Ukraine: Revolution, Phase 2

In Yezhednevnyi Zhurnal, Yevgenia Albats takes a calm view of the recent governmental split in Ukraine, seeing it as a stage of normal development in a fledgling democracy, and she has some words of caution for those in the Russian Federation – particularly those around President Putin – who show signs of jumping to hasty conclusions:

The delight of the Kremlin and near-Kremlin technologists concerning the political crisis in Ukraine is so frank ("The revolution is at an end!"), so childishly direct (I imagine they were drunk with joy in the Kremlin offices), that one sincerely wants to warn the comrades, so that their subsequent disappointments will not prove to be as painfully unexpected as was the case with candidate Yanukovich. No, it’s not the end, but only the beginning of the transformation of the regime. No, the "Orange Revolution" - as a rejection of the previous system of government – has not died, but has merely passed from the phase of street demonstrations to a phase that is fundamentally more important (although no less problematic) - the phase of the institutional building of the new state and the new country. The risks are enormous, but there is hope that the deadlock can be overcome.

Even if Timoshenko wins the 2006 elections, Albats writes, it will not be a disaster, and the potential of the situation will not be essentially changed:

First, both Timoshenko and Yushchenko – for the present, at any rate - adhere to a common aim: entry to the European Union and the formation of a democratic regime in Ukraine. Rejection of this aim for Timoshenko will indicate an unequal romance with the Kremlin, which for a whole series reasons, including personal ones, is not without its dangers for her. To say nothing of the fact that Maidan, which for the most part still supports Timoshenko, will not forgive her for it: the memory of the fact that it was the street that did not permit the falsification of the elections – that memory will not quickly be erased.

In the second place, having obtained a parliamentary majority and become prime minister, her populism will subside a little: among other things, the state of the energy market will not permit it. What we are seeing just now are victories for her, and defeats for Yushchenko. In a parliamentary republic the responsibility rests on the prime minister, and a decrease in economic growth accompanied by inflation are the inevitable consequences of populism.

Thirdly, no matter who wins the election, the Ukraine will in any event win, since after losing, both Yushchenko and Timoshenko will be able to form a strong opposition, which - for the sake of victory in future elections - will check each step of the bureaucracy and each kopeck of state expenditure. Evidence for this is the experience of the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe, above all Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic, where governments have been changed like gloves, something which, with the obvious risks, has finally contributed to shaping a consolidated democracy in those countries. While in those countries where approximately the same officials have remained in authority - and so it has been in many countries of the CIS, including Russia – everything has moved and is moving in the opposite direction.