[Walenciak] And does such goodwill exist in Polish-Russian relations?
[Rotfeld] Here the problem is both more complex and less complex. On the one hand, there are many people in Poland who would like to constantly give Russia advice. I would be the last person to consider such an attitude rational. This does not mean that there are no grounds for astonishment or concern.
[Walenciak] What does astonish you?
[Rotfeld] When I closely listened to, and then read President Putin's speech of the 4th of September, I was surprised that he spoke about traditional threats: Russia's borders -- Putin was saying -- are not protected either to the east or to the west. He did not mention the south at all. But it is there -- and only there -- that threats for today's Russia come from. I thought that whoever wrote that speech for him should ask himself the question whether he wasn't falling into an old scheme of thought. The ruts of speeches by Brezhnev and Chernenko. Today Russia is a signatory not only of the NATO Founding Act from 1997, but also of the document about the "new quality of relations between NATO and Russia," as well as a party to the joint NATO-Russia Council. In the West, Russia has partners more numerous than it seems to have had in its entire history, not enemies... The threats are born in the south.
[Walenciak] The Caucasus, ethnic issues...
[Rotfeld] The uprising of Shamil, the imam of Dagestan and Chechnya, the leader of the mountainous peoples of the Caucasus in their war against tsarist Russia, lasted more than 60 years. After the Revolution - during WWII - Stalin worsened the situation, by deporting all of the Chechens to Central Asia and Siberia. They came back, after Stalin's death, under the rule of Nikita Khrushchev. The new Russia had chances of resolving the problem; I had the impression that president Boris Yeltsin was close to this, especially after the signing of the agreement in 1996 between General Lebed and Maskhadov. It remained in force for a very short duration. The current Russian Government does not have confidence in Maskhadov.
[Walenciak] Should we be surprised?
[Rotfeld] Let's look at internal Polish affairs. General Wojciech Jaruzelski, after all, did not have confidence in Lech Walesa, nor Walesa in Jaruzelski. But the realism of both the former and the latter meant that however they perceived each other's weaknesses and shortcomings, they also knew that they had no other partner for discussion. I have the impression that president Vladimir Putin is wrestling with this problem today. Meanwhile, in his speech, he was saying that the Russian nuclear potential was like a "bone in certain peoples' throats," and they wanted to eliminate this threat. Terrorism -- Putin was saying -- is "only an instrument to achieve this goal." Well, yet this nuclear potential is "a ball and chain" for Russia today -- it is absolutely inappropriate for the purposes. Russia cannot use it to solve the problem of Chechnya. Moreover, these weapons are becoming a huge burden, because they are getting old and have to be destroyed. But Russia does not have the money to do so. The world has allocated the astronomical sum of $20 billion to reducing these and other weapons of mass destruction in Russia. The United States is paying half of this -- $10 billion. So, saying about that someone finds distasteful, what is for Russia a problem and burden, attests to a sort of cognitive dissonance. The shock of Beslan has brought back a conviction that Russia is allegedly a besieged fortress.
[Walenciak] Maybe among a part of society, but not, it seems, among the leaders.
[Rotfeld] From president Putin's speech emerges a longing for the lost status of a superpower: our country -- the Russian president was saying, once had the "strongest system for protecting its borders"; "we live today, after the collapse of the huge power, which proved to be incapable of life under the conditions of a rapidly-changing world. But we have managed to preserve the nucleus of this giant, which was the USSR, and we named this new country the Russian Federation. We live under conditions of heightened internal conflicts and inter-ethnic clashes, which were formerly kept under control by the hard fist of the prevailing ideology. We've stopped paying attention to the problems of defense and security. We were unable to react adequately to all of the processes that are taking place in the world; we demonstrated our weakness. And the weak get beaten." These are conceptual phrasings that come from times that are thankfully behind us. Whoever wrote this speech did not perceive the essence of the problem. In today's times, it is not military potential that determines a country's strength, but rather the rule of law and economic potential. Russia has, as I have said, problems to the south. The problem is that although Russia is capable of quelling any uprising that breaks out there, it will not resolve the essence of the matter in this way. Because only a political solution can be a lasting solution. Gorbachev says this, former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin says this, Yeltsin says this. I think that president Putin also thinks in a similar way.
[Walenciak] I interpreted this speech a bit differently. It did not surprise me. I think that Putin didn't have a choice, he had to demonstrate toughness, he had to appeal to profound emotions, because this is what Russian society and his group of backers demanded from him. In such a situation, a leader has to be with society. And so, this was his speech for domestic purposes. I expect that Putin will now make several tough moves, so as to seek political solutions later, perhaps in a year.
[Rotfeld] I accept the second portion of this argumentation. Life will force Russian leaders to seek a political solution. I do not agree, on the other hand, that society expected such a reaction from him, meaning a reminder of who rules in this country. This has already been clear for five years. When president Putin came to power, he took over a Russia that was wobbly, unpredictable. He normalized the situation and the world took this with great relief. Putin gained popularity in Russia and very great recognition among Western partners. Putin had, and has, the backing of Russians.
Let's compare this with the approach taken by Anthony Brenton, Britain's new ambassador to Russia, in a much shorter interview for Kommersant Daily:
Volkhonsky: With regard to political relations, do you not think that friendship between leaders, smiles and handshakes just mask the serious, deep-seated problems?
Brenton: First of all, I should say that the relationship between our prime minister, Tony Blair, and your president, Vladimir Putin , is really excellent. They have a common view of many problems, in particular the problem of terrorism. The recent terrible events in Beslan provoked an extensive response in British society and in the government. I was in the United States on 11 September 2001 and I can see that the reaction in your society to the events in Beslan is in many ways similar to that, which occurred in America with regard to the acts of terrorism in New York and Washington. And this just emphasises the community of our aims.
Volkhonsky: Moscow is openly accusing London of dual standards, citing the fact that a number of individuals accused of aiding and abetting terrorists by the Russian government have been given asylum in Great Britain.
Brenton: I understand that you mean the case of Zakayev. Our position with regard to this is clear. This issue is governed not by parliamentary decision but by law. And the law says that if convincing proof of specific individuals' guilt is provided they will be extradited. Such proof has not been provided. But if the Russian government provides it, we will be among the first to demand that these individuals should be made to answer before the law.
Volkhonsky: During recent times, in connection with the events in Russia, the question of what is primary -- the fight against terrorism or democracy and human rights -- is being actively discussed. How do you assess this aspect of the situation in Russia?
Brenton: All countries must keep a balance between the tasks of protecting the population from terrorism and democracy and human rights. Russia must determine itself precisely where this boundary should lie. But we are taking into account President Putin 's statement made in May at the Federation Council. He said then that no one would ever force Russia to turn off the path of democracy or to renounce human freedoms and rights. And we hope the measures, which Russia is taking now, will not go against this statement.
Volkhonsky: Great Britain has a long history of its own problems with terrorists. Can your experience in Northern Ireland teach Russia anything?
Brenton: Of course, every case is different and the situation in Chechnya is not identical to the one in Northern Ireland. One of the aspects of the fight against terrorism is the strengthening of the law-enforcement bodies and we decisively took this path. But there is another aspect as well. It is that the socio-economic conditions in the problematical region need to be changed so that young people can obtain well paid jobs, which enable them to buy sports cars. Then they simply have no reason to become terrorists. After all, one of the main manifestations of democracy is a developed economy. And I am glad to see that it is this path, which the Russian president intends to take.
All one can say in response to this rather embarrassing performance is that British foreign policy with regard to Russia has always been characterized by a rather large degree of dualism. It should be remembered, for example, that throughout fifty years of the Cold War, despite numerous phases of "rapprochement" and "detente" with the Soviet Union, Britain stubbornly refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States. That said, it's a pity that the new British ambassador should be quite so effusive in his lauding of the "excellent" relationship between Blair and Putin. There is also the unfortunate recent precedent of another short interview - the one conducted by the Russian Vremya with Terry Davis, recently appointed Secretary of the Council of Europe. While there are few excuses for Davis's incautious and naive remarks, the ambassador's newness may be a factor in his apparent gullibility - or perhaps he is just repeating the line so often heard from Washington these days. Or perhaps - in a manner that's not quite unknown in Britain's participation in Europe's history during the last three-quarters of a century - he is letting Poland do the real talking.
(via Marius)
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