at the time of the eruption of Mount Vesuvius, received no orders to retreat from Pompeii. They are standing under the deadly rain of ash and lava. We are on the brink of disaster, but no one is answering the fundamental question: what do we do? Frankly, this is terrifying. As terrifying as the sense of powerlessness can be.

Infographic - https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=468734096588584&set=a.211188579009805.47448.100003559926167&type=1&relevant_count=1

2. Today, Russia has launched the “second phase of military exercises” for their troops, including those near Ukrainian borders. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the exercises will continue through the end of March.

The fact that Russians lied about March 7, 2014 being the end date of their “exercises” was clear to everyone. Even yesterday, I personally couldn’t understand how they were going to explain the fact that the border regions of Russia and Ukraine continue to be packed with troops. It turned out that the Kremlin can lie with ease: it simply announced an “extension of military exercises.”

There is no doubt that these [exercises] are the preparation for invasion. The only question is whether the troops will be eventually ordered to cross the border.

3. The Ukrainian Navy Commander has made an announcement. I have read it three times and still could not understand a word of it. It’s none of my damn business to criticize the Admiral, but how could he announce that the Russian military were storming our units and threatening our men with weapons, while at the same time saying how “the Ukrainian Navy leadership is in control of the situation [at military units]“? What kind of “control” is he even talking about??

I think it would’ve been better to keep quiet about it all. Such words will only serve to further demoralize our troops, who are stuck between Russian aggression and strange statements from their own commanders.
The good news:

1. Towards the evening, there were reports that the Russian Foreign Ministry was ready to discuss the situation in Crimea under the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States formed by former Soviet republics] framework. But our diplomats demand that negotiations be held in Kyiv, whereas the Russians insist on Minsk [Belarus]. The outcome of this ongoing diplomatic dispute is unclear.

These are not direct negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, but only a “discussion” by Foreign Deputy Ministers within the CIS. It is also unclear whether this meeting will take place at all. But since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this is the first signal that the Kremlin is, somewhere and somehow, ready to begin discussing the situation in Crimea, even if they will keep fighting for their interests and advancing their own demands. Before today, they were not willing to do anything like that.

2. Perhaps this is related to the previous point, but [the officials in] Moscow finally started to use their brains regarding the economic sanctions. Today, a member of the Presidential Economic Council Presidium of Russia [and a former Finance Minister] Alexei Kudrin announced that the economic sanctions of Western countries towards Russia due to the situation in Ukraine could have a stronger impact on the [Russian] economy than the Kremlin would like to admit. Will Russians be scared with the zero GDP growth in 2014? Are they prepared to tighten their belts for the sake of dubious moral satisfaction in oppressing their “brotherly nation” Ukraine? I don’t know. But the fact that a Russian pro-governmental expert has started making such declarations is definitely a sign of things to come.

3. The United States plan to extend the stay of USS George H.W. Bush [aircraft carrier] in the eastern Mediterranean. This is a good position to fully control the Russian Black Sea Fleet forces in the Black Sea. On one hand, Americans are far enough so as not to frighten the Russian warriors to death. But they are also close enough that, if need be, the hats of Russian sailors will litter the Southern Coast of Crimea, and their marine pea coats will float all the way from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk [Russian port on Black Sea]. The only bad thing in this situation is the fact that we cannot rely on our own Navy the way we trust in the Americans.

May the new day bring us good news of Ukrainian origin. We need it like oxygen.