Chechnya the Draft

The Chechen Society Newspaper, #17, August 30, 2005

Chechnya the Draft

Until very recently there has been no precise or considered strategy in Chechnya for managing the Republic. To use an analogy, Chechnya is like a draft that the administration of the President of the Russian Federation is using for practice. Neither are the political leaders defining the course the Republic should follow themselves definite. The current leaders, President Alu Alkhanov and Ramzan Kadyrov - the Vice Prime Minister with security responsibility, are just strokes of the pen on this draft.

By Timur ALIEV

Alkhanov – Kadyrov

In the year since the death of Akhmat Kadyrov at the stadium in Grozny, the Kremlin has still not taken its final decision on whom to appoint in Chechnya and how. This is shown by the apportionment of power in the Republic, with no one leader or person striving for the leadership having been completely taken out of the fight. Apart from those who stand for the separation of Chechnya from Russia, naturally.

Meanwhile, the temporary option to manage the Republic - the fairy tale combination of Kadyrov-the-Younger-Alkhanov - is currently still in the lead.

Alkhanov is doubtless a decent man, a fact which seems to have won over the Kremlin for his candidacy. The general public can see the weakness in their President but still have some confidence in him. This support, however, has not been won over his Presidency of now almost a year, but was trust given like credit to the new leader of the Republic, which has still not completely run out.

Ramzan Kadyrov is patriotic in his own way – many of his actions bear witness to his desire to be useful to his Republic and his people. Examples include his recent decision to close all gambling arcades and the various building sites around Chechnya.

However, despite his achievements in the past year, Ramzan Kadyrov cannot compete with his father, for example, in his ability to lead external political affairs. Saying this, Kadyrov is still useful for the Kremlin as Moscow cannot see any other power in the Republic at present.

It is possible that Ramzan Kadyrov’s position will soon become a burden for the Kremlin because his resources are needed here and now, whilst punitive measures are necessary. The “Kadyrovtsy” [troops under the command of Ramzan Kadyrov] are their own kind of propaganda of the understanding that “it is better to be with us than against us”.

In any case this is not a question that can be solved in a day, especially after the Sochi meeting between Vladimir Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov, which showed that the position of the latter in the Republic is as strong as ever.

The Opposition

Despite the large number of believers in the theory that Moscow decides everything and that Moscow is supporting someone particular in Chechnya, the Kremlin only decides the general line taken – the rest is decided by concrete individuals.

As a matter of fact it is in the Kremlin’s interest for new political figures to come through in the Republic, people capable of influencing the situation, as long as they fall within the current boundaries. I.e. the Kremlin needs opponents but not to the authorities in the Republic but to several figures within the authorities, namely Ramzan Kadyrov. If any new politician can prove he is indispensable, then it is possible he will be able to gain the support of the Kremlin.

However, this opposition should again not become military, and should not become a conflict, putting in doubt the current “stability” in the Republic, as the recent conflict between Ramzan Kadyrov and the former vice-Prime Minister of Chechnya, Bislan Gantamirov, showed. When the conflict escalated beyond the Cabinet boundaries through the mass media, the Kremlin was forced to intervene and “reconcile” the politicians, calling them to the Kremlin offices and ordering them to calm down.

Good vs. Evil

The only definition that exists, is in regard to the separatists. After the destruction of the separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov it became clear that no contact at all with them was expected (of any kind – no talks, nothing). The elimination of Maskhadov allowed for the strict division of Chechnya into two political camps – the pro-Moscow and the pro-Ichkeria. At one end of this conflict there is the Kremlin and the pro-Moscow leadership of Chechnya, whilst at the other there is the terrorist and leader of the radical wing of Chechen separatists, Shamil’ Basaev and his supporters. There is no longer any middle, the moderate fighters who prefer a political resolution to the conflict and whose leader was Aslan Maskhadov.

This has turned into a classical type of opposition: the “good” and the “evil”. The Kremlin is good, as it proclaims a peaceful future for Chechnya, Shamil’ Basaev is bad, calling for total Jihad. Basaev is the kind of enemy the Kremlin wants to see in the Caucasus. He takes hospitals and schools hostage, constantly threatens new acts of terrorism and calls Muslims to a global jihad. Basaev is bad. He is a classical enemy who needs to be destroyed and that will be Russian policy in the Caucasus.

Europe Against a Sovereign Chechnya

European policy on Chechnya is quite straightforward. Europe is against the violation of any human rights in Chechnya and is prepared to announce this firmly in recommendations to Russia from European institutions. However, Europe is equally firm in its objections to the acquisition of full independence for Chechnya, particularly by non-political means, being wary of creating an international precedent. In supporting Chechnya in its attempt to gain independence, the world could get other conflicts, for example in Kosovo or in the State of Punjab. Europe does not want to redefine the world’s territorial boundaries and so will not support the Chechen separatists in their military struggle with Russia.

The Economy

For the future Chechnya will remain an “additional supply of raw materials” for Russia – there are no plans to restore Chechen oil-refining plants. The process of signing the Agreement on the division of power between Moscow and Chechnya, which all regions need to sign, is also being dragged out. Official Chechnya is trying to win back its own resources within the framework of this agreement, so far unsuccessfully.

All operations concerned with oil (extraction, transport) are currently still handled by the Federal State Company “Rosneft’”. Part of the money is returned to the Republic, but only through Moscow and only in the form of grants.

This happens mainly because Moscow is worried that if Chechnya comes off the grant “hook” and gains economic independence, it could easily start wanting political independence too.

Lobbying aimed at the Kremlin by Chechnya’s neighbours in the south of Russia may also be partially to blame for this, as they do not want a strong economic neighbour either and do not want to see a redistribution of economic benefits in favour of Chechnya.

Restoration and Corruption

The restoration of the Chechen Republic is happening extremely slowly for two reasons. The first is bureaucracy and how as a result of a lack of co-ordination of instructions any important decisions to be taken are delayed. The second reason is corruption at every level of authority. Every bureaucrat in Chechnya comes to office having paid the person above him. This means that instead of working normally at his post he has to earn the money to pay off the amount he paid for it.

Any inhabitant in Chechnya wanting to find him or herself a prestigious or well-paid job finds themselves in virtually the same position. The ability to get a job by handing over a bribe also leads to a situation whereby positions managing the republic are sometimes taken by people who do not have the necessary knowledge to do the job.

The lack of permanent jobs forces many inhabitants of the Republic to work in the “grey economy” as it is called – either as a private cab driver, small trader, day work on a building site or elsewhere, or working for semi-criminal or criminal “businesses” – extracting or refining oil, transporting the oil products, or stealing non-ferrous metals.

Military action and the violation of human rights

There has been a marked decrease in the militarization of the situation in the Republic in the last two years. There are no longer any large-scale military actions being run in Chechnya. The separatists continue the partisan war – damaging military equipment and small diversions, whilst the federal forces run special operations combing the woodland and foothill tracts.

Tactics of mass mop-up operations in populated areas of Chechnya, changed several years ago to targeted operations to detain those suspected of belonging to the separatist forces, have not brought much success. At the same time it is precisely these tactics used by the federal forces that have provoked the most criticism from the public and human rights organisations, as innocent people often suffer.

The policy of “Chechenisation” whereby Chechens fight Chechens, which was conceived by Moscow, has already started to bite back. This was shown by the situation in Borozdinovskaya. Having given weapons and a carte-blanche to destroy fighters to loyal Chechens, Moscow has created a force in the Republic that it cannot control.

Military presence

The federal military [forces] are no longer a force that can completely influence the situation in the Republic. The tactic of controlling the situation through federal check-points, set up on key roads in Chechnya, has gone forever, never having justified itself. Some of the check-points have been removed, others take care of routine checks on road vehicles.

At the moment we can say that the military have “gone into the shadows” but that they are still carrying out their activities as before. Their strength does not depend on the 80,000 troop contingent which is based in the republic, but on their contacts with the Chechen security forces and politicians. Some of the military, including the former head of the General Headquarters of the Russian Armed Forces, Anatolii Kvashnin, and the current head, Yury Baluevskii, support Bislan Gantamirov. The military have known him since the beginning of the Chechen war in 1999, when Gantamirov created the Chechen police detachments, which came forward on the side of the federal troops against the fighters. He is also trusted because he does not use former fighters as his military support.

Parliament

The future Chechen parliament, the elections to which have been set for the end of November this year, will not become a political force, capable of changing the situation in Chechnya or even influencing the share of power in the Republic. This is mainly because any power the parliament could have in reforming Chechnya will depend totally on the Kremlin and as yet there are no preconditions for that.

No one trying to get into parliament is actually aiming for that anyway. Gantamirov himself wants to get back to the Republic any way he can as he has too much money invested in there. He owns a market and several buildings in the centre of Grozny and could lose them if he has no support within the republic leadership.

The future parliament will more likely become an auxiliary resource. If “Unified Russia” gains the victory then it will mean a strengthening in the position of Ruslan Yamadaev in the Republic, the former deputy of the Russian State Duma from Chechnya and his brothers. Ramzan Kadyrov is actively trying to stop this and is ready to create a new social movement and promote it to parliament.

The point of view of President Putin’s Official Representative in the South of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Kozak, could also win the day. Dmitry Kozak is not against the parliament becoming a multi-party entity as this would allow [Russia] to demonstrate the democratic nature of power in the Republic and at the same time weaken Kadyrov and Yamadaev’s position there.

The Kremlin can allow itself this as from the very start no political forces that could stand for independence will be allowed to take part in the parliamentary elections. From Kozak’s point of view any democratic and liberal forces in Chechnya who could be guaranteed a place in the parliament if they won, would stand at most for a broad mandate for Chechnya within Russia, but would not stand for full sovereignty on any terms.

Civil society

At the moment there is no stable, active civil society that could become a new force in these conditions of an extreme centralisation of power in Chechnya. The rare sparks of civil action at events like demonstrations and human rights conferences do not aim to create this civil society either, but are more like PR for several public leaders who would not be against going into politics themselves.

The situation for civil society in Chechnya is similar to that in Russia generally. So in Moscow President Putin is trying in vain to create a Public Chamber which could control the vertical of power which he has created, without destroying it completely. In Chechnya the situation is worse because the local authorities have not still fully understood the importance of civil society.

The official number of inhabitants in the Chechen Republic is one million and eighty thousand people (according to information from the Russian Census of 2002). According to unofficial figures there are around 800,000 people living in Chechnya today.

As far as the demographic situation in the Republic is concerned there is a characteristically high birth-rate. In 2004 there was a natural growth in the population of around 25 babies for every one thousand inhabitants, whilst the birth-rate was around 3.9 times higher than the death-rate.

The average wage in 2004 was 3,600 roubles. Those who worked in finance, credit and pension provision earned the highest salary – ten and a half thousand roubles. Next came: branches of the authorities – six and a half thousand roubles, material production – six thousand roubles, material-technical supply and sales – four and a half thousand roubles. The lowest wages were for agricultural workers – one and a half thousand roubles.

The number of children in the Republic aged under 16 is 416,000. The overall number of pensioners of different categories is just over 200,000. The average pension is 1,400 roubles.

The high level of unemployment can be explained mainly by the lack of industry and developed agriculture. Just over 150,000 people out of 550,000 economically active people who are fit to work have work. Out of this number just over 100,000 inhabitants of the republic have permanent work. The highest number of jobs is found in the education sector- almost 34,000, the health sector – 16,000 and agriculture – 10,000. Seven and a half thousand people work in industry, which is one thousand less that those working for the republic’s authorities - eight and a half thousand. (According to figures from the publication “Business Chechnya”).

This article is based on the author’s material for the Rosbalt information agency.

Translated by Claire C.RIMMER

"Chechen Society" newspaper, #17, 30 August 2005
http://www.chechensociety.net/