A Step At A Time

Pavel K. Baev, on the background to Vladimir Putin's silence about the 50th anniversary of Khrushchev's Secret Speech:

There were several events around this anniversary, including a conference at the Gorbachev Foundation, but Russian President Vladimir Putin chose to ignore it. He covered a great many topics at his extended press conference on January 31, found time to congratulate every Russian Olympic champion, issued special decrees to commemorate composer Dmitry Shostakovich and scholar Dmitry Likhachev, but did not say a word about that remarkable watershed, much the same way that he never mentions the coup of August 1991.

There is certainly more to this silence than just the political gut feeling to avoid issues that remain divisive and might damage his popularity in some marginal groups. The main guideline of the "de-Stalinization" campaign launched by the 20th Congress was against the super-concentration of power in one pair of hands -- and that is exactly what Putin has been doing since arriving at the Kremlin. A carefully orchestrated PR campaign has sought to prove that this style of governance suits Russia the best, so now 57% of Russians are sure that the country needs a determined leader who could rule with a "firm hand" (Newsru.com, February 25). This opinion ties logically with others: 47% of respondents have a generally positive view of Stalin and 21% perceive him as a "wise statesman" (Vedomosti, February 14).

The United States and the 'Problem' of Venezuela

By George Friedman

Venezuela has become an ongoing problem for the Bush administration, but no one seems able to define quite what the issue is. President Hugo Chavez is carrying out the Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela and feuding with the United States. He has close ties with Cuba and has influenced many Latin American countries. The issue that needs to be analyzed, however, is whether any of this matters -- and if it does, why it is significant.

Chavez came to power in 1999 through a democratic election. He unseated a constellation of parties that had dominated Venezuela for years. Chavez, an army officer, had led a failed coup attempt in 1992 and spent time in prison for that. He sought the presidency without any clear ideology other than hostility to the existing regime. There was a vague belief at the time of his election that Chavez would be simply another passing event in Latin America. Put a little more bluntly, there was an assumption that Chavez rapidly would be corrupted by the opportunities opened to him as president, and that he would proceed to enrich himself while allowing business to go on as usual.

The business of Venezuela, however, is oil. Not only is the country a major exporter, but the state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA), also owns the American refiner and retailer Citgo Petroleum Corp. Venezuela has tried to diversify its economy many times, but oil has remained its mainstay. In other words, the Venezuelan state is indistinguishable from the Venezuelan oil industry. Chavez, therefore, has faced two core issues: The first was how income from the oil would be used, and the second was the degree to which foreign oil companies could be allowed to influence that industry.

Chavez was able to win the presidency because he promised the Venezuelan masses a bigger cut of the oil revenues than they had seen before. More precisely, he promised a series of social benefits, which could be financed only through the diversion of oil revenues. From Chavez's point of view, the problem was that the Venezuelan upper class and the foreign oil companies were pocketing the oil money that could be used to pay for the social services upon which his government rested and his political future depended. From his fairly simple populist position, then, he proceeded to move against the technical apparatus of PDVSA and against the foreign oil companies, most of which opposed him and threatened to undermine his plans.

But there was yet a further dilemma. In order to support his political base, Chavez had to have oil revenues. In order to generate oil revenues, he had to have investment into the oil sector. But diverting revenues and building up the oil sector were competing goals. Given the political climate, foreign oil companies were not inclined to make major investments in Venezuela, and PDVSA -- minus its technical experts -- was not capable of maintaining operations and existing output levels. There was, then, a terrific problem embedded in Chavez's political strategy. In the long term, something would have to give.

Two things saved him from his dilemma. The first was a short-lived coup by his opposition in April 2002. This coup was truly something to behold. Having captured Chavez and sent him to an island, the coupsters fell into squabbling with each other over who would hold what office and sort of forgot about Chavez. Chavez flew back to Caracas, went to the Miraflores presidential palace, and took over, less than 48 hours after it all began. The coupsters headed out of town.

The coup gave Chavez a new, credible platform: anti-Americanism. He was never pro-American, but the brief coup allowed him to claim that the United States was trying to topple him. It would be a huge surprise to us if it turned out that the CIA was utterly unaware of the coup plans, but we would also be moderately surprised if the CIA planned events as Chavez charged. Even on its worst day, the CIA couldn't be that incompetent. But Chavez's claim was not implausible. It certainly was believed by his followers, and it expanded his support base to include Venezuelan patriots who disliked American interference in their affairs. What the coup did was flesh out Chavez's ideology a bit. He was for the poor and against the United States.

Chavez got lucky in a second way: rising oil prices. The appetite of his government for cash was enormous. Someone once referred to Citgo as "Chavez's ATM." With Venezuela's oil production declining, Chavez's government likely would have collapsed under social pressure if world oil prices had remained low. But oil prices didn't remain low -- they soared. Venezuela still had substantial economic problems and its oil industry was suffering from lack of expertise, investment and exploration, but at $60 a barrel, Chavez had room for maneuver.

All of this led him into an alliance with Cuba. When you're anti-U.S. in Latin America, Havana welcomes you with open arms. Cuba needed Venezuela as well: After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Cubans were cut off from subsidized oil supplies, and their ability to pay world prices wasn't there. Chavez could afford to provide Castro with oil to sustain the Cuban economy. It could be argued that without Chavez, the Castro regime might have collapsed once faced with soaring oil prices.

In return for this support, Chavez benefited from Cuba's greatest asset: a highly professional security and intelligence apparatus. Arguing, not irrationally, that the United States was not yet through with Venezuela, Chavez used Cuban expertise to build a security system designed to protect his regime. His government -- though not nearly as repressive as Cuba's is at the popular level -- nevertheless came under the protection not only of Cuban professionals, but of cadres of Venezuelan personnel trained by the Cubans. The relationship with the Cubans certainly predated the coup in Caracas, but it kicked into high gear afterwards. Both sides benefited.

Chavez's rise to power also intersected with another process under way in Latin America: the anti-globalization movement. From about 1990 onward, Latin America was dominated by an ideology that argued that free-market reforms, including uncontrolled foreign investment and trade, would in the long run lift the region out of its chronic misery. The long run turned out to be too long, however, because the pain caused in the short run began forcing advocates of liberalization out of office. In Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia, economic problems created political reversals.

The old Latin American "left," which had been deeply Marxist and always anti-American, had gone quiet during the 1990s. It recently has surged back into action -- no longer in its dogmatic Marxist style, but in a more populist mode. Its key tenets now are state-managed economies and, of course, anti-Americanism. For the leftists, Chavez was a hero. The more he baited the United States, the more of a hero he became. And the more heroic he was in Latin America, the more popular in Venezuela. He spoke of the Bolivarian revolution, and he started to look like Simon Bolivar to some people.

In reality, Chavez's ability to challenge the United States is severely limited. The occasional threat to cut off oil exports to the United States is fairly meaningless, in spite of conversations with the Chinese and others about creating alternative markets. The United States is the nearest major market for Venezuela. The Venezuelans could absorb the transportation costs involved in selling to China or Europe, but the producers currently supplying those countries then could be expected to shift their own exports to fill the void in the United States. Under any circumstances, Venezuela could not survive very long without exporting oil. Symbolizing the entire reality is the fact that Chavez's government still controls Citgo and isn't selling it, and the U.S. government isn't trying to slam controls onto Citgo.

Washington ultimately doesn't care what Chavez does so long as he continues to ship oil to the United States. From the American point of view, Chavez -- like Castro -- is simply a nuisance, not a serious threat. Latin American countries in general are of interest to Washington, in a strategic sense, only when they are being used by a major outside power that threatens the United States or its interests. The entire Monroe Doctrine was built around that principle.

There was a fear at one point that Nazi U-boats would have access to Cuba. And when Castro took power in Cuba, it mattered, because it gave the Soviets a base of operations there. What happened in Nicaragua or Chile mattered to the United States because it might create opportunities the Soviets could exploit. Nazis in Argentina prior to 1945 mattered to the United States; Nazis in Argentina after 1945 did not. Cuba before 1991 mattered; after 1991, it did not. And apart from oil, Venezuela does not matter now to the United States.

The Bush administration unleashes periodic growls at the Venezuelans as a matter of course, and Washington would be quite pleased to see Chavez out of office. Should al Qaeda operatives be found in Venezuela, of course, then the United States would take an obsessive interest there. But apart from the occasional Arab -- and some phantoms generated by opposition groups, knowing that that is the only way to get the United States into the game -- there are no signs that Islamist terrorists would be able to use Venezuela in a significant way. Chavez would be crazy to take that risk -- and Castro, who depends on Chavez's cheap oil, is not about to let Chavez take crazy risks, even if he were so inclined.

From the American point of view, an intervention that would overthrow Chavez would achieve nothing, even if it could be carried out. Chavez is shipping oil; therefore, the United States has no major outstanding issues. A coup in Venezuela, even if not engineered by the United States, would still be blamed on the United States. It would increase anti-American sentiment in Latin America, which in itself would not be all that significant. But it also would increase hostility toward the United States in Europe, where the Allende coup is still recalled bitterly by the left. The United States has enough problems with the Europeans without Venezuela adding to them.

Taken in isolation, Venezuela can't really hurt the United States. If all of South America were swept by a Bolivarian revolution, it wouldn't hurt the United States. Absent a significant global power to challenge the United States, Latin America and its ideology are of interest to Latin Americans but not to Washington. The only real threat that Venezuela poses to the United States would be if its oil production becomes so degraded that the United States has to seek out new suppliers and world prices rise. That would matter to Washington, and indeed it may eventually occur -- Venezuelan output has dropped about 1 million bpd below pre-Chavez highs -- but it would matter a thousand times more to Venezuela.

This explains the strange standoff between Venezuela and the United States, and Washington's basic indifference to events in Latin America. Venezuela is locked into its oil relationship with the United States. Latin America poses no threat on its own. The chief geopolitical challenge to the United States -- radical Islam -- intersects Latin America only marginally. Certainly, there are radical Islamists in Latin America; Hezbollah in particular has assets there. But for them to mount an attack against the United States from Latin America would be no more efficient than mounting it from Europe. The risk is a concern, not an obsession.

For the United States, its border with Mexico matters. For the Venezuelans, high oil prices that subsidize their social programs and buy regional allies matter. Both want Venezuelan oil to keep pumping. Aside from the one issue that they agree on, the United States can live and is living with Chavez, and Chavez not only lives well with the United States but needs it -- both as a source of cash, through Citgo, and as a whipping boy.

Sometimes, there really isn't a problem.

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A few more notes on Gunther Schuller's groundbreaking volume of essays, papers and addresses, Musings (1986).

The contents of the book are as relevant to the issues of music education now in the 2000s as they were at the time of publication. In fact, in some ways Schuller's analysis of the problems in this wide and variegated sphere of cultural activity is if anything even more acute - now that an attempt has been made to incorporate some of the directions, tendencies, practices and visions he invokes in the volume, which in itself represents more than forty years' experience of composition and practical music-making. It's possible now to see the results obtained by the manner - sensitive or otherwise - in which those ideas have been implemented in education systems,not only in America, but also in the wider world.

When, as one of America's foremost composers, conductors and instrumentalists, Schuller took the Presidency of the New England Conservatory in 1967, he was characteristically modest. "Forgive me for becoming autobiographical for a moment," he said, "but I do it only to make a point."

I stand before you as one of the original dropouts. I do not have any degrees; I do not have even a high school diploma. Now, I'm not advocating this necessarily as a road to education, and I am aware of the fact that times have changed tremendously in the twenty-four years since I left high school. But I have the feeling I would not have been a very good music student in, for example, the rigid programs which allow for almost no electives which some of our schools demand. What I am trying to say is that we must develop a new flexibility in our music education, in our programs, in our curriculi, to make room for the tremendous range in student and faculty types. We seem to be in the process of doing the opposite.

Criticizing universities as "mammoth institutions with mammoth organizational problems", little more than factories with an educational process resembling that of the assembly line, Schuller pointed to the smaller-scale, more intimate surroundings of the conservatory as a hope for the future of music education. However, he also takes care to draw attention to the heart of the problem: institutions, like individual human beings, must remain flexible, or they will rigidify and atrophy. He sees the real test not in the creation of new structures, but in the assessment and evaluation of quality:

quality of faculty, quality of student. And here there is no room for compromise. Idealism does not thrive on compromise, nor does quality. And to extent that it is possible for me to achieve this quality in a human way, I will pursue that goal.

In his talk entitled "Qualitative Evaluation in the Arts", delivered in a symposium at New York University in 1980, Schuller reflected on his experience at the Conservatory, and on the subject of criticism and assessment in the arts, particularly the art of music. The subject, he noted, is "profoundly complex and unyielding of easy answers".

While rejecting the concept of "interpretation" in favour of what he terms "realization", Schuller suggests that the evaluation of a work or a performance depends much more on the observer and the evaluator than it does on the work itself, "or its performance". To explain this, Schuller points to the fact that the degree of an audince's appreciation and understanding of a work is inextricably connected with its level of musical education. Yet the criteria involved in such judgments are not fixed or absolute: they may vary from one historical period to another, they rest on a tenuous balance between subjective perception and objective knowledge, a balance, Schuller says, "between knowns and unknowns". Ultimately, however, education is the only sure basis for the making of such judgments: the only alternative, he points out, is "suspending judgment entirely".

Our culture, Schuller suggests, has been corrupted by a process of excessive visualization: we go to "see" a concert or performance, not to hear it:

Look around you at the next concert and see if you find anyone who is just listening to the music, perhaps with eyes closed or head bent. You won't. What you will see is a hall full of people appreciating and evaluating the performance primarily (and perhaps totally) in relation to the gestures and movements of the conductor.

Schuller also takes the example of someone who knows little about the background to a work of "program music" (he selects Richard Strauss's tone poem Till Eulenspiegel) versus one who does know the origin and background of the work. The latter type of listener is is much more widely-encountered, and will probably account for the majority of the audience in a concert hall. The two types have vastly different experiences of the work, and those experiences and reactions may all be valid. Where the queston of evaluation is concerned, however, they cannot be considered equal.

A way out of the impasse, Schuller suggests, may be achieved by our taking a more critical and skeptical attitude towards the relentless pressure for quantification that exists in our society:

We trust nothing but numbers any more. In education we do not trust the content of a thing, the substance. We quantify it, numericalize in some primitive way - not much higher than the Nielsen rating in television in intent or content. And all that is particularly lamentable in the arts, for they are the least quantifiable of all of humans' endeavors and strivings.

It's in an essence-directed, more life-attuned apprehension of the realities of musical composition and performance, Schuller implies, that we may seek the possibility of overcoming this "number-oriented" approach, and of escaping the trap set by mediocre evaluations and classifications that are the product of a quantifying education system and are in themselves responsble for producing mediocre performances, artistry and training.

All of Gunther Schuller's remarks are, of course, applicable in the widest musical sense, and are certainly relevant to issues of jazz education. In a future posting I want to return to that particular subject, again in the context of Musings.


See also: Musings

In the Washington Post, Peter Baker writes that the Bush administration is "quietly exploring ways of recalibrating U.S. policy toward Russia in the face of growing concerns about the Kremlin's crackdown on internal dissent and pressure tactics toward its neighbors."

London's Mayor Ken Livingstone has been suspended for four weeks.

I think this is a positive decision - though I wish the suspension had been for longer, if not for ever.

See also in this blog: Stopping The Virus

Armoured Killers

Collisions between BTR armoured vehicles and cars in Grozny, as a result of which civilians frequently die, have become systematic. Meanwhile, those at fault – the drunken drivers of BTRs from the federal forces – as a rule get away with a meaningless disciplinary reprimand.

By Ruslan ZHADAEV

On 15th February there was an accident on Grozny’s Staropromyslovskoe highway,near the village of Butenko. An armoured personnel carrier with soldiers from the Interior Troops of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Russia, driving in a military convoy, crashed into a “Zhiguli”, Mark 7. The driver of the “Zhiguli”, Ali Zaipulaev, was seriously wounded and was taken to hospital. The passenger, Salavdi Murtazaev, the head of the Cardiology Centre from municipal hospital number 3 in Grozny, died ot the scene of the accident.

Witnesses maintain that the armoured vehicle unexpectedly veered out of the convoy of vehicles and ran into the “Mark 7” , which was parked on the side of the road. The soldiers tried to get away from the scene of the accident but they were blocked by people [at the scene], which meant that members of the Chechen police service arrived in time to take the BTR and its crew to the regional branch of the interior affairs authorities (ROVD).

As usually happens in this type of case, the military quickly came to the defence of its colleagues. At the military prosecutor’s office (whose staff had also been to the scene of the accident), they announced that the accident was the fault of the driver of the “Zhiguli”. “My colleagues have informed me that the BTR was driving along on its own side of the road but the doctor’s car drove right at it”, said Maksim Toporikov, the Military Prosecutor of the United Group of Forces in the Northern Caucasus, in an interview to “Kommersant” newspaper.

Neither did the prosecutor fail to note that it was far too early to come to any firm conclusions on who was to blame for the accident. “There was such a lot of fuss going on, that it was almost impossible to follow up on any fresh leads, as you should”, he said.

The opinion of the witnesses and the members of the regional police force who arrived first at the scene of the accident, are obviously of no interest at all to the military. Plus, they do not bear any relation to the version given by the prosecutor. “The BTR was driving in a convoy, and in the middle of the convoy too, so it was impossible for it to be able to veer out into the Zhiguli, as the military said”, a “Kavkazskii Uzel” correspondent was told in the regional branch of the interior affairs authorities (ROVD).

The police also maintain that the driver of the armoured vehicle was very drunk. “Their (the military’s) drunken escapades cost us dearly”, we were told in the duty room of the regional branch of the police. “It is completely obvious that the military will deny everything and do everything they can to shield yet another soldier with military shoulder straps, guilty of killing someone. As well as trying to blame the driver of the ill-fated “Zhiguli”, the military have also come out with a version that the mechanic-driver of the armoured vehicle ‘could not manage the steering’”.

This is also a fairly widespread and well-developed way of making sure a soldier is not held responsible. And there is quite a lot of evidence to support this. In October last year a BTR carrying Russian fighters crushed 24 year old Eliza Ismailova to death (she also worked as a doctor). The armoured vehicle, which was driving at high speed down Mayakovskii Street in the Leninskii area of town, crashed into a traffic light and knocked down Eliza, who was standing at the bus stop. The “military car” crew, who were extremely drunk, were detained by fighters from the special forces brigade of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Chechnya. The military announced at once that the driver of the BTR was completely sober, that he had tried to avoid colliding with a “Gazelle” minibus that was driving towards him and he simply could not manage the steering. As a result the garrison military court of Grozny sentenced Dmitry Vasil’ev, the driver-mechanic of the armoured vehicle, practical ly the direct killer of the girl, to just one year of service in a disciplinary battalion. (Those who have served in the army probably know what a disciplinary battalion is, or “disbat” as it is usually known”. “Disbat” is part of themilitary but with significantly stricter conditions of service. Usually soldiers who have committed serious misdemeanours in the course of their military service end up there, such as beating up or mocking other soldiers. Service in the “disbat” does not count towards your time in the army and after they have served out their punishment, most soldiers return to their unit. But the “disbat” is also not a usual correctional institution for criminals and the time spent there is not considered a prison sentence). In order to sentence any person guilty of killing a girl, even a soldier, to one year’s service in a “disbat” you would have to have a very rich imagination.

Some time after the death of Ismailova, this time in the Oktyabr’skii region of Grozny, another BTR rammed into two cars (a “Volga” and a “Zhiguli”), which were driving along in the other direction. Thankfully, there were no deaths that time, although the driver of the “Volga” was seriously injured. The mechanic-driver of this armoured vehicle was also extremely drunk.

In May 2005 on the highway near the village of Starye Atagi, an armoured vehicle carrying infantry (BMP) with soldiers from the military commandant’s office from the Itum-Kalinskii region, drove into a “Volga” GAZ-Z110 car. A 14 year old girl died at the scene of the accident and her mother, her younger brother and the driver were taken to hospital in a critical condition.

“What is happening in our republic, including what is happening on the roads, never mind the kidnappings and murders, clearly illustrates that the Russian military are behaving as though they are on enemy territory here. And correspondingly, all the inhabitants of the republic are seen as enemies, people who can be oppressed, burnt, shot and taken hostage without fear of any kind of consequences for yourself”, according to Usman Baisaev from the Memorial Human Rights Centre.

“The most offensive thing about the Murtazaev case is that because of the actions of some drunken scum, an educated, intelligent man has died. A man who has needed by the republic and its people and who saved other people’s lives. And the good-for-nothing who is guilty of his death will laugh about it later and boast that he “got one”. I can even tell you approximately what kind of “punishment” this latest killer in military uniform will get. He will get a year at most suspended with no right to occupy any commanding post. Sergeants, for example, are demoted to the ranks”.

According to human rights defenders, in the last few months, the Russian military have been responsible for several serious road accidents, as a result of which five people have died. And in almost all of this type of case the soldiers who have committed the crime against the civilians of Chechnya get away with a scare or they get a meaningless punishment. And there are many examples that prove this.

For example, on 25th April 2000, on the Alkhan-Yurt- Urus-Martan highway, a “Ural” military wagon drove onto the other side of the road and deliberately crashed into a “Zhiguli” car, driven by Agabiev, a local resident. Apart from the driver, there were three women, a young child and a man in the car. They were all seriously wounded and injured and were hospitalised. Members of the Chechen police detained the soldiers who tried to escape the scene of the accident. The criminal case against the soldier who engineered the accident was closed “due to the expiration of the time period in a long-standing criminal investigation”.

On 9th June 2000, in the regional centre, Shali, an officer of the Russian army driving an armoured vehicle carrying infantry (BMP) whilst under the influence of alcohol, drove into two local women: Kurmagaeva and Dakhaeva. The latter died later from the injuries she sustained. A military court ruled that the officer was guilty of the crime and sentenced him …. to a three year suspended sentence, with a one year probation period and banned him from driving for one year.

Further comment is unnecessary.

Or let’s take another case. On 6th October 2000 in the Khankala settlement, a soldier from the Russian army driving a self-propelled artillery installation (SAU) crashed into a car. As a result of the accident two women died. A military court again found the soldier guilty and sentenced him to a five year sentence with a deferment of implementing the sentence of four years, meaning he was given a suspended sentence. This makes you think involuntarily of the film “Kavkazskaya Plennitsa” (the Prisoner from the Caucasus) and want to cry out: “Long live our courts! The most humane courts in the world”!

“The military prosecutor’s office has many ways of letting soldiers get away without punishment. Often this takes the form of deliberately dragging out the enquiry for a long period of time after which the guilty party is usually cleared due to “the expiration of the time period in a long-standing criminal investigation”. However, the most widespread method of saving soldiers from punishment is awarding a sentence with a deferment of implementation (i.e. a suspended sentence, or a ban from taking up a commanding post and service in a “disbat”)”, says Baisaev.

Why the commanding officers of the Russian military group pay practically no attention to the arbitrariness of those under their command on the roads of the republic, is not at all clear. After all every soldier has a huge number of direct commanders and superiors: the commander of the platoon, company, battalion, unit, brigade, division, army and region. Why do they take no responsibility for the criminal actions of those under their command? If an officer cannot control those under his command, he is a criminal. If he can control them but he is not taking any action, then he is a criminal twice over.

And his place is in a prison along with his soldier. Especially if someone is guilty of the murder of a civilian, however the crime was committed or the conditions under which it was committed.

If the war in Chechnya really did end a long time ago (as they love to repeat in Moscow), then the military should be in their barracks studying military tactics, and not drinking large amounts of alcohol and careering round the streets. Otherwise, it will not be an army at all, but a pale imitation of one, more like a band of anarchists from the time of the Civil War in the last century.

Translated by Claire C.RIMMER

"Chechen Society" newspaper, #04, 22-25 February 2006
http://www.chechensociety.net

Burning-Point Of Oceans

by Pia Tafdrup

 


“No Fishing”
   it says there on the sign beside the curved ocean,
but I have just caught
               a whale
without being swallowed ―
it’s the words that hold the whale in my mouth now.
In the light,
which is grey like human ashes,
I think about the whale’s being
–  realize,
while the earth is kissed
by metal-hot rain,
that nothing is what I have expected.
There is no other centre in a seasick world
than everything that freely moves ...
What did the whale’s
eye catch?
From the primordial sea it threatened me
with a crater’s joy,
                with holy shamelessness.
To my relief it fills
infinitely more than my own life,
when I dream about it
– or in order to exhaust the realm of the possible
encounter it fever-naked
            and notice
as the miraculous glows and hurts,
that I’m losing my soul in its soul,
            because it is losing its in mine.

(my translation from Danish)

Pia Tafdrup

Louise Arbour, the U.N. commissioner for human rights, has now completed her tour of the North Caucasus. At a press conference in Moscow today, she said that

rights abuses remain rampant in Chechnya, and suggested the republic's pro-Kremlin government has a vested interest in maintaining, in her words, "a society ruled by force:" "Two phenomena, in my view, are particularly disturbing. One is the prevalence of the use of torture to extract confessions and information. And the second one is the intimidation of those who make complaints against public officials. In my opinion, there's no doubt that these phenomena are more than mere allegations, and that they have in fact considerable basis in reality."

Helsingin Sanomat has a report on yesterday's demonstration in Helsinki, Finland in protest against Russian military operations in Chechnya.

(via chechnya-sl)

A new article I just translated for Prague Watchdog:

Chechen human rights workers believe authorities may soon increase pressure on NGOs

By Liza Osmayeva

CHECHNYA / INGUSHETIA - Representatives of local NGOs working in Chechnya and Ingushetia note that regional authorities and law enforcement agencies have recently begun to show an increased interest in their activity.

According to them, officials of various power ministries and agencies have begun to use all kinds of pretexts in order to call on representatives of human rights organizations and independent media active in the region. As a rule, such visits are made for purposes of familiarization and so far no concrete complaints about the work of the NGOs have been presented.

Taisa Isayeva, head of the Information Centre of the Council of Non-governmental Organizations (SNO), said a "friendly" visit of this kind was recently made to her office which is located in the town of Nazran, Ingushetia. The other day a man arrived there introducing himself as an official of one of the law enforcement agencies and demanded to be given data on volunteers and also on all other sources from which the Centre’s information is drawn.

"While the talk was of a preventive kind, the ‘visitor’ none the less hinted that if he so wished, he would be legally authorized to seal up the office and stop the work of the organization. I think they are simply letting us know that our activity is being closely watched by the law enforcement agencies. In addition, I know of several other cases in which the taxation services and other inspecting authorities have been used in order to exert pressure on this organization or that, and also on the media. It is possible that this pressure will soon increase, especially on those NGOs which are monitoring the human rights situation in Chechnya,” Isayeva told PW’s correspondent.

This opinion is shared by the well-known Chechen human rights worker Ruslan Badalov, chairman of the Chechen National Salvation Committee (ChKNS). In a conversation with PW’s correspondent he also expressed fears that the local authorities may interpret the new federal law on NGOs as the signal for an offensive.

"The law gives officials a big opportunity to stiffen control over NGOs, all the way to liquidating them. I think they will make use of this. Take the Dmitrievsky trial and the recent ‘spy scandal’, which involved a trustworthy human rights organization. These events show that today no NGO is safe from such accusations and suspicions,” he observed.

In this connection it should also be noted that during the last week of February the hearings of the case concerning the Chechen National Salvation Committee are due to resume in Nazran, Ingushetia. The republic’s prosecutor’s office has perceived an “anti-constitutional and anti-Russian" direction in the Committee’s activity and for the past year and a half has been trying to have the organization’s information materials branded as extremist.

Badalov categorically disagrees with such conclusions and assesses the proceedings as an attempt to forbid the activity of the organization. "There is no anti-Russian or anti-constitutional direction in any of our statements and press releases. On the contrary, we inform the Russian and world community about cases we know of where the law has been violated. In this instance I see the actions of the prosecutor’s office as an attempt to liquidate our organization. But we nevertheless hope that the judicial inquiry will be fair and objective, and that all the charges against the Committee will be dropped,” Ruslan Badalov said in this regard.

Chechen human rights workers fear that pressure on NGOs in the region may intensify soon. In their opinion, the accusations against Russian human rights activists, the ban on the activity of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) in Chechnya, the legal proceedings against the ChKNS are all links in the same chain, and this cannot really be explained simply as an excess on the part of the authorities.

Excerpts from Finnish author Juha Ruusuvuori's A Stranger in Moominvalley (Muukalainen Muumilaaksossa, 2005) in my translation are now online at the Books From Finland website, in the latest issue of the magazine. There's also an essay on Ruusuvuori by Finland-Swedish critic Pia Ingström.

I wrote some comments on Ruusuvuori's pamphlet - on the complex theme of crossing from one Finnish culture to another - in a report from the Helsinki Book Fair last November.

A Thoroughbred Night

by Apti Bisultanov

(my tr.)

So bright
That a dog barks at its shadow
That one can see the breath of the sleeping grass
So pure

Go blind
From rain of shooting stars
Go mute
From poems
Die
From beauty

A thoroughbred night
Or
A mountain range is growing in my heart


1983

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Apti Bisultanov was born in 1959 in Goichu, Chechnya. He studied philology and worked as a lecturer, editor, publisher, and partisan. He was Minister for Social Protection in the government of President Aslan Maskhadov. In 1992 he received the Chechen National Award for his poem "Written in Chaibach". Since 2002 he has lived in Berlin. He received the award of the Netherlands-based Poets of All Nations Foundation (PAN) in 2003. In 2004, a collection of his poems in German translation, Schatten eines Blitzes, was published.

'Bisultanov goes on to say that it is only when children are killed that the world takes an interest in the conflict; a fact demonstrated by the hostage-taking in Beslan. He adds, however, that no-one is interested in the Chechen victims; even when these victims are children. Human rights organisations estimate that at least 40,000 children have died in the fighting over the past five years.

'"But regardless of how many die - be it 30,000, or 1,000, or one - it is still children that are dying,“ says Bisultanov, himself a father. “Beslan was the most horrific, gruesome mirror image of the Chechen war to date. Beslan is Chechnya".'

Today is World Chechnya Day, which is being held in order to

• Recognize the suffering and genocide of the Chechen people as a human catastrophe of historic significance
• Respect all victims of Stalinist deportations
• Raise awareness and understanding of the Chechen genocide as an issue of importance to humanity
• Ensure that the horrendous crimes, racism and victimisation that were committed during the Chechen genocide will never be forgotten or repeated, in Europe or elsewhere in the world
• Reflect on contemporary atrocities that raise similar issues
• Educate subsequent generations about the genocide and the continued relevance of the lessons that can be learnt from it
• Assert a continuing commitment to oppose racism, victimisation and genocide
• Support shared aspirations for the ideals of justice, security, dignity and peace for all


History:


On the 23 February 1944 the Soviet Union set in motion the immediate deportation of the entire Chechen and Ingush peoples to the steppes of Central Asia. In the depths of winter they were subjected to summary massacres and food shortages: it was a solution no less final or less brutal that the one being inflicted at the same time in Europe on the Jews. By conservative estimates half of the population died; the proportion that perished is probably much greater.

In early January 1944, tens of thousands of NKVD troops had started to arrive in the tiny mountainous republic, and fanned out to almost every settlement in the region. On Red Army Day, February 23, in every town and village the men were summoned to meetings in the local Soviet building. None suspected the calamity that was about to befall them; all came willingly. Instead of commemorating the Day, the crowds were read the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which announced the complete deportation of the Chechen and Ingush people for treason and collaboration with the German enemy.

There was no evidence to support the claim of Chechen collaboration with the Nazis, which Stalin used as a pretext for disposing of a population that had continually refused to submit to Moscow's will. In fact, the German advance had never reached Chechen soil, stopping just short of the border. Moreover, Chechen soldiers had distinguished themselves in major actions throughout the Second World War, and been awarded a larger number of medals than was proportional to their numerical weight in the Soviet army. However, in the end even soldiers were not spared: they were removed from their units and sent directly to the deportation camps in Central Asia.

In each town Studebaker trucks (provided by the United States to her wartime ally under lendlease) rolled up to be loaded with Chechen men, women and children at gunpoint. The trucks transported their cargoes to the nearest railway points, where the people were crammed into bare cattle-trucks with no food and utterly inadequate clothing. Villagers from the remote mountain settlements were forced to march down to the plains. Stragglers were shot, as was anyone who resisted. Pregnant women, elderly people and others deemed to require too much effort to transport were killed. One documented example of this is the instance of 700 women, children and old people who were burnt alive in the mountain village of Khaibakh.

However, massacres like this took place all over the republic, and the Aûls (mountain villages) smouldered for weeks after.

Within days, with ruthless efficiency, an entire people had been erased from the land of their ancestors. Overnight Chechnya and Ingushetia were entirely depopulated; cartographers were instructed to expunge all references to them from official maps, records and encyclopaedias.

On February 29 Lavrentii Beria, Chief of the NKVD Secret Police, wrote to Stalin: "I report the results of the operation of resettling Chechens and Ingushi. The resettlement was begun on February 23rd in the majority of districts, with the exception of the high mountain population points... 478,479 persons were evicted and loaded onto special railway cars, including 91,250 Ingush. One hundred and eighty special trains were loaded, of which 159 were sent to the new designated place."

For almost half a million Chechen and Ingush people on their black odyssey across the frozen tundra, an ordeal of monumental suffering had just begun. The sealed trucks were crammed with families – men, women and children of all ages – in freezing, cramped conditions with no toilet or washing facilities. Typhoid epidemics swept through the crammed cattle-trucks, killing many in scenes that must have resembled those of Buchenwald and Auschwitz. Little food was provided; the weak and ill were finished off by hunger and cold.

Along the way they were treated with contempt and abuse by the local people, who had been told that the people in the trucks were being punished for collaboration with the enemy.

At one of the railroad stations Dimitri Gulia, the prominent Abkhazian educator, witnessed a scene of surreal despair: "… an unbelievable sight: an extremely long train… jammed full of people who looked like Caucasian Mountaineers. They were being sent off somewhere east, women, children, old people, all. They looked terribly sad and woebegone… These are the Chechen and Ingush and they were not travelling of their own free will. They were being deported. They had committed `very serious crimes against the Motherland'…"

The trucks were frequently searched for corpses, which were simply thrown to the side of the rail tracks and left. To avoid this fate for their relations, the Chechens tried desperately to disguise or hide the corpses in the hope of giving them an Islamic burial at their journey's end. After several weeks of travel the Chechens were scattered in remote locations across present-day Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Little or no provision was made for food or shelter for the hundreds of thousands of deportees, who were mostly left to fend for themselves.

As a historian at Moscow State University wrote two decades later: "…The most fearful and irremediable blow to the Chechen-Ingush people was struck in the first two or three years, when starvation and the most dreadful diseases obliged them to bury tens of thousands of their fellow tribespeople in the steppes of Central Asia."

In the years that followed thousands were to die of pneumonia and hunger. It was a dark episode in the tumultuous history of the Chechens, who had already suffered a long war against the full military might of the Russian Empire in the mid-nineteenth century, followed by large-scale forced emigration. Many families were scattered and were never able to reunite.

The settlements of the deportees were in effect large penal colonies. The most trivial infringements of the rules were punished by imprisonment or hard labour. Yet as the Russian writer and dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn described in The Gulag Archipelago, the Chechens' will to survive endured.

"There was one nation which would not give in, would not acquire the mental habits of submission -- and not just individual rebels among them, but the whole nation to a man. These were the Chechens... I would say that of all the special settlers, the Chechens alone showed themselves unbroken in spirit. They had been treacherously snatched from their home, and from that day they believed in nothing... The Chechens never sought to please, to ingratiate themselves with the bosses; their attitude was always haughty and indeed openly hostile... And here is the extraordinary thing: everyone was afraid of them. No one could stop them from living as they did. The regime which had ruled the land for thirty years could not force them to respect its laws."

Conditions for the Chechens remained harsh until after the death of Stalin in 1953. Soon afterward Chechens were making official representations in Moscow for permission to return to their homeland; indeed, a trickle of Chechens had already started to return to their homes. In 1956, at the 20th Party Congress, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev acknowledged the wrongs that had been done the Chechens and the other exiled peoples. The trickle had by this time become a flood, despite the authorities' best efforts to prevent the Chechens returning -- often bringing with them the bones of their kindred in order to bury them in their ancestral graveyards. But their lives could never really return to what they had been before 1944. The evil of the deportations lived on in memories, poverty, ill-health, and the bitterness spawned by these sufferings. Returning Chechens also found that their homes had been given to Russian and Dagestani settlers, from whom they had to be bought back; few were able to do so.

The deportations were not only a personal catastrophe for each of the Chechens; they were also a collective disaster for the Chechen nation as a whole. Many of the ancient mountain Aûls were in ruins and uninhabitable, forcing most of the Chechen people to live in the plains for the first time in their history, and irrevocably altering their mountain ways. Moreover, the massive loss of life among the elderly disrupted a rich oral tradition stretching back through many centuries,inflicting grave damage on Chechen culture.

The trauma and disruption inflicted by the genocide and the Chechens' subsequent ordeals cannot be overestimated, and the memories and grief of those terrible years are keenly felt by the Chechen people to this day.

The Telegraph, reporting on Louise Arbour's North Caucasus tour:

THE United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, said today she was deeply disturbed by accounts of torture and kidnappings in Chechnya, where the Russian military has for over a decade been engaged in the bloody repression of militant separatists.

Ms Arbour said that while she did not underestimate the task facing the Russian forces in restoring order in the war-torn republic, she was deeply worried by reports from numerous human rights organisations of abuse at their hands, Russia news agencies reported.

She made the comments during a meeting in the Chechen capital Grozny with the public prosecutor for the region, Valery Kuznetzov, the agencies said.

Ms Arbour cited accounts of civilians disappearing, interrogators using force to extract information and pressure being exerted on witnesses who reported abuse by members of the security forces.

She recommended the creation of an independent body to investigate crimes committed during the Russian military's attempts to restore Moscow rule over the breakaway republic.

But Mr Kuznetzov dismissed her suggestion.

Read the rest.

I just translated the following report for Prague Watchdog:

Ukrainian woman attempts self-immolation in protest at expulsion of her Chechen husband

By Aslanbek Dadayev

KIEV – A Ukrainian woman made an attempt at self-immolation in Kiev on Tuesday. Natalya Tretyak, a 48-year-old resident of Poltava Oblast, poured petrol over herself and set light to it in front of the Presidential administration building, in protest at the authorities’ decision to expel her Chechen husband Ruslan Bagayev from the country.

The building’s guards were able to douse the flames. Natalya Tretyak was taken to hospital with light burns. The doctors assess her condition as satisfactory.

The story of her husband, Ruslan Bagayev, began 11 years ago, when he left Chechnya during the First Chechen War. Since then, the refugee has not been able to acquire a residence permit that would enable him to live legally in Ukraine. Not even his marriage to a Ukrainian woman has helped him to remain in the country on a generally accepted basis. A few years ago he was even deported from the country by the Ukrainian authorities, and managed to return only after persistent efforts by his wife.

Last week a court issued a judgement on Ruslan Bagayev’s deportation to Russia and it was this that impelled his wife to such a radical step.

Aslanbek Dadayev is a Kiev correspondent of Radio Svoboda and irregular contributor to Prague Watchdog.

U.N. Human Rights Commissioner Louise Arbour visits Chechnya today as part of a week-long tour of the North Caucasus, AP reports (via RFE/RL):

On 21 February, Arbour was in the North Caucasus republic of Ingushetia, where she held talks with the regional President Murat Zyazikov and met with Ingush refugees of the 1992 conflict in North Ossetia.

On 22 February, Arbour heads to North Ossetia where she will visit Beslan, the site of the bloody school siege in 2004 that left more than 330 people dead, many of them children.

Before ending her stay, Arbour will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is expected to raise what Russia sees as the "politicization of human rights" and "double standards" in the international community's approach to such issues.

19.30: There is a fairly full report on Louise Arbour's visit to Ingushetia yesterday at this link.

****

Some OHCHR documents on Chechnya can be found here.

At RFE/RL, senior correspondent Jeffrey Donovan writes about the David Irving Holocaust Denial case, which went to trial in Vienna today (Irving received a three-year prison sentence):

Amid the recent storm over the Muhammad cartoons, many Europeans have supported their publication as a free-speech right -- even though the cartoons, like Irving's opinions, are offensive to many people:

“[Irving’s] actual thoughts, and views, are actually a deep affront to those who actually survived or lost loved-ones in the Holocaust," says David Dadge, who studies freedom of expression issues at the Vienna-based International Press Institute.

Dadge says free societies must allow freedom of expression, even when it offends, such as the Muhammad cartoons. He says the free exchange of information lets the public challenge questionable ideas and facts -- and that, in turn, helps marginalize them.

“You cannot, with views and ideas, keep them from being discussed," Dadge says. "And such laws as the ones that Austria actually has, tries to prevent that. But of course, through the Internet, people are going to be able to access those types of views; you can get on a train and go to another country in Europe to hear the likes of David Irving actually give speeches on those subjects. So having laws that locally try and prevent that kind of discussions is in essence kind of pointless, because it doesn’t prevent those discussions and those views from actually getting out.”

Some in the Muslim world criticize Europe for being hypocritical on free speech. That is, while some in Europe may clamor for the right to publish the Muhammad cartoons, at the same time people like Irving face the prospect of jail for simply expressing their opinions about the Holocaust.

Dadge doesn’t agree with the Holocaust denial laws in Austria, Germany, and some other European countries. But he says they were put in place in hopes of preventing a repeat of what happened during World War II and the Holocaust.

“These laws were put there to stop the virus of Nazism from spreading," Dadge says. "You can see that from a historical point of view; there’s a kind of fear about that.”

For years the string group I play in has been using Volume One of the Peters edition of the Mozart String Quintets. Perhaps strangely - though we've never thought to question it - the first volume includes quintets "4-8", though these are listed as "1-5" in the parts themselves. Recently we decided we wanted to look at the rest of the quintets, so I got hold of Volume Two, which contains quintets "1-3" and "9-10", numbered "6-10" in the printed parts. Volume One contains the best-known of the quintets (K.406, K.515, K.516, K. 593 and K. 614), while Volume Two has two early quintets (K. Anh. 179 and K. 46) which are only attributed to Mozart and may not have been written by him, the Quintet in B flat K. 174, and then two versions of the Clarinet Quintet K. 581 - one in the original scoring for clarinet and string quartet, and another in which the clarinet part is played by the first viola. The series is completed by the Horn Quintet K.407, with a first viola part that can accomodate the horn part.

So Volume Two is definitely something a mixed bag. I feel that there must be some more rational way of organizing the music, but there don't appear to be any other performing editions available. The Henle Urtext editions haven't got round to producing one yet. The Breitkopf edition does present the works in a more logical order, but there is apparently no commercially available set of parts to accompany it. Perhaps I'm wrong about this - would be grateful for information on the subject from anyone who knows.

At caucaz.com, correspondent Thibault Courcelle writes about how the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is at long last shaking off its apathy with regard to the issue of Chechnya:

On 25 January 2006, after much inaction, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in its debate on the Chechen situation, finally passed a resolution condemning the methods employed by Russian security forces in Chechnya and harshly criticised the Committee of Ministers, the Council of Europe's executive body, for its passivity in the face of the continuing human rights abuses in the province. The resolution, accompanied by a recommendation, has yet to be approved by the Council of Ministers, but will probably bring about little change.

Read the whole thing.

(via chechnya-sl)

For those who have been trying to locate the English-language versions of those VOA/AB Fable broadcasts, Anthony Barnett writes:

It seems that although the VOA programs were broadcast over the radio in both English and French, only the French were posted online. Saturday’s has now gone, and Sunday’s will go after tonight’s new program.

A limited dedication to violins on the part of VOA, it appears. Once again, the all-consuming commercial factor in the music world - see this post - takes its toll.

Carl Bildt posts a link to the text of Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, delivered just 50 years ago. Bildt considers the effects of its contents on the Communist world:

Riots in Poznan in Poland were just the beginning. In October of 1956 Hungary exploded and literally threw the Communists out - only to be brutally surpressed by the Soviet invasion some weeks later. In China, Mao Zedong refused to accept the verdict on Stalin, and quietly the beginning of the rift between the Soviet Union and China began.

Read it all.

For students of Estonian who also like Mozart, Estonian Radio's Klassikaraadio has a series of interviews with world-renowned interpreters of Mozart, including Alfred Brendel, Christopher Hogwood, Cecilia Bartoli, Andras Schiff, Maria João Pires, Anne Sofie von Otter and Colin Davis. The interviews are in English, but there is an interpretation into Estonian after each few sentences - and the method works surprisingly well.

See also in this blog: A Rap For Mozart

Via worldchechnyaday.org

London, United Kingdom

World Chechnya Day Memorial Service

Date: Thursday 23 February 2006

Time: 12 - 1pm

Venue: Yalta Memorial, Cromwell Gardens, South Kensington (behind the Ismaili Centre).

Nearest tube station: South Kensington (District, Circle and Piccadilly Line)

As part of World Chechnya Day, you are invited to attend the Save Chechnya Campaign remembrance service at the Yalta Memorial in South Kensington from 12-1pm on Thursday 23rd February to commemorate the Deportations and Genocide of the Chechen people in 1944.

Sixty two years ago, on 23 February 1944, Stalin ordered the forcible deportation of the Chechen, Ingush and other nations of the North Caucasus to Central Asia. The people who were were transported with little or no provision in cattle trucks and more than half died in transit or in massacres committed by Soviet troops. Those who survived the journey were left facing starvation and disease in the harsh winters of Siberia and Central Asia. In 2004 the European Parliament passed a motion formally recognising this tragedy as a genocide.

Speaking at the Memorial will be:

* Professor George Hewitt - Professor of Caucasian Languages (SOAS), Trustee of MARCCH
* Mrs. Saida Sherif - Chairperson, Save Chechnya Campaign
* Vanessa Redgrave - Actress and Human Rights Activist
* Ahmed Zakayev - (Late) President Maskhadov's Representative in Europe
* Rabbi Jacqueline Tabick - North West Surrey Synagogue
* Revd Father Frank Gelli - Former Curate of St Mary Abbots, Kensington Parish Church. Founder of Arkadash Network for Religious Dialogue.
* Abdur Raheem Green - London Central Mosque

Schedule:

12.00 Gather at the Yalta Memorial
12.15 Opening: Mrs. Saida Sherif
12.20 Vanessa Redgrave
12.25 Professor George Hewitt
12.30 Ahmed Zakayev
12.35 Rabbi Jacqueline Tabick
12.40 Revd Father Frank Gelli
12.45 Abdur Raheem Green
12.50 Recital of Memories
13.00 Prayer
13.09 Minutes Silence
13.10 Balloon Release

Directions:

The Yalta Memorial is situated in South Kensington, London SW7 in public gardens between Cromwell Gardens and Thurloe Place:

Map


For further details, please contact Hajira Qureshi on hajira@cantab.net

See also in this blog: World Chechnya Day

Yesterday February 16 Vladimir Putin created by decree a new National Counterterrorism Committee (NAK), which will coordinate all federal-level antiterrorism policies and operations. RFE/RL notes that "the committee will be headed by Federal Security Service Director Nikolai Patrushev (FSB) and includes members such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Lebedev, the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)."

Until now, the Federal Antiterrorism Commission -- created in 2002 and led by Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov -- was the top federal organ responsible for the coordination of counterterrorism activity. The new decree not only replaces this commission with the NAK, but also creates a new "antiterrorism vertical" that will act in parallel with existing federal and regional executive powers.

Indeed, the proposed new network -- regional counterterrorism commissions led by regional administration chiefs, territorial operative staffs led by territorial FSB heads -- bears considerable resemblance to the Soviet system, which had power in any given province concentrated in the hands of the local Communist Party secretary and the head of the regional KGB.

I’ve been reading a fascinating and searching volume of essays by the scholar, composer, conductor and teacher Gunther Schuller, whose contribution at the recent Mingus seminar at the IAJE 2006 conference was in my opinion one of the most telling of the whole 4-day event. The collection, entitled Musings, was published as long ago as 1986 – yet its analysis of the fields of musical activity and inquiry it encompasses is if anything even more actual and topical today than it was twenty years ago.

Schuller is in some ways unique among contemporary musicologists in not only having a background in routine instrumental playing – he served as a player of the French horn in American symphony orchestras for some fifteen years – but also in possessing an almost encyclopedic knowledge of all the world’s different musics: from “classical”, through jazz, to all the many other musical languages of America and far beyond. In the late 1950s and early 1960s he was one of the prime movers in the founding of the Third Stream movement, which aspired to create a new musical polarity that would include classical and jazz modes of musical expression, without being confined to either.

As a composer, Schuller has always sought to bridge the gap that exists in music between the “popular” and the cerebral, the mainstream and the avant-garde. As an educator, exasperated by the onslaught of commercialism which has characterized the musical scene, dominating it and appropriating the label of “popular” for music of the least imaginative kind, he has engaged in combat. The struggle has been primarily with those who would try to narrow the discussion of contemporary music to the “elitism-versus-populism” debate, which seeks to pit the “advantaged” against the “disadvantaged”, attempting to make people “who cherish quality music look like autocrats, snobs and eggheads, insinuating that there is something anti-democratic and un-American about considering Duke Ellington superior to the Plasmatics or Mozart greater than John Lennon.” As Schuller points out, this debate is a spurious one. It avoids the central issue: “namely, that quality, creativity, and high craftsmanship can and do exist in all forms and categories of music. So can and do their opposites: mediocrity and absence of quality. No form of musical expression is either inherently blessed with quality or intrinsically devoid of it.”

In future posts I want to look at some of Schuller’s arguments in more detail, considering in particular the ways in which they apply to music education – increasingly one of the most important areas of human civilisation now.

An editorial from today's Moscow Times:

A Question of Double Standards

President Vladimir Putin's decision to invite the leaders of Hamas for talks in Moscow has angered Israel and raised many eyebrows in the international community. Such a reaction should come as no surprise to Moscow, given that Hamas has carried out nearly 60 suicide bombings in Israel since 2000, killing hundreds of people.

Israel and the United States have classified Hamas as a terrorist organization, refusing to make a distinction between its political and militant wings. Just as the Kremlin has refused to make a distinction between Chechens such as Shamil Basayev, who has ordered the most horrendous terrorist attacks in Russia's history, and separatist envoys like Akhmed Zakayev, who has been granted political asylum in Britain. Both are terrorists in Putin's eyes.

Even Aslan Maskhadov, who won a popular election to become president of Chechnya in 1997, was branded a terrorist following the Dubrovka hostage-taking in 2002. Notably, Maskhadov denied any involvement in the seizure of the Moscow theater. He condemned terrorism and more than once suggested he would seek the prosecution of Basayev over the attack.

Yes, Maskhadov said his willingness to bring terrorists to justice was conditional upon the withdrawal of troops from Chechnya and restoration of his presidential rule. But even if his words were only empty rhetoric, Maskhadov, who was killed last March, did say these things. The Hamas leadership, on the other hand, has shown no willingness to condemn its militants for their suicide bombings.

Moscow has called for a united international front against terrorism, arguing that there should be no double standards and that one man's terrorist should not be another man's freedom fighter.

The invitation to Hamas has weakened Russia's argument, and the Kremlin is playing a risky game if it is betting on its capacity to influence Hamas in spite of having lost its clout as a global superpower.

But Putin -- who met Wednesday with an envoy of the Quartet of Middle East peace mediators, former World Bank President James Wolfensohn -- will still come out ahead if he unequivocally demands that Hamas renounce terrorism and acknowledge Israel's right to exist. He will then have to be ready to cut all ties with the Palestinian organization if it refuses to meet these demands.

Otherwise, Moscow will no longer be able to complain about double standards. Its only hope will be that the United States and other members of the international community turn their backs on whatever is left of the moderate wing of Chechen separatism.

Via Wired, AP's report on the shaming of Yahoo, Google, Cisco and Microsoft that took place yesterday in the House of Representatives. An excerpt:

Lawmakers blasted four U.S. tech giants Wednesday, accusing them of willingly helping China suppress dissent in return for access to a booming internet market.

Representatives from Microsoft, Yahoo, Cisco Systems. and Google defended themselves at a House International Relations subcommittee hearing, but a Google official acknowledged that figuring out China's internet market "has been a difficult exercise."

Lawmakers, however, were skeptical of what several saw as the companies' efforts to explain their business practices in China only after a recent crush of negative media and government attention.

Rep. Tom Lantos, the full committee's top Democrat, told the company officials that they had amassed great wealth and influence "but apparently very little social responsibility."

"Your abhorrent actions in China are a disgrace," Lantos said at the hearing. "I simply don't understand how your corporate leadership sleeps at night."

The BBC's report is here.

See also in this blog: The Great Firewall of China

"Escalating Harassment of Mari National Activists"

issued by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) today.

For further information, please contact Henriette Schroeder
schroeder@ihf-hr.org
__________________________________________

Press and Public Information, Henriette Schroeder
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights
Wickenburggasse 14/7, A-1080 Vienna, Austria
Tel. +43-1-408 88 22; Mobile: ++ 43 - 676 - 725 48 29
Fax: +43-1-408 88 22-50
Internet: http://www.ihf-hr.org



Escalating Harassment of Mari National Activists

Vienna/Moscow, 15 February 2006. The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) and the Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG) are concerned about reports of escalating harassment of Mari national activists in the Republic of Mari El, one of Russia's so-called ethnic regions.

According to information available to the IHF and the MHG, the authorities of Mari El have recently stepped up their efforts to stifle the activities of two local organizations committed to promoting the rights of the Mari minority, Mari Ushem and Mer Kanash. An investigation has been opened to consider grounds for closing down the two organizations and leading members of the organizations, as well as their family members, have been subject to pressure. The chair of Mari Ushem, Nina Maksimova, has been threatened by dismissal from her position as a teacher at a children's center.

There are indications that the problems faced by Mari activists may have intensified after the publication of a joint IHF-MHG report about the Mari minority of Mari El on 1 February 2006. This report shows that members of the Mari national movement have been the targets of a growing crack-down on their activities during the period in office of the current president of Mari El, Leonid Markelov. Involved in peaceful efforts to communicate their concerns about the protection of the Mari minority and to challenge official policies of the republic, members of the movement have been ridiculed and denigrated in state-controlled media and have been subject to intimidation, arrest, prosecution, dismissal and violent attacks.

The new developments in Mari El take place in the context of an ongoing broader assault on civil society groups in the Russian Federation, which includes the adoption of a highly restrictive NGO law and efforts to silence leading human rights groups working at the federal level.

The IHF and the MHG call on the authorities of Mari El, as well as the Russian Federation, to immediately stop all forms of harassment against civil society organizations involved in efforts to publicize and address problems with respect to minority and other areas of human rights protection and to instead work together with such organizations toward ensuring compliance with international human rights standards.

The recent IHF-MHG report - The Human Rights Situation of the Mari Minority of the Republic of Mari El - is available, in English and Russian, at

http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id=3&d_id=4185

A Finnish summary can also be found at the IHF website.

Fore more information:
Vienna: Aaron Rhodes, IHF Executive Director, +43-1-408 88 22, +43-676-635
66 12; Henriette Schroeder, IHF Press Officer, +43-1-408 88 22; +43-676-725
4829; Ann-Sofie Nyman, IHF Researcher, +43-1-408 88 22
Moscow: Irina Sergeeva, MHG Project Coordinator, +7-495-207 0769

(via MAK)

A recent post on chechnya-sl

Much Ado About (Almost) Nothing

Here in Israel there were over the years some claims of Chechen Aid to the Palestinians, and i can testify that not one had any ground to it (BTW, Maskhadov's Government alway denied this alleged link; as far as i know, most of the time the Chechens wanted nothing to do with the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict). Those Hamas "links" are a Poster showing the faces Of Khattab, Hamas Leader Akhmed Yassin and Bassayev and Bin-Laden - all portrayed as heros of Islamic Struggle, see the links - some other Anti-Russian material, and a Fatwa (Islamic Ruling) from 2001 byMahmed Ibn Abdullah El-Seif (Do I spell it correctly?), the so-called "mufti of the Chechen Islamic fighters", sanctioning Suicide attacks agains the infidels. this last fatwa was Published on the Hamas Website in 2001. I Personally know the material is Original, and the army captured more than one Hamas CD-Rom and Poster that endorses theChechens' struggle against Russia, trying to portray it as part of as worldwide Islamic Struggle. However, I'm quite Sure That Russia knows that already. for twoyears they have been getting this material, and i don't think thatPutin has any Illusions about the Hamas, or really believes it is not a terrorist organization. he does it for his political reasons, perhaps to get himself back into middle east Bussiness, and I believe he's fully aware of the Hamas Covenant and Anti-Russian propaganda. Therefore the Israeli effort is unlikely to bring any change in Russian attitude towards the Hamas.
Links:

1. Khattab, Yassin, Bassayev, Bin-Laden:

http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/9_04/img/chech_1.gif

2. "Hamas - we don't believe in Talks". map of Chechnya on the left.

http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/9_04/img/chech_3.jpg

3. "The Commander of the Mujaheedin In Chechnya, The Shaid Commander Kahttab":

http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/9_04/img/chech_4.jpg

4. Obituary for Khattab:

http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/9_04/img/chech_6.jpg

5. From the CD "Russian Hell in Chechnya" (available through Emule. i used it for research):

http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/9_04/img/chech_7.jpg

ok, i think this is enough. Those who read russian can find the review by the Israeli center for Intelligence and Terrorism Studies here:

http://www.intelligence.org.il/ru/ru_n/pdf/hamas_moscow_r.pdf

The "Great Firewall of China" open hearing in the U.S. House of Representatives is currently going out live at this link.

(Via Bildt Comments)


The session is proving to be quite telling, and is revealing some real weaknesses in State Department and Administration policies towards China. Yahoo, Google, Cisco and Microsoft, all of which have official representatives present and testifying, are not doing too well in justifying their practices, either. They sound angry and defensive, and are falling back on the threadbare "imperfect world" and "constructive engagement" arguments that were so familiar during the - pre-Internet - detente debates of the Cold War.

What's becoming clear as the hearing continues is that the U.S. Internet companies are essentially doing the Chinese government's work for it, and are co-operating in the persecution and detention - often leading to torture and death - of Chinese citizens accused of anti-government activity. As Tom Lantos most eloquently pointed out, the argument that the companies have been following legal orders of the U.S. government is not valid - IBM was following legal orders when it worked in Nazi Germany during the 1930s and helped to create the technology that made the Holocaust possible.

It all adds up to another example of how some of the world's most repressive governments are increasingly trying to turn the elements of Western democracy against it - and having some success, something that didn't really happen during the Cold War. Someone has been studying and learning some lessons.

By George Friedman

Last Thursday, Feb. 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin invited the leadership of Hamas, the Islamist political party that won the recent Palestinian elections, to visit Moscow. Hamas quickly accepted, and the meeting is expected to take place later this month. As with many things diplomatic, the fact that the invitation was extended and that the meeting will take place is infinitely more important than what is said during the meeting.

The invitation has little to do with Hamas and less to do with Israel. On the whole, anything that strengthens the radical Islamist movement -- which would certainly include Hamas -- ought to be anathema to Moscow, given the trouble that the Russians are having in Chechnya. But Russia has bigger problems: namely, its own role in the world, and the United States. The invitation is not about Israelis and Palestinians. It is entirely about U.S.-Russian relations -- and as such, it represents a significant moment.

Backdrop: Russia's Strategy Reversal

On Sunday, Feb. 12, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice repeated what has now become a constant American theme on Russia, saying, "We are very concerned, particularly about some of the elements of democratization that seem to be going in the wrong direction." She went on to note, "I think the question is open as to where Russia's future development is going." To say that this theme irritates the Russians vastly understates the situation.

The Russians are, in fact, redefining their geopolitical position. Since the mid-1980s, the Russians have been of the opinion that abandoning a geopolitical confrontation with the United States would result in economic benefits. Put another way, the Russians were prepared to learn from the West and took their bearings from the West. Western advice and lectures were expected and, in some ways, even welcomed.

Today, the Russians' view of this strategy is divided. There are those who think that this arrangement has been a catastrophe for Russia. Then there are those who would argue that the process has been bad but can be redeemed. Finally, there is a very small minority who believe that the reforms would work if they would only go farther and faster. This faction has become irrelevant in Moscow. The debate is between those who want a complete reversal in policy -- a large minority -- and those who acknowledge that massive readjustments must be made on all levels but say the basic idea of private property and markets should not be completely abandoned.

What is going on, therefore, is a struggle over how far democracy should be curtailed and to what extent market reforms should be reined in. Overlaying this is a deep suspicion about the intentions of the United States. The dominant view is that Rice's demands for increased democratization are an attempt to weaken Russia further. Those who hold this opinion point to what they see as the behavior of U.S. intelligence in the areas of the former Soviet Union that they regard as being properly part of Russia's sphere of influence. In particular, they view events in Ukraine as evidence that the United States is committed to causing Russia's implosion, by forcing harmful reforms within it and then by surrounding Russia with hostile clients of the United States.

At the V-E Day celebrations in May 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush went out of his way to push both themes -- first by visiting Latvia and Georgia, two countries regarded as hostile to Russian interests, and then by publicly criticizing the failure of the Russians to democratize. Washington made it clear that it did not intend to relieve the pressure, and the Russians believed that. As a result, the Russians have been on an offensive, on multiple levels, to challenge U.S. influence in what they call "the near abroad." Since Jan. 1, shutting off natural gas flows to Ukraine and Georgia has been part of this process.

And this brings us to Moscow's invitation to Hamas. There are a number of reasons to make the invitation -- the single most important of which was that the United States did not want it to be done. The Russians also reached out to the Israelis, albeit belatedly: On Saturday, Feb. 12, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov invited his Israeli counterpart, Shaul Mofaz, to Russia in a gesture designed to show that the Russians were not tilting toward Hamas. But between the lines, the Russians wanted to deliver two messages to Washington.

The first was that Moscow no longer regards itself as a junior partner to the United States in foreign policy -- and, in fact, doesn't regard itself as a partner at all. Second, they wanted to make it clear that, just as Washington is making trouble for Russia in its own periphery, the Russians are equally capable of making trouble in areas that are of fundamental interest to the United States. Moscow's message is this: Do not assume that the failure of Russia to exercise its foreign policy options means that the Russians have no foreign policy options. Nothing Russia is getting from the United States in economic relations compensates for the geopolitical harm the United States is doing to Russia. In other words, this is about 2005, not 1995. A lot happened in the last decade, most of it not good for the Russians. The rules are changing.

There is another, more directly strategic reason for the move. Russia has, and has always had, strategic interests in the Middle East. Given the decay of Russia's strategic position in the formerly Soviet region, these interests -- which today include ties to Syria and a potential partnership with Iran on nuclear enrichment -- have become more important rather than less. The U.S. penetration of Central Asia, the Baltics and Ukraine cannot simply be countered in these areas; it is only by challenging the United States in the Middle East that Moscow can divert American attention from areas of great interest to the Russians. It is not just a matter of bandwidth -- meaning that the more trouble the United States has in the Middle East, the less time it has for the former Soviet Union. It is also the case that if Russia is to contain the American presence along its southern frontier, having influence and a presence to the rear of this region -- in the Middle East -- gives it leverage over some of the former Soviet republics.

Russia also sees a major diplomatic opening. The United States backed a political process in the Middle East that has resulted in the election of a government unacceptable to Washington. The United States does not have the means for negotiating with Hamas, given the rules of the game that Washington has defined. In some ways, Israel has expressed a less rigid view of Hamas than the United States has. The Russians, however, have no problem talking to Hamas, nor do they have a problem talking to the Israelis. The Israelis do not want the United States to change its position on Hamas; they welcome the rigid U.S. position. But they do recognize the need to deal with Hamas on some level. The Russians represent a useful intermediary. Thus, Russia could emerge as a critical mediator, at least for a time.

A New Dynamic

Russia's willingness to speak to Hamas creates a new dynamic in the Muslim world. Syria and Iran are seeking "great power" support against the United States. Indeed, we could expect an evolution in which the Iraqi government also would be looking for counterweights to American power. By inviting Hamas and possibly opening a channel between Hamas and the Israelis, Russia is positioning itself to become a mediator in other disputes, and to walk away with relationships that the United States has been unable to manage.

Given the robustness of Russia's arms industry, which is much more vital and advanced than is generally understood, the Russians could return to their role as arms provider to the region and patron of governments that are hostile to the United States. The situation from 1955 to 1990 was a much more natural geopolitical dynamic than the current situation, in which Russia is really not present in the region. Russia is a natural player in the Middle East.

Remember also that Hamas is very close to Saudi Arabia, with which Russia has an intensely competitive relationship in the energy markets. And then there is Chechnya. The Russians have long charged that "Wahhabi" influence was behind the Chechen insurgency as well as insurgencies in Central Asia. In the Russian mind, "Wahhabi" is practically a code word for "Islamist militants," including al Qaeda. The Russians also feel that, while the Americans have forced the Saudis to provide intelligence on al Qaeda, they have not elicited similar aid on the issue of the Chechens. In other words, Moscow perceives the United States not only as having neglected to help Russia on Chechnya, but as actually hindering it.

The Russians badly want to bring the Chechen rebellion under control without allowing Chechnya to secede. They believe that the Chechen insurgents, and particularly the internationalized jihadist faction among them, would not survive if outside support dried up. They believe that the United States is not displeased to see the Chechen war bleeding Russia, and that Washington has discouraged Saudi collaboration with Moscow. All things considered, this is probably true. In reaching out to Hamas, Russia is also reaching out to the Saudis. The Saudis cannot control the Chechens, but they may have some means of determining the level of operations the Chechens are able to maintain.

Conclusion

Of course, many of these things are amorphous, and some are certainly dubious. Nevertheless, the Hamas affair is of substantial significance, for several reasons. First, the Russians are clearly signaling that they intend to get back into the Middle East game. Second, they are aware that this will make the United States extremely uncomfortable. Third, that is exactly what they intend to achieve. Creating problems for the United States in strategic areas is what the Russians think is in their national interest right now.

Washington has been trying to get its arms around the evolution in Moscow for months now. Given everything on the Bush administration's plate, it is not clear that there has been time to look deeply at the emerging situation. At least publicly, the administration continues to maintain the same attitude toward Moscow that has been evident since Mikhail Gorbachev: The Russians are the students, and Washington the teacher. Washington is concerned about the Russian evolution, but at this point has no policy response.

Washington will have to choose one of two courses. First, it can try to close the noose on Moscow -- consolidating the U.S. position on Russia's periphery, blocking Russian counters and encouraging secessionist tendencies within the Russian Federation itself. In other words, the United States can go in for the kill and be prepared to live with the consequences of failure. Alternatively, it can accept that it has reached the high-water mark of U.S. influence in the Russian sphere, and then manage the return of most of that region to Moscow's orbit. In turn, it can then deal with Russia's re-emergence as a potential superpower in a generation or two.

What is not a strong option is what the United States is now doing. Wounding a bear without killing it is the most dangerous game of them all. Nothing the United States is doing now will kill the bear. It is, however, guaranteed to irritate him enormously and convince him that in due course, he will be killed. There are no good outcomes from this strategy.

In the end, Moscow's invitation to Hamas is intended to be a warning that Russia can make life increasingly difficult for the United States -- and that Russia plans to do just that.


Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.


Distribution and Reprints
This report may be distributed or republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com.

Yulia Latynina, writing in the Moscow Times, has some observations about Russia's spin doctors (who include the country's president) which make disturbing reading, as they indicate that Russia's "security services" actually work against the country's security. An excerpt:

In his speech to the FSB brass, Putin commended the border guards for shoring up the country's borders and making it harder for terrorists to enter. Judging by Putin's speech, you'd have thought Shamil Basayev was hiding out in Mexico, like Trotsky. But when Basayev gave an interview to Andrei Babitsky last summer, he met the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter in Ingushetia. Earlier, the authorities had nearly captured Basayev and his wife on the outskirts of Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria.

When it became clear that cops had driven Basayev around Nalchik, the Interior Ministry needed to save face. Not long after, the cops entered a mosque belonging to the Jamaat of Kabardino-Balkaria in the village of Volny Aul and beat up hundreds of people. After several years of similar beatings, the Muslims of Nalchik rose up in armed rebellion on Oct. 13, 2005. And they were destroyed. In his speech last week, Putin singled out the operation in Nalchik as "an example of successful work by the Russian law enforcement agencies as a whole and by FSB employees in particular."

Commenting on the recent explosion at an army barracks in Chechnya which killed 13 and injured more than 20, Latynina points to the absurdity of the government's spin on this, which suggested that the explosion had been caused by propane gas tanks - which turned out to be intact. She adds:

Two parallel worlds exist in this country. In one world, the military, law enforcement and the security services have turned into an enormous supermarket that offers its services to criminals and terrorists alike. The siloviki release hard-core extremists for cash and provide a taxi service for Basayev.

In the other world, terrorists are wasted in outhouses and caves, and when Defense Ministry barracks explode, propane is the culprit.

What astounds me about the propane story is that they showed the intact gas tanks on television. Any explosives expert will tell you that when a propane tank explodes, the metal pretty much vaporizes.

Then again, any spin doctor worth his salt will tell you that if you want people to believe that a propane tank explosion destroyed an army barracks, you'd better show them some tanks.

The article can also be read here.

Yulia Tymoshenko's speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs(Chatham House) in London on February 2 contained the following comments on the Ukraine-Russia gas dispute, and the subsequent RosUkrEnergo gas deal:

The gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine has been a wake-up call for many in Western Europe and Washington, and attracted great attention to the use of energy as a post-Soviet neo-imperialist weapon.

The proposed agreement for the settlement of the argument poses more questions than it answers. Firstly, it ignored the fact that both parties had a valid binding contract until the 1st of January, 2010. The matter could and should have been referred for review to the Stockholm court of arbitration. Secondly, the proposed deal guarantees a price of $95 per 1000 cubic meters of gas only for the first six months of 2006, while at the same time locking Ukraine into an unchangeable gas transit deal for the next five years. Thirdly, the deal places Ukraine's energy interests in the hands of RosUkrEnergo, a shadowy company, with suspected links to international criminals.

During my premiership, my government sought to investigate RosUkrEnergo - to discover who precisely its owners are, how it gained a virtual monopoly on the import of Central Asian gas, and where its profits go. It is perhaps not a surprise that when I left government, that investigation was shelved. I think that in order to find out who exactly benefits from this deal, it is necessary to carry out an investigation where both Ukrainian and international structures participate and that the case is thoroughly examined in a court of law.

For a deeper understanding of the extent of the damage from this gas deal from the 4th January 2006, I want to once more explore in detail the main points of the deal.

- The provision of a monopoly supply of natural gas to Ukraine and the loss of direct international contracts with Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
- The entanglement of an opaque structure RosUkrEnergo - in the supply of gas.
- The occupation of the internal market of Ukraine by RosUkrEnergo - in effect we have got a double monopoly.
- The transition fee of Russian gas through Ukrainian territory has been secured for the next five years, at two times below market price.
- Ukraine has surrendered the whole of the gas that it was contracted to receive from Turkmenistan at $75, at a time when it is receiving the exact same gas from RosUkrEnergo at $95. Ukraine has, as a matter of fact, accepted a clear system of shadow kickbacks.
- An agreement to buy Russian gas at $230 per 1000 cubic meter, which at the Ukrainian border is actually a higher price than that paid by Germany or France by some $60. Clearly such prices are fatal, considering the energy consumption in homes and in industry, and the need of 2-3 years to prepare an effective system of energy saving technologies.

Ukraine's conciliatory position in talks with Russia has weakened the position of other countries such as Moldova in their negotiations with Gazprom.

I am certain that this deal is not dictated by the market. This is nothing more than energy terrorism.

The gas deal of 4th January 2006 was the straw that broke the camel's back and it is precisely why we decided to vote for the sacking of Yekhanurov's government. It was not a politically motivated act timed to coincide with the elections but rather a reminder that the Orange Revolution embodied accountability and responsibility to the people.

The vote of no confidence was not a betrayal of the national interests - quite the opposite; it was a restated confirmation of national interests. Ukrainian energy supplies, as well as European energy supplies will never be truly safe, whilst control of the transit of gas remains in the hands of a shadowy company - with unknown owners. What we need is an objective, just and transparent solution to the problem, and I will do my best to achieve this.

The gas crisis also highlighted another pressing problem - the necessity for Ukraine to have professional experts and independent advisers that are not aligned to energy politics or spurious business interests. This will help prevent corruption and damaging monopolies from occurring.

Maybe we need to consider the creation, in conjunction with our European partners, of a common working group which would address the question of energy security and reform of Ukraine's energy sector. This could be an important step towards a common European energy policy.

The problems that have arisen from the gas crisis go beyond energy security, once again triggering the question over Ukraine's role in Europe and the world. Ukraine must decide where it fits into Europe and consider the balance that must be struck between its own expectations of EU accession and its relations with Russia and other post-Soviet block neighbours.

Alongside our own declaration that our future course is to become a full member of the EU, we must also accept that few of even the most fervent supporters of European integration want to help Ukraine quickly become a member.

Yet the gas dispute has proven that our fates are more closely entwined than many previously thought. So the message I would like the Ukrainian people to hear is that you - the west - will play your part as Ukraine redefines its historic ties to Russia, and that when the necessary EU conditions are met, we will be welcomed by the UK and the other member states.

(Via Maidan, where the text of the whole speech - "Where Is Ukraine Going?" - may also be read)

Via RFE/RL:

Iran: Self-Immolation Of Kurdish Women Brings Concern
By Golnaz Esfandiari

An unidentified Iranian woman immolating herself (file photo)
(gooya.com)

The Kurdistan Human Rights Organization is expressing concern over the self-immolation of Kurdish women in Iran's Western Azerbaijan Province. The organization has published the name of more than 150 Kurdish women who have committed suicide in the past nine months, the majority of them by setting themselves on fire. Observers and activists say self-immolation of women is also happening in some other Western provinces of Iran that have large Kurdish populations, such as Ilam, Kermanshah, and Kurdistan. Domestic violence, social injustice, and discrimination are cited as the main reasons for self-immolation among women.


PRAGUE, 8 February 2006 (RFE/RL) -- Nasrin Mohammadi is a member of a women's NGO in Marivan in Iran's western province of Kurdistan. She says the number of women who attempt to kill themselves through self-immolation is growing in her city.

One of the recent cases involves a woman who set herself on fire to protest her husband's decision to marry another woman.

"I know this woman who is illiterate; her husband became very rich in a very short time and he forced his wife to sign a letter of consent so he could marry another woman," she said. "She didn't know what she was signing. Since then she has attempted to commit suicide by self-immolation; 80 percent of her body is burned and considering her condition I think she will die [soon]."

"We should at least boost the women's morale; we should give them some hope for the future so that they don't feel that they are totally alone and defenseless."Little Hope And A Grim Future

Mohammadi tells RFE/RL that due to conservative traditions and social restrictions, women in her region have little hope in life and often a grim future.

"Desperation is the main reason for the self-immolation [of women]," she continued. "Women face more pressure in a traditional society and in our region because of deprivations and the rule of [old] traditions this pressure has become much stronger. Women in our region are seen as 'second class' citizens. The economic situation of women is a main factor; they are totally dependent on men and also the laws of our country are such that the courts never protect women."

The Kurdistan Human Rights Organization has said that for many women in the region, burning oneself is an outcry against the "patriarchal system" that rules the society and also against the abuse of their basic rights.

Mohammad Sadegh Kabudvand says violence against women is one of the main reasons for suicide among Kurdish women.

Subjected To Violence

"It is certain that pressure and domestic violence and religious prejudice is causing this problem," he said. "In the Kurdish regions men have more [rights] at home and in the society and women are considered inferior."

Kabudvand told RFE/RL that all the documented cases of self-immolation of women in Iran's Western Azerbaijan Province involve young women -- between the ages of 14 to 30 years old -- with little education. He says his organization is planning to document cases of self-immolation in other provinces such as Ilam and Kermanshah where self-immolation is reportedly common.

Mohsen Janghorbani is a professor of epidemiology at Isfahan University of Medical Sciences who has done some research on attempted suicides in Ilam. He believes easy access to flammable materials such as petrol makes self-immolation the most common method of suicide in Ilam. Professor Janghorbani told RFE/RL that self-immolation is not just a way to end life, but also a way to send a message to their families and to the society.

"I think that women do not want to really commit suicide but they want, in fact, to make their cry for help to be heard and say that they are facing injustice," he said. "They use this means, [even though] it is the worst form of suicide. Most of them are young women who are suffering in forced marriages or have some other family-related problems."

Education Needed

He believes better protection of women's rights and economic development in the region could help tackle the problem. He adds that a woman's access to a better education would make them more aware of their rights and help them express their despair in other ways.

Nasrin Mohammadi from the Cultural Society of Marivan's Women agrees. "Laws should be changed in a way that they will protect women," she said. "[The mentality] of the families should change and also the culture of the society [should change]. It needs a long time. Currently we can't do much but we should at least boost the women's morale; we should give them some hope for the future so that they don't feel that they are totally alone and defenseless."

Experts believe the availability of family mental-health centers and psychological programs may reduce the rate of self- immolation in the region.

The Human Rights Organization of Kurdistan has called on media and NGOs to help raise people's awareness about women's issues in an effort to help change social and cultural patterns relating to men's behavior. The organization has also called on the Iranian government to join international agreements and conventions that guarantee equal rights for women such as the UN Convention On The Elimination Of All Forms Of Violence Against Women.

Copyright (c) 2006. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. www.rferl.org

“ Russia closes the door of the North Caucasus ”

Interview with Musayev Ilias, Copenhagen spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya (ICR).

Interviewed by Aslan BARANETS

- How many refugees from Chechnya live in Europe nowadays, and what is their social structure?

- According to the last information, we have about 200,000 Chechen emigrants. The majority are persons who support the Chechen Movement for Independence and cannot, or do not want to stay in our home republic under Russian occupation. They represent all social groups, but mostly they are intelligent people: journalists, writers, and surgeons - our best professionals in their area. It is really sad that they do not have the possibility to work and express themselves in Chechnya now. Their only blame is love to their motherland.

- The new president of ICR Abdul-Halim Sadulayev closed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a short period of time earlier this year, what would you say about it?

- After the closure of the ministry, the president made a new staff end established it again. So today many more active professionals serve us in the politicial arena. If in the past there were only 3-4 representative in Europe , now we have 20. And we are planning to send new representatives to the other European countries where are don’t have any diplomats yet. Unfortunately I cannot tell you now the names of those persons or countries where they will be sent for understandable reasons.

- From where do you get financial resources for your activity?

- There are many political movements all over the world. Some of them are situated in West European countries and a couple of non-politicial Middle Eastern organisations support us in every way they can. For example also the Chechen community in Copenhagen - people from different parts of Denmark endow us their money.

- How are your relations with the Danish government?

- They are definitely good and friendly. If they were not so, I do not think that we could have the possibility to lead such a way of life as we do now. The Danish government practically helps us in all kinds of conflicts with Russian authorities by supporting the Chechen community here.

- I am sure that you have heard about the scandal of the published Muhammad drawings in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. What is the position of the Chechen community on this issue?

- Definitely, we consider the drawings to be scandalous but I think there is one very interesting point in this story: I realized Jyllands-Posten’s editor of culture is married to the daughter of a FSB general. And he had been working in Moscow as Jyllands-Posten’s correspondent. I suppose that this scandal is nothing else than another regular provocation of the Russian Special Services. Why did they do this? That’s another question. We all know very well that Russian authorities for a long time have been trying to close the North Caucasus' door for western humanitarian organisations, which have a good experience of supporting the Chechen population and also collected a large data archive about war crimes permitted in Chechnya. Of course, they do not want this information to be used by international human rights prosecutors. And the present situation with the Danish Refugee Council is not surprising. Of course the official position of our government in exile is that we would like the Danish Refugee Council to remain in Chechnya. Ramzan Kadirov, the prime minister of Chechnya, only has a 3rd grade education, and he is only a Kremlin mafia's puppet. He never had his own opinion. And he cannot do such kind of steps without the Kremlin's special edict. Also it is a possibility for FSB to create in Denmark the same massive phobia that we have now in Russia. It is the same dirty business, they only changed the picture of the public enemy. If in Russia it is Chechens blasting Russian buildings, in America and, now in Denmark , it is warlike Muslims burning the Danish flag. Using their own agent in Jyllands-Posten, they felicitously prepared the world for the 3rd World War. War between two civilisations – East against West. And I do not really think that Russia will take sides in such a war.

http://www.chechensociety.net/

From: World Chechnya Day <info@worldchechnyaday.org>


Dear Friends,

On Thursday 23rd February 2006 individuals and organisations around the world will commemorate World Chechnya Day. The Day will be a means of bringing together organisations and individuals sympathetic to the people of Chechnya and their historic tribulations. In particular the Day is intended to raise awareness of the genocide that occured in 1944 when Stalin deported the entire Chechen people.

Sixty two years ago, on 23 February 1944, Stalin ordered the forcible deportation of the Chechen, Ingush and other nations of the NorthCaucasus to Central Asia. More than half of the people who were to be forcibly transported died in transit or in massacres committed by Soviet troops. Those who survived the journey were left facing starvation and disease in the harsh winters of Siberia and Central Asia. In 2004 the European Parliament passed a motion formally recognising this tragedy as a genocide.

World Chechnya Day is being commemorated to:

* Recognise the suffering and genocide of the Chechen people as a
human catastrophe of historic significance
* Respect all victims of Stalinist deportations
* Raise awareness and understanding of the Chechen genocide as an
issue of importance to humanity
* Ensure that the horrendous crimes, racism and victimisation that
were committed during the Chechen genocide will never be forgotten
or repeated, in Europe or elsewhere in the world
* Reflect on contemporary atrocities that raise similar issues
* Educate subsequent generations about the genocide and the
continued relevance of the lessons that can be learnt from it
* Assert a continuing commitment to oppose racism, victimisation and
genocide
* Support shared aspirations for the ideals of justice, security,
dignity and peace for all

To learn more about World Chechnya Day, its history, its supporters and
other events taking place worldwide, please visit:
www.worldchechnyaday.org <http://www.worldchechnyaday.org>. The website
is intended to be a portal for Chechnya commemoration events worldwide.
Also attached is an overview document on the Day.

How can you help?
Organise Event
We are encouraging people and organisations all around the world to
organise film showings and talks locally, to sell and wear the World
Chechnya Day wristbands and, generally, to raise awareness of the Day
and the issues concerned.

If you are already commemorating the Deportations in any way then we
would be grateful if you could let us know by submitting details online
at: http://www.worldchechnyaday.org/page/add_event.

If you are interested in participating, then please feel free to contact
us at info@savechechnya.org <mailto:info@savechechnya.org> for
documentaries, speeches, wristbands and any other support you may require.

Buy a wrist band
Please do submit any events you organise locally on the WCD events page,
http://www.worldchechnyaday.org/page/add_event as
If you should be interested in purchasing World Chechnya Day wristbands
(£1/wristband), please email us at info@savechechnya.org
<mailto:info@savechechnya.org> with the number of wristbands you
require, your contact number and the delivery address. Please follow
this shortly with a cheque or postal order made payable to 'Save
Chechnya Campaign' of the correct amount, sent to 'Save Chechnya
Campaign, 27 Old Gloucester Street, London, UK WC1N 3XX'.

Translate World Chechnya Day Document
We are translating the attached document into as many languages as
possible to publish on the World Chechnya Day website. Currently we are
still seeking translations into the following languages:

* Greek
* Hindi
* Italian
* Japanese
* Korean
* Persian/Farsi
* Portugese
* Spanish
* Swedish

The translation should be of high literary standard and will be checked
prior to publishing.

Thank you for your time. I hope to hear from many of you very soon,

World Chechnya Day
...a day that few are aware of and yet none should forget...
www.worldchechnyaday.org

Rodolfo at México desde fuera has an interesting take on the Muhammad cartoon controversy, considering it in the wider context of Al Qaeda, the military occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the important but rarely-discussed aspects of the later Cold War era in which these phenomena have their historical roots:

El hecho que las minorías que dirigen Arabia Saudí, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y otras naciones árabes actúen guiadas por una doble moral (parte del reclamo original de Osama bin Laden a sus parientes en Arabia Saudí) ha alentado también, ya desde los setenta, movimientos como el que se hizo del control de Irán luego de derrocar a la familia Reza Pahlevi, títere a su vez de los intereses británicos y estadounidenses.

No sólo eso, es necesario tomar en consideración los efectos perversos de la invasión soviética de Afganistán en la década de los setenta. Por una parte, los soviéticos representaban, desde la lógica del Islam, la versión más radical y secularizada del "Occidente". Los abusos perpetrados por Stalin en algunas de las naciones anexadas a la Unión Soviética (Kazajastán, Kirguiztán, etc.), hacían prever una situación similar para el futuro de Afganistán. Sin embargo, una coalición de fundamentalistas islámicos entre los que destacaba Osama bin Laden y operativos de la CIA, hicieron de Afganistán una pesadilla para las fuerzas armadas soviéticas y garantizaron la sobrevivencia y financiamiento de distintos grupos vinculados en mayor o menor medida a Bin Laden. Éste, a su vez, desarrolló otras estrategias de financiamiento en el así llamado Triángulo de Oro, el área de Afganistán en la que se producen las mayores cantidades de opio para el consumo europeo.

Creo que querer entender el efecto de las imágenes de Westergaard al margen de este contexto complejo es sumamente difícil, díría yo que imposible.

Vladimir Putin's official visit to Spain last week was "not a great success", writes Pavel K. Baev in EDM. Putin's bombshell announcement about his invitation to Hamas to visit Moscow, following close on the heels of his remarks about Hamas "not being a terrorist organization", was apparently intended as a diversion: the questions of Spanish journalists, media representatives, human rights workers and senators were simply too direct, intrusive and hard to duck. Issues of energy politics were not really relevant, as Spain does not import any significant amount of Russian gas, and although Spain has aspirations to join the G-8, Moscow is opposed to them, as it doesn't want any further competition in that body. So some other issue had to be brought to the fore, in order to channel attention away from the unwelcome public relations "black spots", Putin

apparently rushed the invitation in order to escape from a tight diplomatic corner, and it took all concerned parties by surprise. The Spanish hosts politely acknowledged Russia's key role in the Middle East peace process but refused to comment on the legitimacy of Hamas. The reaction in Washington was sharper, since the "Quartet" (UN, EU, US, and Russia) was supposed to stick to the common position that had been agreed upon during the January round of negotiations, during which Moscow did not mention any plans of this sort (Gazeta.ru, February 10). Israel has been simply outraged by the invitation, interpreting it as a step toward international acceptance of the Hamas government without any conditions focused on denouncing terrorism and revising its charter, which calls for the destruction of the Jewish state (Kommersant, February 11). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had some explaining to do in the telephone conversation with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, but Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov had a much harder time at an emergency meeting in Italy with Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz (Gazeta.ru, February 11).

Clearly disconcerted by this barrage of criticism, Moscow could only stick to its position that Hamas was democratically elected by the clear majority of Palestinians and so "sooner or later" must be accepted by all parties as a fact of political life (Polit.ru, February 7). While references to democracy coming from the Kremlin may appear not entirely convincing, its initiative could be interpreted as a pragmatic step aimed at scoring a few points by taking on a necessary job that nobody else wants to do. Indeed, Russia often positions itself as a communicator between the West and the regimes it finds too unpleasant to deal with, like North Korea (Ekho Moskvy, February 10). By establishing a dialogue with Hamas, Moscow might expect to improve its very marginal position in the "Quartet" and become an important player in the "major league" of Middle Eastern politics instead of merely "pulling chestnuts out of the fire," as Putin bitterly noted. His very strong condemnation of the publication of "blasphemous" cartoons in European newspapers was also clearly aimed at gaining a bit of extra credibility in the Muslim world (Kommersant, February 10).

This "pragmatic" policy might appear simply unscrupulous and shortsighted, but there is a deeper layer of quasi-ideological aspirations beneath the readiness to embrace the "untouchables." This layer was momentarily revealed in Putin's remark at his annual press conference last month, when he characterized the Hamas victory as "an important setback for American efforts in the Middle East." It was more than quiet satisfaction that the U.S. drive in promoting democracy had brought results directly opposite to those desired in that repetitive statement; it was also the perception that a U.S. setback meant a Russian victory.

From this "realist" perspective, the success of the European "troika" (France, Germany, and the UK) and the United States in convincing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to refer the Iranian "case" to the UN Security Council was a setback for Russia's policy of forging a "strategic partnership" with Iran. The maneuver of opening a channel of direct communications with Hamas is seen as compensation for that forced concession, which still can be withdrawn during the debates in New York among the "veto" holders, and also as a way to exempt Russia from the brewing confrontation between the West and Islam. It comes as no surprise that Hamas has enthusiastically accepted the invitation, announcing that Russia, which has shown readiness to talk without any conditions, would replace the United States as the key peace broker in the Middle East (Vedomosti, February 10; Newsru.com, February 12). The delegation led by Khaled Mashal, the head of the Hamas "political bureau" in Damascus, could rush to Moscow in a few weeks, defying the travel ban maintained by Israel.

In this context, Baev also raises one important question in relation to Russia's attitude to the conflict in its home region of Chechnya:

Why is the Kremlin ready to negotiate with the Palestinian terrorists but not with the Chechen separatists? (Kommersant, February 10). Apparently, the answer has been prepared well in advance: The only possible partner for such negotiations could have been Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, and he was murdered last March. The new leadership of the Chechen resistance is professing more hardline views than his predecessor, so Moscow can ask with sincere indignation: Who could possibly negotiate with the likes of Shamil Basaev? Offering the West the unsolicited advice "not to go the easy way of burning bridges" in the Middle East, Putin has determinedly burned his own bridges in Chechnya (Vremya novostei, February 10). He may still discover that a small domestic war could make an irreducible stain on his reputation -- and cause great deformities in the politics of the state that still refuses to accept responsibility for its choices.

Sunday's French-language portion of the VOA music show devoted to AB Fable's newly-released I Like Be I Like Bop double CD is now online at this Real Audio URL. There are early bebop violin tracks by Joe Kennedy, Paul Nero, Odd Wentzel Larsen, Svend Asmussen and André Hodeir (Claude Laurence), among others. I haven't yet succeeded in locating the English-language version of the show, but it should be around somewhere on the labyrinthine VOA website.

See also in this blog: Violins on VOA

They come out at dusk, flat
shadows across the fields. They are composed in equal
parts of pig, badger, fox. Helplessness
is their principal distinguishing mark. They root in the snow
for something to eat. We find them unnatural:
their aimless wandering, their hunger, their obscene
lack of protection. At the first sign of danger the racoon dog
lies down and pretends to be dead. We find such behaviour
pitiful, we find the pitiful repulsive, we
are outraged by the hungry shadows of
this sugar-beet field, so unlike the snow leopard that silently
pursues its prey six thousand metres
above sea-level.

- Tua Forsström [my tr.]

I'm 61 today. Time doesn't stop.

I'm currently reading Reid Badger's informative and vivid biography of early jazz composer, violinist and bandleader James Reese Europe, and I'd been looking for some recordings of Europe's music. Now I have found them, both on a CD, and on a website written by Tim Graczyk. On the website it's possible to listen to Europe's World War I compositions "On Patrol In No Man's Land", "All Of No Man's Land Is Ours", and a couple of dozen others. These vigorous, robust, syncopated arrangements from the very dawn of jazz - beautifully played, with warm, brilliant tone, by the African-American 369th Infantry "Hellfighters" Band of 1918-19 - give a whole new meaning to the term "big band". There is even a Russian Rag.

On chechnya-sl, Marco Masi has posted some excerpts from the transcript of an Italian TV show which illustrates Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi's continuing advocacy of Vladimir Putin as a "truly democratic" world leader. There is something about Berlusconi's attitude to Putin that is eerily and disturbingly reminiscent of an earlier era:

Chechnya: "Russians guarantee order"

(ANSA) - ROME, 9 FEB

"In Chechnya there is the presence of the Russian Federation which guarantees public order", Berlusconi said. "There is a Chechen resistance that resorts to violence", added the Prime Minister, "and in no way does it want to open itself to a dialogue after Chechen citizens had the chance to open parties and to participate in free elections".

According to the premier "Putin is a democratic and reasonable person".

-----------------------

These nice words came during a TV show where he also added: "Putin did everything that was possible to transform Russia into a true democracy."

During his interview to the Spanish media in Madrid on February 7, Vladimir Putin had this to say about the fate of former YUKOS CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky, now serving a 9-year sentence in a Siberian prison camp (via kremlin.ru):

QUESTION: Mr President, you held a big press conference a few days ago where you gave detailed answers to many different questions. I would like to ask a question that was not raised on that occasion but that interests the public and the media nevertheless.

Some people here say that what is happening to [Mikhail] Khodorkovsky is revenge. I would not like to think this. Nevertheless, putting someone in an isolation cell just because he had a document detailing his rights: is this routine behaviour or is this an exceptional case? Did the prison authorities have particular orders in this regard or were they advised to take this line of behaviour?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: To be honest, I don't actually know what you are talking about. What I know is that there was a court decision, that the court passed a guilty verdict and that Khodorkovsky was convicted and sent to prison.

QUESTION: His lawyer said that he was put in an isolation cell because the Justice Ministry documents did not state what his rights are, and that is not to mention the fact the he was sent to Chita, which is a long way from home.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Prison is not a rest home. Prisoners are sent where it is deemed necessary to send them. People who have been convicted by the courts do not get to choose where they will carry out their sentence. It is the Justice Ministry that makes this decision.

To be honest, this is the first that I have heard of Mr Khodorkovsky being put in an isolation cell. As for whether this could be some kind of revenge. I don't understand who could want this, and for what reason? If he broke a rule, then the prison authorities would have reacted in accordance, but I don't actually know anything about this.

QUESTION: Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote about it, his lawyers wrote about it. I read about it in your press.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: It's good that our press is writing about all these things, but the fact of the matter is that I simply do not get time to read everything. Now that you have brought this matter to my attention, however, I will certainly ask the Justice Ministry what is going on here, where he has been sent and for what?

But the prison system, the prison colony, this is not the corporation where he was the one in charge and the one who gave the orders. Now he has to obey the rules of the establishment where he has been sent.

In Maidan, Taras Kuzio has drawn up a balance sheet on Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko's first year in office. Kuzio is at pains to point out to Western readers the nuances of the Orange Revolution protest, noting that

A large proportion of the Orange Revolution protestors sought to block a Yanukovych victory. Others did so in disgust at the crude tactics employed by the Leonid Kuchma regime. Some younger Orange protestors wanted to see their Ukraine become a 'normal' European country rather than Belarus-Lite under the educationally challenged Yanukovych. Others still protested because of a mixture of these different factors.

These nuances are important to grasp as Western commentary (particularly in the USA) has tended to gloss over the varied reasons why protestors joined the Orange Revolution. The Orange Revolution did not just take place because Ukrainians hit the streets to defend 'democracy' or a free market. These concerns included five key areas that will now be highlighted and their progress, or otherwise, during Yushchenko's first year in office will be discussed.

Kuzio lists the five key areas as

- democratic rights and the rule of law

- market economic business practices

- oligarchs and corruption

- the threat from the Donetsk clan

- away from Russia to Europe

and provides detailed background to each group of concerns. Noting that

while prior to the energy conflict, Washington insiders believed that Ukraine's membership in NATO was only likely after the next election cycle in 2009-2011... NATO officials are now stating that Ukraine is likely to be included in the next wave of NATO enlargement in 2008

in conclusion, Kuzio delivers the assessment that

There has been some important progress in Ukraine's democracy under Yushchenko. But, this could be undermined if Yanukovych takes power in the more powerful new parliament. If Yushchenko had early on installed Holovatiy as Justice Minister and removed Piskun as prosecutor they, together with Interior Minister Lutsenko, could have followed through on many of the demands and hopes of the Orange Revolution protestors. Yushchenko may well rue the day that he failed to find the political will to follow through on his election pledge of 'Bandits to Prison!'

BBC World Service Radio's Outlook programme has highlighted the plight of humanitarian aid workers Shanti Sellz and Daniel Strauss, who face trial for aiding and abetting illegal immigration, after they attempted to take to hospital three Mexicans who were trying to cross the border into the United States.

No More Deaths, the organization to which Shanti and Daniel belong, has some background information on the case:

No More Deaths volunteers, Shanti Sellz and Daniel Strauss, both 23, were arrested by the U.S. Border Patrol for medically evacuating 3 people in critical condition from the 105-degree Arizona desert in July 2005.

Shanti and Daniel were following the protocol of NMD training (acknowledged by NMD and US Border Patrol) by consulting medical professionals who advised them to evacuate the critically ill men to a medical facility, and then consulting a NMD attorney who approved the evacuation.

Their arrest and subsequent prosecution for providing humanitarian aid has shocked people of conscience around the world. These young humanitarians are facing prosecution by the US government which could result in a 15 year prison sentence.

We urgently need your help and support to stop this prosecution.

Anthony Barnett writes:

Dear Colleagues

Voice of America (VOA) radio has interviewed AB Fable about our Violin (or should that now be Voalin) Improvisation Studies CDs. This Friday and Saturday they will broadcast two separate programs playing tracks from all our CDs mixed in with comment. I think and hope they will play more music than comment. The programs will then be available on the web all week.

The two different programs will go out on Saturday FEBRUARY 11 and Sunday FEBRUARY 12

Matthew Lavoie producer of the programs has sent me the following message about difficulties that might be encountered negotiating the VOA website:

*

Our website is a confusing mess. It is damn near impossible for most of us in the building to figure it out. The program will air in French and English. The easiest place to hear it is (I know this page works!)

http://www.voanews.com/french/music.cfm

I don't think the programs are broadcast in real time on the web but they are put on the site immediately after radio broadcast.

The Saturday evening program is broadcast at 19.00 UTC
The Sunday evening program at 20.00 UTC

In short by late afternoon Saturday the program should be on the website and the same goes for the program on Sunday evening. The programs will be on the site all week, until they are replaced by the following weekend's Blues and Jazz programs.

Interested listeners should just click on the link under Du Blues au Jazz.

I will try and get you the link to the other [English] page as well.

*
Thank you for allowing me to post this message and happy listening.

Anthony
http://www.abar.net

Again in EDM, Vladimir Socor notes that the post-Soviet secessionist leaderships are making a cautious assessment of the London meeting of the Contact Group, which launched the negotiations toward defining Kosovo's status.

See also in this blog: Frozen Conflicts

An ice-flower from Finland.

(courtesy of SL, Helsinki)

Oleg Varfolomeyev, writing in EDM, points out that

current realities make quite possible a coalition between Yushchenko's Our Ukraine and Yanukovych's Party of Regions (PRU) after the March parliamentary election. This is because of the constitutional amendments that came into force on January 1, according to which a majority in parliament, rather than President Yushchenko, will appoint the cabinet after the election. Our Ukraine and PRU may well form the majority, unnatural as it may seem.

In an interview published in Spanish newspapers today, Russian president Vladimir Putin urges Denmark to apologize to Muslims for the controversial cartoons of Muhammad. RFE/RL has the details.

An article I just translated for the Prague Watchdog:

Changes in the underground Chechen government

By Ruslan Isayev

There has been another series of replacements in the government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI), the underground establishment representing the once independent Chechnya. Four ministers who are currently abroad have been relieved of their posts by a decree of President Abdul Khalim Sadulayev, which stipulates that heads of ministries and departments must be located in Chechnya.

The only minister of the four to receive a new post is Movladi Udugov. He will head the National Information Service of the State Defence Committee (GKO) of the ChRI, a body created by another decree.

Akhmed Zakayev has been retained as Culture Minister. However, the fact that he resides abroad may possibly deprive him of that post.

After the death last year of Aslan Maskhadov, President of Independent Chechnya, the differences of opinion between the radical and moderate representatives of the hechen resistance were obvious, but almost no one expected them to be manifested so soon.

In the view of a source close to the Chechen government in exile, the formal pretext for the sackings was a discussion between Udugov and Zakayev about the ChRI’s political system which appeared on the Chechenpress website. The real reasons, however, lie in a split in the leadership of the Ichkerian government and parliament.

The main point at issue is that a large section of the parliament, together with Akhmed Zakayev, consider that relations with international organizations should not be severed over the matter of regulating relations with Russia. The other section, composed of Islamic radicals, to which Movladi Udugov and, to some degree, warlord Shamil Basayev belong, consider that in war all methods are acceptable. In short, it can now be boldly asserted that the radicals are winning this struggle.

On the other hand, it is possible but not very likely that in these decrees Sadulayev is attempting to bring round the Ichkerian politicians in exile who are discussing “incontrovertible truths” such as the nature of Chechen statehood without consulting the top leadership.

It is also quite possible that all these changes were planned simply in order to remove Akhmed Zakayev from the political arena. Many observers note that the hand of Movladi Udugov, a master of political intrigues, can be glimpsed behind the changes.

For Movladi Udugov, to whom, not without foundation, the "information victory" in the first Chechen war was attributed, the removal of Akhmed Zakayev from the political scene signifies his own renaissance as an Ichkerian politician abroad. And it is most likely he who will draw up the ChRI’s foreign policy.

In this manner, Udugov has returned to his natural element, and it is perfectly possible that the information component of the Chechen resistance will undergo change in the direction of radicalism.

Commenting on the decrees for the Chechen desk of Radio Svoboda, Udugov welcomed them, expressing the view that the changes will be of benefit to the fight with the Russian aggressor, and that they are even long overdue. “The war will not end today, and it will not end tomorrow. We must be ready to continue the struggle,” he noted.

Akhmed Zakayev, the now former leader of the foreign policy bloc in the Ichkerian government which contained the four ministries, believes that the matter will not end with the new changes. He is apparently referring to the possibility that he may be sacked, i.e. that he will be relieved of his ministerial post.

It is unlikely that any of the sacked Ichkerian government ministers will return to Chechnya in order to try to retain their posts, and particularly not in a government that exists in the deep underground.

In fact, it is most probable that the decrees were not even aimed at this. This is now the third and most far-reaching change in the Chechen government since the post of ChRI President passed to Sadulayev, and it can indicate only one thing - that the Chechen resistance, whose activity has already gone beyond the limits of Chechnya alone, is now making long-term plans and that there is no place in its government for supporters of democratic values. This is the character that this unequal and unjust war has acquired.

www.watchdog.cz

Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights:
Letter to Russian NGOs on new NGO legislation (31 January 2006)

IHF, Joachim Frank <frank@ihf-hr.org>


COUNCIL OF EUROPE

THE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
_____________________

LE COMMISSAIRE AUX DROITS DE L´HOMME


Strasbourg, 31st January 2005

Dear Friends,

I write in reply to your letter of 23rd December 2005, in which you expressed your concerns about the Draft Law on Non-Profit Organisations that had just been adopted by the Duma. My Office obtained a copy of the legislation on its publication following its signature by the President of the Russian Federation and I have since been able to examine the final text and consider your views and those of other experts.

I was, indeed, somewhat concerned when I first heard about the plans to revise the legislative framework for NGOs in Russia. During my six years in Office, I have had the opportunity to witness the important contribution made by charitable and human rights organisations such as yours to the enjoyment of social and civil rights by ordinary Russian citizens and my resulting impression was that the existing legislation worked well. Whilst respecting the legitimate interest of the Russian authorities to regulate the functioning of domestic and international NGOs, I did not particularly see the need for changes in this area.

An analysis of the initial draft law and subsequent contacts with Mr. Vladimir Lukin, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation and Mrs. Ella Pamfilova, Chair of the Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights Council under the President of the Russian Federation, revealed a number of specific difficulties.

I was encouraged, therefore, that the Minister of Justice, Mr. Chaika, should travel to Strasbourg to request the views of the Council of Europe on the draft legislation. My own concerns, which I was able to transmit to Mr. Chaika directly on this occasion, were broadly reflected in the resulting Council of Europe opinion and I can only welcome the fact that the finally adopted text has been significantly altered in the light of it.

A number of concerns do, however, remain – particularly, it seems to me, in respect of the state’s powers to attend NGO meetings and in the vague wording of a few remaining provisions granting discretionary powers to administrative entities. I recall, in this context, that many of the human rights problems I observed during my 2004 visit to the Russian Federation and reported on in my report of last year resulted not so much from the inadequacy of the legislation in place, but from its poor or arbitrary implementation. It is essential, therefore, that provisions of the new NGO legislation, in particular those requiring further interpretation, be
applied in practice in a manner consistent with the freedom of expression and association.

The implementing regulations and the guidelines given to the public authorities referred to in the Law will consequently be of particular importance and I have contacted the Ministry of Justice to express my hope that they will, with their scope for greater clarity than Parliamentary Acts, provide sufficient direction to exclude the abusive or arbitrary use of administrative powers. I have also requested that the legislation’s application be carefully monitored. I shall, for my part, continue to observe and, when necessary, comment on developments in this area for the remaining months of my mandate.

I cannot, in conclusion, sufficiently stress the importance of NGOs of all types to the health and development of socially conscious, democratic societies. Within the broad spectrum of organised civil society, human rights NGOs have a special and essential role to play. It is for them to measure governments against their obligations and to hold them publicly accountable for their failings. Such criticism must often be trenchant, but, if objective and expressed in good faith, can only contribute to the protection of the fundamental rights of all.

Allow me to take this opportunity, as my mandate draws to a close, to express my respect and gratitude for the work that you have done and the cooperation we have enjoyed over the last six years.

Kind regards,

Alvaro Gil-Robles
Commissioner for Human Rights


Oleg Orlov, Director, “Memorial” Human Rights Centre
Yuri Dzhibladze, President, Centre for the Development of Democracy and
Human Rights
Ludmila Alexeeva, Chair, Moscow Helsinki Group
Svetlana Gannushkina, Director, “Civic Assistance” Committee, member of the
Board, “Memorial” Human Rights Centre
Alexander Auzan, Chair of the Board, Institute of National Project “Social
Contract”
Tatiana Lokshina, Chair of the Board, “Demos” Centre
Arseny Roginsky, Chair of the Board, International Human Rights, Historical
and Educational
Society “Memorial”
Natalya Taubina, Director, “Public Verdict” Foundation
Svyatoslav Zabelin, Chair of the Board, Socio-Ecological Union
Alexey Simonov, President, Glasnost Defence Foundation

__________________________________________
Joachim Frank, Project Coordinator
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights
Wickenburggasse 14/7
A-1080 Vienna
Tel. +43-1-408 88 22 ext. 22
Fax: +43-1-408 88 22 ext. 50
Web: http://www.ihf-hr.org
______________________________________

Today's summary by RFE/RL's Newsline of current developments in Russian government foreign policy and thinking on democracy leaves little room for doubt as to where Moscow's attitude to the countries of the West is headed:

RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER WANTS UN TO LEAD ANTITERROR FRONT... Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov told an international security conference in Munich on 5 February that there is an urgent need for an international front against international terrorism under the aegis of the United Nations, RFE/RL reported. Ivanov said such an organization should press the international community and individual countries to remove loopholes in international law and domestic legislation that allow terrorists and their allies to operate. He said the UN should also eliminate what he called double standards in evaluating the terrorist threat, arguing that attacks on military forces in Iraq are defined as terrorism while similar actions by militants in Russia are frequently presented as a struggle by the Chechen people for freedom and independence. Ivanov also criticized Western governments for delaying ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Western countries are reluctant to ratify the treaty until Russia withdraws all its military forces from Georgia and Moldova's breakaway Transdniester region. PM

...WHILE BEING VAGUE ON NATO... Defense Minister Ivanov said in Munich on 5 February that Russia has no plans to join NATO at present, Interfax reported. "Russia is not thinking about applying for NATO membership.... [Russia is] a Eurasian state, which develops relations with China, India, Korea, and other countries in that region," he noted. Ivanov argued that future relations between his country and the Atlantic alliance, if it expands further to the east, "will depend on the future image of NATO. If the alliance remains a purely military organization, it will pose a certain threat to Russia." PM

...AND CALLING FOR TALKS WITH IRAN. Russia continues to favor a diplomatic approach to dealing with Iran, Defense Minister Ivanov said in Munich on 5 February, arguing that "nothing beats the IAEA mechanism," Russian news agencies reported. He argued that it nonetheless would be "a very bad sign" if international inspectors were expelled from the country. "Iran is our neighbor, and we are not interested in aggravating the situation in that region, which is already explosive," Ivanov stressed. When asked by the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" whether he agrees with U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's observation that Iran is the foremost sponsor of terrorism, Ivanov replied that this is a matter for debate. He argued that it was not Iranian nationals who carried out the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and that Iran does not sponsor "terrorist activities" in Chechnya, as some other, unnamed countries in the Middle and Near East do. Meanwhile, unnamed sources close to Russian-Iranian negotiations told Interfax in Moscow that Federal Atomic Energy Agency head Sergei Kiriyenko will visit Iran in late February. An Iranian delegation is expected in Moscow on February 16 to discuss Russia's uranium-enrichment proposal. PM

IVANOV PRAISES LUKASHENKA... Defense Minister Ivanov said in Munich on 5 February that he has no doubt that Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka will win reelection in the upcoming vote, Interfax reported. "Does anybody doubt...that [Lukashenka] is the most popular candidate for president in Belarus? This is a fact, like it or not. I am convinced that he will win." Asked if unrest is a possibility in connection with the Belarusian vote, Ivanov replied: "We should do all we can so that this does not happen. This is important." He added that Russia "will react negatively, of course," in case of unrest. PM

Garrison Keillor, on professionalism in musical life.

Sometimes she grits her teeth. The trumpets were bad, or the baritone dropped a wine glass on the stage, and it rolled into the pit and almost creamed the harpist. Often she has something pithy to say about the conductor or the soloist. If she says, "I thought he was very unprofessional," it's a real slap. A famous soloist who is haughty towards the commoners backstage -- that's unprofessional -- it's just not done! A conductor who glares at someone who just played a bad note -- unprofessional! Worse than the bad note. Orchestra professionalism is a world apart from mine prizes attitude and a rakish hat, and star quality, and interesting underwear. And this concept of professional(alism), prizes ensemble playing, and precision, and a sort of selflessness -- and this concept of professionalism can be expressed in certain principles. You won't find this list posted backstage, but, my wife tells me, that's because everybody knows this stuff right out of music school.

(Via Andrew Homzy)

In the current issue of Melbay's FiddleSessions bimonthly webzine, Anthony Barnett has the first in a three-part series of articles on "Electric Violins and Jazz Violinists 1930s-50s". The article contains many fascinating details of early amplification and amplified string instruments, particularly as used by the great Black jazz violinist Stuff Smith, and there is also speculation on the identity of a certain A. Baux of Toulon.

It's a highway, mmm mmm mmm mmm mm
Its' a highway to heaven yeah, and oh but none can walk up there
None but the pure, the pure in heart, yes

It's a highway (highway)...
It's an uphill journey, but I'm walking
I'm walking up the Kings's ... (highway, highway)
And I'm walkin... (walkin, walkin, I'm walkin)
Oho oh oh oh oh yeah
I'm walkin up the King's Highway... Yes

You see the reason why we sings this song
Cause we know how it is to cry all night long
And still not see the light of day
But we won't give up up now (Oh No)
Til' we receive our crown
But it's a highway (highway, ooh, ooh, ooh, ooh, ooh, ooh, ooh)
And I'm walking up the King's highway (highway, highway)
And I'm walkin'

Wakin, walkin.. I'm walkin...
Movin, movin.. I'm movin
Pressin, Pressin.. I'm....

Chorus
Walking up the King's highway

-------------------------
Trinitee 5:7

Masha Gessen has a moving and thought-provoking piece on her blog (and in the Moscow Times) about her 8-year-old son, the Russian conscription laws, and Russian army hazing rituals.

RFE/RL's Newsline (February 3) on the apparently imminent Russia-Ukraine gas deal:

KYIV CLAIMS TO HAVE SECURED GAS PRICE FOR FIVE YEARS... Naftohaz Ukrayiny and the Swiss-based RosUkrEnergo on 2 February signed an accord on creating a joint venture to sell gas in Ukraine, as they were obliged to do under a framework agreement concluded between them and Gazprom on 4 January (see "RFE/RL Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova Report," 10 January 2006), Interfax-Ukraine reported. The joint venture, named UkrGazEnergo, has a charter capital of 5 million hryvnyas ($1 million) with stakes shared evenly between its founders. Naftohaz Ukrayiny spokesman Eduard Zanyuk told journalists in Kyiv that neither gas-storage facilities nor gas pipelines in Ukraine will be included in UkrGazEnergo's charter fund. He also revealed that RosUkrEnergo and UkrGazEnergo signed a five-year contract on gas supplies to Ukraine. Under the contract Ukraine is to receive 34 billion cubic meters of gas in 2006 and some 60 billion cubic meters annually in 2007-10. "The gas price defined in this contract is fixed for five years and is $95 for 1,000 cubic meters," Zanyuk noted. RosUkrEnergo's managers, Konstantin Chuichenko and Oleg Palchikov, who attended the news conference along with Zanyuk, refused to answer questions from journalists and reportedly left the conference room to continue talks with Naftohaz Ukrayiny. JM

...BUT GAS TRADER CASTS SOME DOUBT. RosUkrEnergo executive director Konstantin Chuichenko told Interfax-Ukraine in Kyiv on 2 February that his company may revise the price of gas supplies to Ukraine under the contract it signed with UkrGazEnergo earlier the same day. "The price may be changed -- it depends on the price of Russian gas for RosUkrEnergo," Chuichenko said. "There is a procedure [for changing the price] written down in the contract, and it is a typical procedure in international contacts of such a type," he added. Another RosUkrEnergo manager, Ivan Palchikov, told Interfax-Ukraine that there is no "price formula" in the gas contract signed with UkrGazEnergo. According to Palchikov, the effective gas price for Ukraine will depend on the price of Central Asian gas in the total gas volume supplied to the country. Meanwhile, Andriy Halushchak from the UkrGazEnergo supervisory board, told Interfax-Ukraine that the contract includes no "mean tricks" regarding the gas price. "If one side wants to change the price, it proposes to conclude a relevant agreement to the other side. If both sides cannot agree on this, they resort to court," Halushchak explained. JM

In EDM, Vladimir Socor notes Moscow's change of tactics in its efforts to undermine the achievements of Ukraine's Orange Revolution. Since the clumsy and adversarial "gas war" did not work, the Kremlin is now trying to influence and co-opt Ukrainian power structures from within instead:

From the Kremlin's standpoint, the crisis of governance in Ukraine opens a strategic opportunity to roll back the Orange Revolution's democratic gains and re-assert Russia's economic and political influence in the country. While advancing that strategic goal in the run up to the March parliamentary elections in Ukraine, Moscow has changed its tactics in mid-stream.

Initially, Moscow envisaged a prolonged cutoff in gas supplies. This was to hit hard at Ukraine's economy, discredit President Viktor Yushchenko and his Our Ukraine bloc irreparably with the electorate, turn Europe against Ukraine by charging that Kyiv was "stealing" Europe's gas from the transit pipelines, and set the stage for transferring those pipelines from Ukrainian to shared Russian-Ukrainian jurisdiction. Kremlin-controlled media and the officially licensed punditry laid those goals bare and rejoiced in anticipation of the "punishment" to Yushchenko's team at the parliamentary elections.

Those tactics changed markedly, however, on the advice of several Kremlin consultants, preeminently Gleb Pavlovsky, Sergei Markov, and Vyacheslav Nikonov. Although these consultants were partly responsible for the defeat of Moscow's policy in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, they now argued that policy must not be guided by considerations of revanche or "punishing" Yushchenko. In articles and interviews during late December and January -- and undoubtedly in internal channels to the Kremlin -- they argued that the initial choice of tactics was bound to misfire: Ukrainian voters would blame Russia for excessive price hikes and supply cuts; a rally-around-the-flag syndrome would ensue in Ukraine; Orange political fortunes would be lifted by a second wind from their slump; Ukraine's eastern regions, strongholds of Russia-oriented parties, would be the hardest hit by the "gas attack;" Europe would ultimately side with Ukraine against Russia; and, the longer the confrontation, the higher the political costs to Russia and its allies in Ukraine.

These consultants called for resuming gas supplies to Ukraine at prices fixed in Moscow and working flexibly with several political forces in Ukraine. They anticipate that Yushchenko and Our Ukraine would have to contend with stronger oligarchic and pro-Russia groups in the new parliament. Accordingly, these Kremlin consultants recommended political accommodation with a weakened Yushchenko and using this relationship in the post-election period to advance Russia's objectives in Ukraine. This tactic corresponds with Yushchenko's own attempts to reach out to the Kremlin for support to his embattled presidency.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

Public Statement

AI Index: EUR 46/006/2006 (Public)
News Service No: 031
3 February 2006


Russian Federation: Amnesty International calls for guilty verdict against Stanislav Dmitrievskii to be overturned



Amnesty International is deeply disappointed by today’s conviction of human rights defender Stanislav Dmitrievskii on “race hate” charges, for publishing non-violent articles by Chechen separatist leaders.

Amnesty International considers that the conviction of Stanislav Dmitrievskii is a blow to independent civil society in Russia and will have a stifling effect on the right to freedom of expression. Stanislav Dmitrievskii has been convicted for the peaceful exercise of his right to freedom of expression and should not have faced trial in the first place. Amnesty International considers that the conviction should be quashed.

The Sovietskii district court in Nizhnii Novgorod imposed a two-year suspended sentence and a four-year probationary period on Stanislav Dmitrievskii. During this four-year period, Stanislav Dmitrievskii will have to inform the authorities as to any change of residence or travel plans, and will have to report regularly to the local authorities. Any violation of these conditions or a further criminal conviction could result in him being imprisoned for two years.

Following the verdict, Stanislav Dmitrievskii thanked Amnesty International for the organization’s support and expressed his determination to challenge the court’s decision through the Russian courts and if necessary at the European Court of Human Rights. Reportedly, the prosecution also intends to appeal the verdict. Amnesty International will continue to campaign for justice for Stanislav Dmitrievskii and will monitor closely the progress of the case.

Background

Stanislav Dmitrievskii is Executive Director of the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS) and editor-in-chief of the Pravo-zashchita newspaper (Rights defence, a human rights-oriented newspaper), which is published jointly by RCFS and another Nizhnii Novgorod-based human rights organization. Amnesty International is concerned that the criminal prosecution is a violation of his right to freedom of expression, and seems to be part of a campaign of harassment aimed at closing down the work of the RCFS.

Stanislav Dmitrievskii was convicted for publishing in the April-May 2004 edition of Pravo-zashchita an appeal by the late Chechen separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov to the European Parliament calling for international recognition of the current Chechen conflict as “an act of genocide by the Russian government against the Chechen people”, and an appeal in the March 2004 edition of Pravo-zashchita by Aslan Maskhadov's envoy Akhmed Zakaev to the Russian people not to re-elect President Vladimir Putin. He was convicted under Article 282.2 of the Russian Criminal Code which criminalizes:

"...incitement of hatred or enmity, and likewise demeaning human dignity with regard to indicia of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude towards religion, and likewise affiliation to any social group, committed publicly or with the use of the mass media... and with the use of his professional position."

However, Amnesty International considers that the two articles published do not contain any incitement to hatred or enmity, or any form of violence.

Amnesty International is concerned that such prosecutions have a chilling effect on freedom of expression in Russia and in this case has been part of a wider campaign against the RCFS. For several months, Amnesty International has expressed its concern at an apparent campaign of harassment and prosecution aimed at members of the RCFS, reportedly in response to the organization’s work on human rights.

As well as the criminal prosecution of Stanislav Dmitrievskii, the organization has simultaneously been subjected to legal action by the tax authorities and by the registration department of the Ministry of Justice. At the same time, both Stanislav Dmitrievskii and another staff member, Oksana Chelysheva, have been the subject of threatening leaflets which have been distributed this year in Nizhnii Novgorod, where the organization is based. Oksana Chelysheva is deputy Executive Director of the RCFS, editor of the Russian Chechen Information Agency, and editor of the Pravo-zashchita newspaper. The leaflets have accused the human rights defenders of being “traitors” and supporters of “terrorists”. Police investigations into the leaflets have been opened but no one responsible has yet been identified.


(via IHF)

Andrei Illarionov, who last month resigned as an economic advisor to Vladimir Putin in protest at government policies, had an interesting article in the International Herald Tribune on January 25.

From just one section of Illarionov's commentary and analysis:

It is not only economic freedom that has left Russia. Political freedom is also gone. Political prisoners are back. The international organization "Freedom House," which monitors political and civil freedoms in 150 countries, reported a qualitative change in 2005: Russia moved from the group of "partly free" countries to the "not free" group. Others in the group are Rwanda, Sudan, Afghanistan.

"Corporatism" plays a central role in civil society as well. Freezing normal political life has eliminated the social structures that identify, formulate and protect the political interests of the public. Instead, society is structured along different interests - professional, religious, regional.

The corporate ideology may seem unclear at first glance. It does not look communist, or liberal, or socialist, or nationalistic, or imperial. But it does exist: It is an ideology of "nash-ism" - "ours-ism." It is an ideology of offering privileges, subsidies, credits, powers and authority to those who are "nashy," "ours."

It is handing out all sorts of state-owned and national resources to members of the corporation, both current and prospective. "Ours-ism" is an ideology of protecting "our own" not because they're right, but because they're "ours." It is an ideology of aggression to "others." It is a return to barbarism.

"Ours-ism" does not know national or ethnic boundaries. The former chancellor of a foreign country is made a member of the corporation and becomes "our man in Europe." Meanwhile, a Russian businessman who created a company that brought billions into the national treasury turns out to be an "other" and is exiled to the depths of Siberia.

The entire might of the Russian State is thrown behind "our" members of the corporation, whether this means refusing to transit Kazakhstan oil to Lithuania, switching off electricity to Moldova or waging a "gas war" against Ukraine. Russian imperialism has taken a distinctly corporate image.

The point of the new model is to redistribute resources to "our own." The rule of law is only for civilized countries. Fair business practices are only for countries that want to catch up with the developed world. Good relations with foreign neighbors are necessary only if Russia is interested in long-term development. The corporation has other goals.

What's wrong with that? What is so awful if state corporations become the driving force of the economy? If private companies carry out the wishes of the government? If the authorities inflate the non-market sector, strengthen state controls, set restrictions for "strategic" reasons? If state capitalism displaces a market economy? If the primacy of law and equality before law are absent, and inequality and discrimination triumph?

Is it only in Russia that this model exists?

Is it really not viable?

Yes, there are other countries like this. Libya and Venezuela, Angola and Chad, Iran and Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq. Russia is one of them now.

And yes, this politico-economic model can last for quite some time. In some OPEC countries it has survived for a third of a century; in Venezuela, for half a century. It can survive even without high prices for energy. Cuba and South Korea have even more impressive models, and that without any energy resources. There was also the Soviet political, economic and social model.

So from a historical point of view, there's nothing particularly novel about the new Russian model. This country and this nation can take a lot. The current model can last a long time.

There's just one thing. Choosing this model today, at the outset of the 21st century, is nothing other than deliberately choosing the third-world model. More precisely, the model of a very specific group in the third world, whose long-term prospects are well known, no matter how much money they get from oil, no matter how many pipelines they control at home and abroad, and no matter what saccharine stories they tell on TV.

The current politico-economic model of Russian development is a historical dead end. No country that has set off on this road has become richer or stronger or more developed. Nor will Russia. It will fall farther behind. And the price will be paid, as usual, by Russian citizens.

Hat tip: BH

Via Joachim Frank,
Project Coordinator
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights
Wickenburggasse 14/7A-1080 Vienna
Tel. +43-1-408 88 22 ext. 22
Fax: +43-1-408 88 22 ext. 50
Web: http://www.ihf-hr.org/


A Fair Trial for Stas Dmitrievsky?

Trial against Russian-Chechen Friendship Society Head Stas Dmitrievsky - Prosecutor Demands a Four Years Colony-Settlement Term

Vienna, 2 February 2006. The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) is concerned about apparent restrictions on the independence of the court in the criminal trial against Stas Dmitrievsky, Executive Manager of the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS), which suggest that the trial is mainly political. The Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor of the Nizhny Novgorod region founded their accusation on a shallow expert opinion, while an alternative opinion was rejected by the court; put the judge under pressure; and committed numerous other breaches of the law during the investigation and indictment.

It is expected that the court session in Nizhny Novgorod on Friday, 3 February 2005 will be the last when the defendant can make his final statements, after which the court will pronounce the sentence on the case.

Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor of the Nizhny Novgorod Region Try to Put the Judge under Pressure

A.N. Maslova, deputy prosecutor of the Sovetsky district of Nizhny Novgorod and dealing with the case against Dmitrievsky, in the 18 January 2006 hearing expressed her conviction that, “Dmitrievsky is dangerous for the society … all his actions can be regarded as extremist activities aimed at undermining state security”, and she also referred to “the extremely tense situation in the country when accidents like the recent crime in a Moscow synagogue happen more and more often”, which in her opinion make it necessary that publications like those of the RCFS are inadmissible. She demanded a 4-year colony-settlement term for him.

A week earlier, the prosecutor of Nizhny Novgorod Region, Vladimir Demidov, expressed his certainty both about the conviction of Stas Dmitrievsky and the inevitable term of imprisonment, stating “I am sure that Dmitrievsky will be put to prison and, being on the side that supports the accusation, we are going to press for his criminal responsibility,” further stating “it is important for our multinational society, which supports a positive attitude towards all nationalities, that calls made by bandits inciting to ethnic hatred be not published by newspapers”, pointing out that “we mustn’t allow any attempts to destabilise the situation”.

As this can be regarded as imposing pressure upon the court, contrary to the Guidelines on the role of Prosecutors[i], the lawyers of Dmitrievsky lodged a complaint.

Additionally, the IHF has received credible reports that staff members of the Prosecutors Office are under pressure to make sure that Stas Dmitrievsky is indeed convicted and sentenced to a colony-settlement term. They were summoned to work late hours and informed that should they fail to win the case, some of them would be fired.

Accusation is Founded on a Shallow Expert Opinion, While Alternative Opinion is Rejected by the Court

The accusations are based on an expert opinion of Larisa Teslenko, expert of the Privolzhsky Regional Center of Legal Expertise at the Ministry of Justice, who asserted that Dmitrievsky’s actions were aimed at inciting animosity by taking advantage of his official position. While firmly insisting that the incriminated materials raise racial, national and social enmity “between Russian and Chechens”, Teslenko refused to answer most of the 50 questions raised by the defense, explaining that they were beyond her competence. She refused, for example, to define the terms “race”, “nationality” and “social group”, declaring that on these questions the sociologist, instead of the linguist should answer.

Judge Bondarenko refused to attach an alternative expertise conducted by Galina Vronskaya, senior lecturer at the journalism department of the Chuvash State University and president of the Chuvash Guild of Linguists and stated that the reason was that “it had been carried out not by the court’s request and for money”, and therefore was biased. This expert said that in her estimation the statements by Maskhadov and Zakaev contained no degrading descriptions, negative appraisals or statements in relation to racial, ethnic or social groups or individuals representing them. Additionally, the articles contained factual statements that in themselves cannot be regarded as inciting any hostility unless proven untrue.

In the framework of preparing the grounds for opening a criminal case, on 29 December 2004, the office of Nizhny Novgorod Region’s Prosecutor requested an analysis of RCFS publications from Olga Khokhlysheva, professor at Nizhny Novgorod State University.[ii] The analysis, which was delivered quickly, in January 2005, stated that “the publications in Pravo-zaschita can be regarded as serious violations of the Russian Criminal Code and undermining of the Constitutional order”, also contain xenophobic statements that violate Russian law and humiliate people according to their nationality.[iii] This analysis, predictably, was not used in the criminal proceedings but read during the trial on the demand of the defense.

Prosecutor's Office Committed Numerous Breaches of the Law During the Investigation and the Bringing of Charges

Dmitrievsky's lawyer Leyla Khamzaeva called the attention of the court to numerous breaches of law perpetrated by the prosecutor's office in the process of investigation and bringing charges against him. She pointed out that such cases have always been considered in administrative legal proceedings, not in criminal ones. There is a list of expressions that are regarded to be extremist and if they are published, a media venue receives a warning. The RCFS case started immediately with bringing charges under Article 280 and then under Article 282. The lawyer insists there is a clear breach of legal procedure and that Dmitrievsky has the right to demand that charges against him be considered in administrative legal proceedings.

Ombudsman, Head of Human Rights Council and Human Rights Defenders Reject the Accusation

In a statement from 1 February 2006, the Russian Ombudsman, Vladimir Lukin, and the head the Human Rights Council under the President of the RF, Ella Pamfilova, not only expressed their conviction, that in the incriminated texts there were no appeals to any, including interethnic enmity[iv], but they also criticized the prosecutor’s demand for a 4-year colony term as disproportionate, particularly given the (non-)persecutions of extreme nationalists and ideologists of pogroms.

Ludmilla Alexeyeva, head of the Moscow Helsinki Group commented,
“The case against Stas Dmitrievsky is politically motivated. The real aim of those who are behind the charges against the editor of the anti-war newspaper is to close down an independent source for information on Chechnya. I have known Dmitrievsky for many years as a person who has always defended the right of people to live in peace, and when he encountered among his Chechen acquaintances mistrust against the Russian people as such he was always rejecting accusations of their common responsibility for what happens in Chechnya. Stas always fought for human rights and condemned discrimination on racial or ethnic basis. The Moscow Helsinki Group always supported RCFS activities and often used the information of RCFS about the situation in the republic while drafting its annual reports.”

In a 15 November 2005 statement, Amnesty International declared that they would consider Stas Dmitrievsky to be a prisoner of conscience if imprisoned on these charges.

The IHF agrees with Russian human rights defenders who believe that the government’s assault upon the RCFS shall set a precedent for a wider campaign against civil society. It is especially important in the context of the new NGO law. Yuri Dzhibladze, President of the Center for Development of Democracy and Human Rights, regards the trial as an attack on the human rights movement as a whole, and commented,
“In case Dmitrievsky is convicted and even if the sentence will be suspended, he loses the right to establish an NGO, be a member of a board of any NGO or even simply be a member of an any NGO. Moreover, the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society and Dmitrievsky will face renewed attack in an arbitration process where the tax authorities claim that profit taxes should have been paid for grants received by the RCFS. Finally, foreign donors who supported RCFS (the European Commission and the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, DC) will also be under attack: it will be widely publicized that they were funding not legitimate human rights work but extremist activity. Very much like in the “spy scandal” that happened in Russian last week, the verdict against Dmitrievsky will be used against independent NGOs and their foreign donors. This may have very serious implications for freedom of association in Russia.”

Background:

Particularly since January 2005, the RCFS was subject to a series of different forms of harassment, includingcriminal proceedings against the RCFS. A criminal investigation was conducted originally by the FSB, after it had been commenced by the Prosecutors Office in January 2005, referring to article 280 of the Criminal Code (“public calls to extremist activities”). Later, it was reclassified and transferred to the prosecutor’s office of Nizhny Novgorod Region. On 2 September 2005, Stas Dmitrievsky was officially charged under paragraph b, of part 2 of Article 282 of the Criminal Code (“inciting hatred or enmity on the basis of ethnicity and religion”), offences which carry a maximum penalty of five years in prison, for allowing the re-publication of two appeals by Chechen leaders Aslan Maskhadov and Akhmed Zakaev, in the newspaper Pravo-zashchita (‘Rights Defense’), in March and April 2004, urging the international community to help end the war in Chechnya, and calling on Russians not to vote for Putin and thus help end the conflict.

Simultaneously, starting in March 2005, the Federal Tax Inspectorate commenced an audit of the accounts of the RCFS for the past three years, and in June 2005 issued “order Nr. 25”, claiming that the RCFS has violated the Tax Code and has to pay profit tax and a fine totaling 1.001.561 Rubles (around 28.200 Euro). They claim that foreign grants the RCFS is receiving amount to profit. The RCFS appealed this decision with the arbitration court. This procedure is still ongoing, but the arbitration court complied with the petition of the tax inspection to postpone the consideration of the case until a decision by the criminal court in the case against Dmitrievsky is taken. The tax authorities claim that if Dmitrievsky is found guilty on extremist charges, it will be a proof that the grant money was used for illegal purposes and not according to the grant agreement, and that therefore the money cannot be considered tax-exempt anyway and a profit tax and penalty should be paid. As a result, the organisation may be destroyed. Parallel to these proceedings, in September 2005, the Nizhny Novgorod Department of the Ministry of Interior commenced a criminal case on the basis of the conclusions made by the tax inspection for “evading payment of taxes or dues in a big scale” (Article 199, Part I of the Criminal Code) and interrogated Dmitrievsky and both present and former accountants of the organization.

A third form, the civil action by the Justice Ministry Registration Department to deregister the RCFS, which had begun in April 2005 (after an off-schedule control in February) because of RCFS’s “failure to provide the Federal Registration Service with required documents” (that had to be handed over to the Tax Inspectorate at the same time), stopped after a court turned down this request on 14 November 2005.

The criminal and legal cases are accompanied by campaigns in the media against the organization and its heads, threatening leaflets and phone calls, and an burglary into the flat of Dmitrievsky.

See also:
IHF statement, “Legal Harassment Against the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society – Another Update”, 10 January 2006
IHF statement, “Legal Harassment Against the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society - An Update”, 29 November 2005
IHF statement, “British Lawyer Barred From Entering Russia to monitor trial of the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society in Nizhny Novgorod, 15 November 2005
IHF statement, “The ‘Russian-Chechen Friendship Society’s Under Severe Risk of being Destroyed by Russian Authorities. Its Director Stas Dmitrievsky Faces a Prison Term, 2 November 2005
IHF statement, "Russian Federation: Nizhny Novgorod Authorities Launch Final Crackdown on Russian-Chechen Friendship Society. Today’s Protest Picket Dissolved after Five Minutes – Participants Detained", 2 September 2005.
IHF statement, “Continuing Persecution of the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society. Its Partner Organisation Nizhny Novgorod Human Rights Society Closed Down by Authorities”, 10 June 2005
IHF statement, “We Fear for the Safety of our Colleagues in the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society… Russian Human Rights Organization Threatened”, 19 March 2005
IHF statement, “FSB Raids the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society”, 20 January 2005
For further information:
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights
In Vienna: Aaron Rhodes, IHF Executive Director, +43-1-408 88 22 or +43 -676-635 66 12; Henriette Schroeder, IHF Press Officer, +43-676-725 48 29
In Moscow: Tanya Lokshina, +7 -916-624 19 06
Russian-Chechen Friendship Society, Stas Dmitrievsky, Oksana Chelysheva, +7-8312-171 666

Endnotes:

[i] These guidelines were adopted by the 8th United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in Cuba (1999), and state that “in the performance of their duties, prosecutors shall “perform their duties fairly, consistently”, “carry out their function impartially”, and “act with objectivity, take proper account of the position of the suspect and the victim, and pay attention to all relevant circumstances, irrespective of whether they are to the advantage or disadvantage of the suspect”.
[ii] This request from 29.12.2004 was signed by the prosecutor with the department on protecting constitutional rights and freedoms at the prosecutor’s office A.V. Malyugin and bears the № 7/2-31-04.
[iii] It casts her doubts on the existence of the Chechen, Jewish and Arab nations, justifies the deportation of the Chechen people in 1944 on Stalin’s orders by “the historic circumstances and the objective necessity that had emerged by that time”. Therefore, these conclusions contradict with the Russian Law “On Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples” from 1991 according to which Stalin’s repressive acts against different peoples of Russia, including their deportation, were “unlawful and criminal” (Article 1). The law also defines these acts as cases of genocide (Article 2) and establishes criminal responsibility “for agitation and propaganda aimed at preventing from rehabilitation of the repressed peoples” as well as for inciting to such actions (Article 4).
[iv] At the same time they said that it did contain a not always adequate judgment of the actions of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus.

__________________
Endnotes:

[1] These guidelines were adopted by the 8th United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in Cuba (1999), and state that “in the performance of their duties, prosecutors shall “perform their duties fairly, consistently”, “carry out their function impartially”, and “act with objectivity, take proper account of the position of the suspect and the victim, and pay attention to all relevant circumstances, irrespective of whether they are to the advantage or disadvantage of the suspect”.
[1] This request from 29.12.2004 was signed by the prosecutor with the department on protecting constitutional rights and freedoms at the prosecutor’s office A.V. Malyugin and bears the № 7/2-31-04.
[1] It casts her doubts on the existence of the Chechen, Jewish and Arab nations, justifies the deportation of the Chechen people in 1944 on Stalin’s orders by “the historic circumstances and the objective necessity that had emerged by that time”. Therefore, these conclusions contradict with the Russian Law “On Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples” from 1991 according to which Stalin’s repressive acts against different peoples of Russia, including their deportation, were “unlawful and criminal” (Article 1). The law also defines these acts as cases of genocide (Article 2) and establishes criminal responsibility “for agitation and propaganda aimed at preventing from rehabilitation of the repressed peoples” as well as for inciting to such actions (Article 4).
[1] At the same time they said that it did contain a not always adequate judgment of the actions of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus.

Behind-the-scenes negotiations that have lasted for years are probably about to be resolved in a new deal on the future status of Kosovo. Britain, France and the United States - the international powers with a direct interest in the issue - have reached a partial consensus on the need to grant Kosovo "conditional independence". This would separate it from Serbia and Montenegro, but also make it possible for an international mission to supervise the country's fledgling status.

Moscow, however, regards Serbia (in its eyes, head of the "Serb Federation") as a political ally, and has had other plans for Kosovo. The British, French and U.S. deal is not the one that Moscow wanted, but Moscow still sees a way to impose its will via a quid pro quo arrangement that would validate its imperial ambitions in parts of the former Soviet Union. As Vladimir Putin began to hint at his marathon press conference yesterday, in return for agreeing to grant full independence to Kosovo, Moscow might ask in return that the countries of the West recognize the independence of pro-Moscow republics such as those of Abkhazia or South Ossetia, thus putting further pressure on Georgia.

Interviewed by RFE/RL, Economist commentator Edward Lucas has some observations that reach to the central point of this dubious search by the Kremlin for "universal principles" for solving frozen conflicts:

"There's two conflicting principles here, of self-determination and territorial integrity. But I think the key thing is that there is no one outside power that is backing Kosovo," Lucas said. "Kosovo is not the client of a powerful neighboring state the way that Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniester are. So I think the first thing we would have to say if one were trying to find a common standard would be that no neighboring country should exercise a big unilateral blockade or support for one of these frozen conflicts and that, of course, would put Russia in a very difficult position."

Russia might also find itself treading on very thin ice. The principle of self-determination in particular cuts both ways. "And there's also Chechnya," Lucas said. "If you accept that there's the right to self-determination, or at least that it has to be taken into account, and one doesn't only deal with inviolable territorial integrity, then it does of course raise the question of Chechnya now and, perhaps at some other date in the future, some other bits of Russia that are there more by coincidence that by historical right like, for instance, Karelia or Tatarstan."

I've been reading Joel Glassman's Amplify Your Violin again - it's still the best and most comprehensive study of the subject on the Web, in my opinion. But it's useful to read it now in the light of Chris Howes' recent clinic at the IAJE conference, which was also most informative. I'm particularly interested in the topic of the best use of preamps with acoustic and electric instruments. Having for some time used a Beringer Ultra-DI with a Yamaha SV-200 (Silent Violin), I'm now considering purchasing a Fishman GII, which looks as though it must have more control features. Though the Yamaha has two built-in equalization modes, I'm convinced that it must be possible to improve the signal output by the use of the Fishman.

The whole field of violin amplification in a jazz setting is a thorny one, in my experience. Just plugging the instrument - whether electric or acoustic+piezo pickup - directly into an electric guitar amp is liable to produce a harsh, un-violinistic tone that's really cruel to others! On the other hand, the sound of an electric violin is palpably different from that of an acoustic instrument - the question in the end is probably one of taste.

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THE PRAGUE WATCHDOG WEEKLY NEWSLETTER, No. 5/2006 (January 31)
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1) THE WEEK IN BRIEF (January 23 - January 29)
January 25 - The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution in which it condemned the harsh behaviour of security forces operating in Chechnya, the continuation of human rights abuses, and the passivity of the Committee of Ministers.
January 25 - The Russian-Chechen Information Agency, established by the Nizhny Novgorod-based NGO Society of Russian-Chechen Friendship (ORChD), announced it won the "Free Press of Russia 2006" award granted by the Freedom of Expression Foundation (Norway) and ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius (Germany).
January 26-28 - Some areas of Chechnya, including a part of Grozny, were out of gas due to a large failure on the Aksay-Grozny pipeline near Gudermes.
January 29 - Gas supplies from Russia to Georgia, which were halted by two blasts on the Mozdok-Tbilisi pipeline on January 22 and threw Georgia into a severe energy crisis, resumed.
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2) UPCOMING EVENTS

February 1 - Moscow (Russia): Top representatives of leading Russian NGOs will hold a news conference on how the Russian leadership and authorities attack civil society. The event will take place at 11:30 a.m. at the Independent Press Center (Tverskoi Boulevard 20).

February 3 - Nizhny Novgorod (Russia): The local court will pronounce its verdict on the case of human rights defender and journalist Stanislav Dmitriyevsky, who was accused of inciting ethnic and racial hatred after his paper published Chechen resistance leaders' peace appeals.

For more upcoming Chechnya-related events go to http://www.watchdog.cz/calendar.

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3) SURVEY

Majority of Stavropol residents give negative assessment of work of Stavropolsky Region's governor (by Caucasus Times, January 31)
Results of a survey of residents of Stavropol carried out by the "Caucasus Times" agency. http://www.watchdog.cz/index.php?show=000000-000002-000001-000171&lang=1

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4) POLITICS

PACE's resolution and recommendation on human rights violations in the Chechen Republic (by PACE, January 25)
During the debate on human rights violations in Chechnya at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on January 25, PACE adopted a resolution and a recommendation.
http://www.watchdog.cz/index.php?show=000000-000004-000003-000119&lang=1

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5) SPECIAL EVENT: Support Stanislav Dmitriyevsky!

Join an action in support of a Russian human rights activist and journalist of Nizhny Novgorod who faces four years in prison because of his organization's independent coverage of Chechnya and promotion the idea of peace talks. More at http://www.cjes.ru/actions/action.php?p_id=1&l=en.

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6) LATEST ADDITION TO OUR LINKS LIBRARY:

Nana: http://nana-journal.org/

For more Chechnya-related links go to our Links library ( http://www.blogger.com/ ), which is being continuously updated.

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Prague Watchdog Weekly Newsletter is a publication of Prague Watchdog. If you wish to subscribe (unsubscribe) to it, please send us an e-mail to mail@watchdog.cz. The newsletter is usually sent out on Monday evenings.

Prague Watchdog launched its website in August 2000 and its aim is to collect and disseminate information on the ongoing conflict in Chechnya, focusing on human rights, media coverage, political situation and relief aid.

Visit us at http://www.watchdog.cz/. For the Russian version, go to http://www.watchdog.cz/russian.

Russian Defender Faces Prison: Your Support Needed Now!

On February 3, a Russian court will decide whether human rights activist Stanislav Dmitrievsky committed a crime when he published articles calling for peace in Chechnya. If he is convicted, not only could he face up to five years in prison, but a dangerous precedent will be set for all Russians - including human rights defenders and independent journalists - who exercise their right to question and criticize government policies.

This is a critical moment in Russia as a conviction would have a chilling effect on open public debate nationwide. Please support Mr. Dmitrievsky and take a stand against the further erosion of human rights in Russia.

Recent developments indicate that this trial is part of a concerted campaign against independent organizations in Russia.

Earlier this week, several well-respected human rights groups were falsely accused of accepting money from British secret services (read our statement below). On January 10, President Vladimir Putin signed into effect a harsh new law that gives government agencies power to close non-governmental organizations under vague terms.

Human rights activists in Russia are asking for our support. Please take action and tell a friend about this case.

Click Here to Take Action

Click here to learn more about the case of Stanislav Dmitrievsky

Human Rights First Condemns False Accusations against Russian Human Rights Organizations


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About Rescue Chechnya

The Canadian Committee for Peace in Chechnya aims to create a broad base of members with diverse backgrounds; no special knowledge about Chechnya or experience of any sort are required.

You can get involved as much as you want, from simply receiving our email updates to signing petitions, from learning about Chechnya to organizing events and fundraisers, starting a local group. We believe that our strength lies in numbers, especially when it comes to influencing government decision-making related to Chechnya.

Website: http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=6qg6lsbab.0.thu6lsbab.8ipwlsbab.5&p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rescuechechnya.com

Today Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, held a very lengthy press conference at which he presented himself as a friend to all the world, championing democracy, free markets, Chechens, Poland, Georgia - the list goes on and on. AFP's correspondent notes that

He heralded the "freedom" enjoyed by Russians since the end of the Soviet Union. He vowed to "guarantee the independence of the press." He also promised to support non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as a "control on the activities of the state."

He even told an anecdote that involved joking "with my Chechen friends."

All this from a president under increasing Western attack for what critics see as his campaign to crush civil society and manipulate energy supplies as a weapon against pro-Western ex-Soviet republics such as Ukraine.

Not to mention his record in curtailing independent television reporting or what human rights groups say are mass war crimes in Chechnya.

In the latest expression of Western disillusionment with Putin, the influential British think tank the Foreign Policy Centre questioned Tuesday whether Russia should have been allowed chairmanship this year of the Group of Eight (G8) industrialized democracies, given mounting "authoritarianism."

But Putin, a judo black belt, used his three hours-and-26-minutes meeting with the press to throw his critics.

He flatly denied there was opposition to Russia's G8 role and promised investors spooked by growing state control of Russia's energy sector that renationalization was not on the cards.

(via chechnya-sl)

He also began to effect major changes in the working conditions for black musicians. It was a common practice, heretofore, for the large hotels and restaurants in the city and by out-of-town resorts like the Poinciana Hotel in Palm Beach not to pay black musicians and singers for their services directly. As Tom Fletcher remembered it, they would be hired for some menial job, like dishwasher or floor sweeper, with the expectation that they also perform for the guests for tips. Europe began to require the employers of Clef Club musicians to pay them a fixed salary and to include nothing other than entertaining in their duties. Moreover, if an engagement were out of the city, then the musicians were to receive their salaries plus transportation, room, and board. To increase name recognition, he also encouraged club members who had their own established combinations to bill themselves as "So-and-So and his Clef Club Orchestra and Entertainers." A standard dress code was instituted stipulating tuxedos for engagements booked in advance and dark suits, white shirts, and bow ties for pick-up dates. "No one is sent on a job if not dressed correctly," Fletcher recalled. By the early spring of 1911, Europe was leading a Clef Club dance orchestra himself.

From A Life in Ragtime: A Biography of James Reese Europe, by Reid Badger, Oxford, 1995.